TOWARD A THEORY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Charles F. Hawkins

1. Introduction

These words of Stonewall Jackson describe ultimately what a military leader must do, or be prepared to do, and that is to fight. Nothing else, when it comes right down to it, matters. The ability to prepare or get ready to fight, skill in actual fighting, and the will to prevail in combat against a foe, are the critical dimensions of leadership. This must hold as true for the general as it does the private, the ordinary seaman, logistician or finance clerk. 2

A common understanding of leadership is an important element of the overall theory of military conflict. Ideally, a theory of military leadership would be important in other ways, such as providing expectations (predictions) of leader performance under various conditions, or selection criteria for candidates for specific leadership positions.

Although leadership is not exclusively in the military domain, it is an especially critical aspect of it. The reasons this is so are obvious. Without leadership, even poor leadership, military operations would not be distinguished from the actions of a mob or crowd.

Developing a theory of military leadership is a daunting challenge. It must be accepted that a comprehensive set of principles and beliefs is not yet possible, or may never be possible. This makes beginning the chore all the more necessary. The guiding developmental principles are simplicity and first-order effects. Later research and analysis can add detail, perhaps showing cause and effect relationships.

This chapter proceeds with the following sections: a discussion of theory development that accords with The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) understanding; an examination of military leadership, including the twin of leadership, command, and the fighting environment; a rationale for theoretical analysis; and presentation of a tentative leadership model.

2. Theory Development

What is theory? Theory is the symbolic dimension of experience. It mediates between experience and thought. In the words of philosopher George Santayana,

It is worth a moment to look at theory development. These charts show the inductive steps in theory development, and an example¾ development of a theory of gravity. 4

The example (above) serves to remind that history is indeed relevant to theory development, i.e., the data from the heavens that greets us light years after the fact of occurrence of an event; and that even though the information may be available, it is impractical to collect it all, so a relatively small data sample must often suffice.

On the other hand, many past events are heavily leveraged by present-day perceptions of the viewer and the bias and interpretation of the recorder. This can be particularly true of "softer," more subjective information. "History," some folks say, "ain't what it used to be, and never was." This means that a deductive approach is an equally valid way to proceed.

There has been much discussion and some good papers presented regarding what theory is and how theories are developed. Therefore, a detailed discussion here would not illuminate the matter any better, if at all.

Regarding development of a theory of military leadership, it is safe to say that the phenomenon has been identified and that collection and codification of some knowledge has occurred. A rough set of expectations has been developed. That is, we expect military leaders to prepare for and act successfully in violent military conflict. It is difficult to go much beyond these rough abstractions, however. More detailed expectations about military leadership begin to divide along cultural, geographic and even time lines.

For example, in the United States today, we would not expect a brigade or division commander to go into battle at the head of his men, although we expect him to become personally involved in combat to lead his men if the need arises. During the American Civil War, Grant was often at the front, but usually took care to stay out of range of small arms and cannon. By contrast, subordinate Union commanders were regularly at the head of their attacking formations, or at the most dangerous place in a defensive line. For Alexander the Great, it would have been unthinkable for him to be anywhere but at the van of his army for any battle. The cultural ethos of Macedonia at the time was such that he would have lost his throne had he done otherwise. 5

Despite apparent differences in leadership expectations across time and space, it is likely that additional common expressions of expectations can be developed. This is one of the elements that must be examined in future research.

Theory should be comprehensive and must be coherent, and at the same time it should also be simple. Theory must explain practice. Since military conflict is an extremely complex domain, one that is neither art nor science but an amalgam of the two, it might be expected that any comprehensive theory of military leadership would be complex instead of simple. Future research might be based on a general guide: it is better to get something about right (with less detail), than to get it precisely wrong (with so much detail that the object is lost).

Ideally, theory will provide cause and effect relationships. However, initial research may only show associations of factors, and fail to adequately explain the underlying relationship. For practical purposes, theory must explain practice in terms of outcomes; interwoven processes can be investigated once a general set of principles has been established.

Although military conflict dates back as far as 5,000 years, there has been little scientific analysis of quantitative, objective data. Early statistical records of battles date to about 1600. 6 However, most of the recorded work on military conflict and military leadership is qualitative and subjective. This is not necessarily bad, for subjective analysis can help to explain cause and effect relationships, but it is less helpful in support of scientific examinations of the phenomena.

Scientific approaches to developing leadership theory can rely on four things: data from the historical record (that is, data of "real" experiences); the knowledge of experts (be they military leaders, analysts or historians); rational thought; and experimentation. For research regarding military conflict it is impractical to conduct experimental wars. For a theory of military leadership, however, the situation is somewhat modified. Military leaders perform in peacetime as well as in war, and their peacetime performance can be more easily assessed and evaluated; then, it could be compared to wartime performance, and a set of performance criteria established. This thought is hardly a new one, but it can (and should) be the basis for more scientific investigation in the future.

The recent advent of (Western) military professionalism over the past 200 years is a hopeful sign. Combined with advances in technology, particularly communication and computer technology, professional militaries have a good capability to capture, record and store data relevant to scientific examinations of military conflict. Although we may be slow to catch on, we should begin to capitalize on this source of information for future analysis.

3. Military Leadership

Leadership has been described simply as "the process of influencing others" 7 It is probably correct to say that leadership has been a feature of all cultures throughout history. It has certainly been an indispensable quality in all cultures that have survived and flourished. Despite its ubiquitous nature, however, a full understanding of leadership remains elusive.

Military leadership is defined as "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for organizational success to accomplish missions effectively." 8 In general, junior leaders exercise their influence directly, while senior leaders must employ both direct and indirect influencing methods.

Although this definition is an abstraction, closer examination helps discover some important aspects of military leadership. Influence can be direct (i.e., personal contact) or indirect (i.e., sending orders down the chain of command, regulations, standing operating procedures). Leadership must focus on an object, or mission. The process of leading relies on creating conditions so that an organization may function. With the exception of the term "mission," which has military connotations, the definition of leadership could apply equally to business and industrial leadership and to political leadership.

It should be noted that whoever coined the foregoing definition did so by relying on a base of knowledge and by applying reasoning to some sort of theoretical construct, whether they realized it or not.

Military leadership is not new, nor are models relating to it. There are macro and micro models of leadership. It is taught in schools. It is codified in manuals. Officer and noncommissioned officer efficiency reports are, in themselves, a set of leadership expectations. "Fit the OER model," one is told, "and you'll do well."

Why, then, is there a need for a theory of military leadership? Doesn’t one already exist?

The answer is "Yes," or practically so, at least for specific militaries of various countries. The problem is that an overall theory of military leadership is desirable, rather than nation-specific theories or models. In addition, theory should explain bad as well as good behavior.

The body of knowledge that exists, that forms the basis for courses on leadership and evaluations of leader performance, provides an invaluable point of departure for developing and expressing a theory of military leadership that should be universally applicable. Whether it will prove correct or not, many of the constructs that currently exist in leadership course literature in the United States have been applied in this work, as we shall see.

Because it took many centuries of observation of celestial bodies in order to develop the first geocentric theories of planetary motion about 150 A.D., and because it took 1,300 years for Ptolemy=s ideas to be proved incorrect and be replaced by heliocentric theories of Copernicus, it would be outrageous conceit to suggest that a comprehensive theory of military leadership could be developed from the comparatively scant data available and observable patterns, especially after only 200 years or so of professional military experience in the West. 9

Yet there have been volumes upon volumes written on the subject of military leadership. How, then, can there be scant data available? Two acknowledged experts on military leadership provide some insight.

Retired Army Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., argued in 1986 that "we have missed the mark in developing a useful model which translates differing situational variables into a reasonably reliable prescription for leader action." General Ulmer cites the analytical disregard of two key variables in the leadership effectiveness formula: skill and motivation of both leaders and followers. 10

More recently, TMCI member Dr. Jim Tritten provided a Navy perspective in Navy Combat Leadership for Tomorrow: Where Will We Get Such Men and Women? Tritten acknowledges problems with existing leadership studies and source materials, stating that "Navy leadership efforts generally lack serious scholarly consideration of combat leadership in a comprehensive and scientific manner." He explains that existing material is largely "anecdotal in nature, lacking the rigor of scientific analysis associated with other disciplines." 11

To these I add my own observation that the Army seems reluctant to use what "hard" data are available at combat training centers (CTC) to assess leader (or other) performance. Unit rotations, usually battalion or brigade task forces, at places like the National Training Center (NTC) are for "training only," not for unit or leadership evaluations. Observer/controllers at these installations and in wargame exercises, for example, are very quick to point out that their role is not to evaluate, but to observe and assist. Yet there are data collected and organized in electronic data bases that could be useful in a wide range of analyses. 12

In addition, to even the most casual observer, the experience of military leadership must appear so broad, so encompassing of practically every facet of human nature and of diverse cultural elements, that it defies theoretical pigeonholing. Yet it is precisely because military leadership is so diverse and complex that theory provides the necessary, indeed, the only means to discern patterns or relationships among discrete, seemingly unconnected entities or events. Theory helps us to understand what we have not experienced or cannot experience.

Ideally, at its most extreme, military conflict produces a condition of absolute violence. This is the environment in which a military leader must function, or in which he must be prepared to function. For a theory of military leadership to be useful, it must explain leader performance under these conditions.

At this extreme end of military conflict, leaders and subordinates are bounded by contrasting positions on the battlefield. At one end is the front line, where mostly junior leaders and soldiers face direct enemy action. At the other end is the rear echelon, where senior leaders and commanders and their staffs, largely removed from the fear and physical unpleasantness of combat, perform vital operational and strategic functions.

By looking at these "extremes within an extreme," if you will, it is possible to see some of the more and less important influences on a commander, and the elements of human behavior and enemy action that must be considered. The following figure is illustrative.

At the Front	In the Rear
Physical: relatively simple, but demands strength, courage, control	Physical: complex, multiple systems, demands stamina, vision, synchronization
Emotional: highly complex, very stressful; fear, lethality, immediacy of threat	Emotional: complex, orderly, less stressful; not so fearful or lethal, threat less immediate
Rules: simple fire logic, basic tasks and orders	Rules: many, complex, advanced tasks
Orientation: individual, technical and tactical; three-dimensional	Orientation: some tactical, mostly operational and strategic; four-dimensional
Communications: mostly verbal, simple, but hard to do because of noise, distance, terrain, vegetation	Communications: written, verbal and data, complex, multiple systems, relatively quiet, technology-assisted
Leadership: direct (and some indirect) influence over a few (sections, squads, crews)	Leadership: direct influence over a few, indirect influence over many (brigades, divisions)

Leadership theory must account for leader behavior in these two contrasting (but not opposite) dimensions of the battlefield. In addition, to be comprehensive, theory must help bridge the gap between the two. For example, where on the spectrum do company or battalion command posts fit in?

Some good research has been done to unravel the factors and relationships of military conflict at levels from individual to army group. Other than the conventional wisdom that leadership is a combat multiplier, however, there has been little explicit representation of it in models or simulations of combat. Neither has there been much done to connect the two ends in a coherent way. 13

Some work that may have relevance to leadership theory is represented by the work of Trevor Dupuy and the Historical Evaluation & Research Organization. Dupuy's (and other’s) work to develop and refine the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM), a force-on-force model of air supported land combat, shows reasonable and believable results for brigade- through army-level engagements and battles. 14

Research conducted at Los Alamos in 1987 developed a model and computer code representing small unit (platoon-sized) combat. This work recognized that the "behavior of a group of people depends strongly on the interaction of personal (individual) traits with the collective moods of the group as a whole." Investigation covered such psychological properties as feat, excitement, peer pressure, moral outrage and anger. These were considered along with the distribution among the participants of intrinsic susceptibilities to these emotions. The relative importance of other factors, such as leadership, communications, fire logic, camaraderie, training skill and bravery, was included in the research report and represented in the computer program. 15

These cited works, along with others, provide points of departure for further investigation of military conflict environments and the role of military leaders at different levels.

Military leadership and command are two closely linked elements. It is difficult, if not impossible, to consider one without considering the other. Command and leadership are almost the same, but not quite. For a theory of military conflict to be coherent, supporting theories of command and leadership must integrate into a coherent whole.

This is not a discussion of command theory. That is done quite well by John Brinkerhoff in Chapter X. 16 What this section does is show the relationship of command to leadership that must be accounted for in leadership theory.

Part of the problem of considering command and leadership is that there exist a lot of contemporary and official accounts of what each is, and isn’t. Some of these are good descriptions, but most aren’t. In addition, they are specific to U.S. military culture. Brinkerhoff dispenses with these, and states that command is the:

All members of a military organization have this responsibility to activate combat potential and create combat power to accomplish a mission, therefore, all members, from private to flag rank, are commanders in a sense. Leadership, which is "the primary way that a commander expresses his will to accomplish the mission," is a vector of command.

This is a powerful construct. Will, or will power, is a critical element in overall combat dynamics. When a commander expresses his will to succeed, he is demonstrating leadership. How, then, should leadership and command be differentiated? 18

One way, admittedly simplistic, is by relative position on the battlefield. Leaders are at the front, commanders are somewhere to the rear. Thus, when a commander goes to the front he demonstrates leadership. But commanders can demonstrate their will to succeed in rear areas also, and this is no less leadership.

A better way might be to return to the definitions of command and leadership. Both influence others, directly and indirectly, to accomplish the mission. But the commander’s job is to "activate combat potential to create combat power," whereas the leader’s job is to "apply combat power to succeed in the mission." Therefore, the essence of leadership is action, combined with the will power to continue to act to achieve mission success.

Another way to split the distinction is by metaphor. When someone says, "We will do this," or "You and I will attack that hill," that speaker is a leader. But when the speaker says, "You will do such and so," he is talking as a commander.

This means that leaders are at the front, at least the conceptual front, of the action they are performing. For infantry squad leaders the conceptual front is the front line. For a supply sergeant, the front where his action takes place may be more commonly in a rear area, but it is his front nonetheless and he is measured by his will power to perform successfully.

Command is a full-time responsibility that subsumes leader duties. Leadership is a full-time duty that is influenced by command directives. The commander has to know when to command and when to lead. In this regard, historian John Keegan’s perceptive analysis in The Mask of Command is worth consideration. 19

Keegan looks at four commander-in-chiefs, Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler. He asks the question: AAt the front: Always? Sometimes? Never?@ Alexander was always at the front. Macedonian culture demanded such heroic leadership of a commander. Demanding and unassuming, Wellington frequently was in the line-of-fire of the enemy to influence critical phases of battle. Keegan called his leadership "anti-heroic." Grant, whose armies were dispersed over greater distances, was less often in dangerous front line positions. He influenced actions indirectly rather than directly when it came to fighting. Without slight, Keegan dubs this "unheroic." Hitler was the "false heroic," who never led from the front as commander-in-chief, although he frequently reminded subordinates of his front line duty in the First World War to maintain a heroic image.

Theories of command and leadership must at least account for these styles and behaviors.

4. Theoretical Analysis

Despite the foregoing concerns, it seems possible to come to grips with some first-order elements of military leadership. Uncovering these, perhaps, will help to bound the domain for further analysis. In this regard, Gregory Foster=s work on strategy theory at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces offered some paths to travel, particularly as expressed in a chapter in Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process. 20

This section briefly discusses the basis for understanding leadership theory, including the object of leadership. It offers a paradigm for further research into leadership theory.

Foster’s perceptive analysis reveals an important definitional linkage between leadership and strategy. They are both abstractions. Both deal with a process for making something happen. Strategy provides the mission, leadership provides the influence necessary to achieve the mission.

Although Henry Kissinger called strategy simply the way in which society secures its future, to make the linkage between strategy and leadership clear it is useful to look at the definition provided by the late Henry Eccles, a retired rear admiral, professor and strategist. Strategy, he said, is "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives." 21

So, what do we know about military leadership? That is, what can we say about it that is universally true and that would apparently hold true in the future? To begin, there are at least four things that provide a bedrock for understanding.

First, leadership is a real quality that is based on social interactions and perceptions of leaders and of followers. Military leadership exists, it is not a phase or a chimera, and whether or not it is a natural or acquired ability, it is a human one and can be examined in terms of human relationships.

Second, and perhaps self-evident, is that we believe in the concept of a descriptive theory of leadership.

Third, the essence of leadership is action; it is the implementing mechanism for strategy. Leadership is expressed through value choices that are accompanied by risk; while the goals of the process may be clear, the results are uncertain.

Fourth, there are historical frames of reference that are illuminating and can provide empirical weight to theory; history can also be seductive, and must be used cautiously.

This, we posit, is the foundation of leadership theory. Its four elements apply throughout history and across cultural divides, and will be equally applicable in the future. This foundation is a point of departure for developing constructs necessary to a descriptive¾ although far from comprehensive¾ theory of military leadership.

Ultimately, military leadership must deal with fighting an opposing force, and do this through generation and application of combat power. This is the object that drives military leaders, and it results in a condition of battle signified by both casualties and fear in a lethal environment.

There are many other military objects, of course. Their range can seem daunting, particularly now in the so-called "new era." Militaries have to reckon with roles and missions that often appear far removed from the battlefield. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of military existence remains as it always has: the preservation of national existence and protection of vital interests, and to preserve or achieve this security through war, if necessary, as directed by national, political leaders.

The term "paradigm" has been subject to undisciplined use, but it has come to mean a "fundamental image of the subject matter within a scientific or a field of knowledge. ... it is the broadest unit of consensus within the field, and it serves to differentiate one community (or subcommunity) from another. It defines what should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained." 22

It is necessary to differentiate between closely related fields, in this case military leadership and its fraternal twin, organizational leadership, or between roughly analogous levels in a hierarchy, for example, national political leadership and senior military leadership.

The object of militaries (fighting) is their principle distinguishing feature. For military leadership to achieve that object, three areas and related elements, which rest on top of the theoretical base, should be considered. These are: conceptual leadership, functional leadership and applied leadership.

The conceptual layer provides a framework that not only helps to distinguish military leadership from other forms, but also to distinguish between nations and groups. There are seven pillars to conceptual military leadership:

1. National interests

2. Threats to national interests, vital, major and other

3. Intervention choices (range of roles and missions)

4. Mobilization (manpower and techno-industrial base)

5. Economy

6. Law

7. Perception and perception management

These conceptual elements don’t change rapidly or easily, and are a good basis for historical research of leadership requirements of different nations. The military leadership requirements of Israel, for example, can be shown very clearly using these elements as a guide.

Conceptual military leadership is a latent or inherent quality. It is made viable by those elements that make up functional leadership.

Two key groups compose functional military leadership: core attributes and influencing mechanisms.

Core attributes consist of geography, time, morality and power.

Influencing mechanisms include doctrine (or military thought), organization, technology (or mechanistic systems), conflict (or type of military operation), professionalism and culture.

Functional leadership’s core attributes are relatively stable and are linked closely to vital national interests. Britain’s island-nation status is an example of the core attribute of geography, as is the United States two-ocean geography attended by friendly neighbors north and south. Israel’s geographical condition is quite different in contrast. Core attributes direct the requirement for and focus of military leadership.

The influencing mechanisms are more subject to evolutionary change, and in turn to influence change itself. If we looked at the three influencing mechanisms of doctrine, organization and systems, for example, we will see exactly the elements that make up the so-called "revolution in military affairs," a concept that comes from OSD/Net Assessment in the Pentagon.

The elements of conflict, professionalism and culture provide somewhat a counterpoise to the RMA elements. There is a symbiotic relationship among these, but there is also a friction, a pushing and pulling among them as well.

Some of these qualities of functional leadership deserve further examination.

4.3.2.1. Doctrine

There are two aspects of military thought or doctrine that are significant: rigor and flexibility. The pendulum tends to swing between these too poles, perhaps now (in the U.S.) a bit more inclined toward dogmatic rigor than flexibility. Nonetheless, long established guidelines are still acknowledged that differentiate between the dogmatic and the flexible approach. For example, Horatio Nelson=s guidance before the battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 still serves us well. "But, in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood," he said, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." 23

On the other hand, when the pendulum swings too far toward the flexibility end of doctrine’s arc, it can lead to fragmentation of thought, lack of coherence and misdirection of purpose. Or, in Creighton Abrams’ words: "I have used the word ‘flexibility’ for the last time. It seems that it is a large, general purpose tent under which chaos, confusion and incompetency are kept well hidden from the public." 24

In fact, the occasional paradox between rigor and flexibility in military doctrine gives great strength to its nature and ensures doctrine’s longevity.

4.3.2.2. Organization

The level of a military organization helps to determine leadership emphasis. Organizations are the vehicle for dynamic action on the battlefield, but they tend to retain their concept and structure over time, changing slowly. It took great effort, for example, to modify the Army’s divisional structure from the "square" division of World War I to the "triangular" formations seen in World War II. The following are levels of military organization and their mission orientation. 25

Table 4. Levels of Military Organization and Mission Orientation

By comparing this hierarchy with the contrasting conditions listed in Figure 3, Front Line and Rear Area Characteristics, an organization-condition-action framework suggests itself. This will be helpful to ensure coherence in leadership theory.

4.3.2.3. Professionalism

A major characteristic of military organizations and their officer corps, at least in the West, is professionalism. According to Samuel Huntington, professionalism is a military phenomena that arose and matured in the past 200 years. It necessarily distinguishes the amateur from the expert, the political leader from the military leader. Huntington cites five measures of professionalism: 26

1. Requirements for entry into the officer corps

2. Means of advancement within the officer corps

3. Character of the military educational system

4. Nature of the military staff

5. Traditions, esprit and competence of the officer corps

There are trends and patterns of professionalism that should be studied for better understanding of their relevance to theory. In the United States, for example, there has been a strong pattern of increasing professionalism among reserve component (RC) officers and units for the past 30 years or so. This trend is unique for its longevity and because it has placed, for the first time, reserve officers into the same conditions of Huntington’s professional measures as active component (AC) officers.

Although the professionalism of the RC stands out because it contrasts sharply with the nonprofessional image of the past, the AC has honed its professional skills also, especially since the end of the Vietnam War. In addition to reforms of the 1970s, the Army in particular has been all-volunteer since that time. This begs a question of "followership": How does the character followers influence leadership? The answer to this and other questions will impact leadership theory.

4.3.2.4. Culture

An interesting study assignment at the National Defense University a few years ago challenged students to devise lists of strategic cultural attributes for different countries. Because we believe there is a strong linkage between strategy and (senior) military leadership, the discussion of United States strategic culture by Prof. Anita Arms (a student at the time) is worth a look.

Citing Rear Adm. Eccles¾ "...the ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation"¾ Arms writes that the "values that best define American strategic culture are those derived from the major historical influences" on the nation. These are: 27

1. The tendency toward isolationism
2. Adherence to an ideology based on individual rights and freedom
3. The purely political interpretation of what it means to be an American
4. The balance between the protestant work ethic and capitalism
5. A moralistic approach to politics
6. The ethnocentrism born of the belief that Americans occupy the moral high ground
7. The chauvinistic opinion that the entire world aspires to be American
8. An overwhelming need for immediate action and gratification

A paraphrase of Eccles is that the leadership of a nation derives from the values of its people. Is there, then, a military sub-set of these strategic values? How do these elements affect the leadership paradigm?

Certainly some of Army’ cultural factors seem more applicable to the military than others. The U.S. military is action-oriented, yet its members probably tend less toward isolationism than others in our society. Some of Arms’ values are at least partially applicable. Service members seem to adhere to the Protestant work ethic, but in a military system that is essentially socialist there is little room for capitalist expression.

In this particular regard, contrasts and comparisons with the Chinese might prove revealing. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army has a work ethic that remains rooted in Confucianism; they have, however, strong capitalistic tendencies. An American analog would have to at least include the defense contractor community to begin.

Some cultural factors have probably strengthened over time, while others may have waned. For some strategic values the probability distribution may have two humps. The patience and persistence of America’s early pioneers and today’s research community are in stark contrast to the need for action and immediate gratification. If this assertion is correct, then the apparent paradox deserves examination. It is my sense that these "opposite" values actually combine to create a condition of strength and resilience.

Culture is a strong influencing mechanism of military leadership, and it varies, sometimes greatly, from nation to nation. Far more study in this area should be undertaken. We must remain careful not to let it slip into the "too hard box."

To this point in theory development we have established a theoretical foundation, erected a conceptual framework, and fleshed that out with functional elements. In some ways leadership is a lot like combat power. Its potential must be generated and applied before its relative value can be measured. Conceptual and functional leadership really add up to potential leadership. Now, it must be applied to be useful.

Applied military leadership is like a coiled spring once it is freed of restraint and its potential energy converted to kinetic energy. Like combat power, which must be generated and is only combat power potential until it is used or applied, leadership is much the same. The essence of leadership, as noted earlier, is action. Applied leadership is the action component. Borrowing from the model of senior Army leadership and command as described in FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, these are elements of applied military leadership:

1. Leadership Vision
2. Challenge
3. Infrastructure
1. Organization
2. Resources
3. Processes
4. Skills
4. Security
5. Combat Power
6. Ethics

Leadership vision is not solely the domain of senior commanders, but vision is a requisite for senior commanders. Vision is inextricably linked to the challenge faced in a given situation, for, as Clausewitz instructs:

The elements of infrastructure, security and combat power are appreciated, and are not dwelt on here. It should be noted, however, that the components of infrastructure¾ organization, resources, processes and skills¾ are things that are fairly easily measured and compared, and that this is the region of applied leadership in which a substantial portion of study has already been conducted.

The last element, ethics, is not easily quantified. It is closely associated with the cultural aspect of functional leadership and with morality in our conceptual framework. Ethics flow from foundations and responsibilities of the leader. Foundations consist of values, standards and will; whereas a leader’s ethical responsibilities are: to be a role model, promote ethical development, and sustain an ethical climate. The payoff is moral toughness, as expressed by strength, confidence and consistency.

Clearly much more work is needed to develop a robust, coherent military leadership theory. This chapter is an attempt to organize thinking and direct thought. The paradigm shown here may help orient research and provide some initial points of departure. It is expected (even hoped) that it will change as work progresses, that refinements will be added and some elements deleted. The relative importance of some factors may far outclass others.

Perhaps now is the time to return to fundamentals of theory development. To identify and list observable data of the leadership phenomenon to see what patterns exist and what derivative ideas can be developed. Then, a listing of hypotheses can be made, which should then be tested and refined.

This is a beginning, but not much of one. A lot of work remains.

 NOTES:

1. An excerpt of the quote in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1966.
2. There are many examples in history. A favorite is the Japanese banzai charge to seize Engineer Hill on Attu on May 29, 1943. It almost succeeded, but a general, engineer troops, the lame and halt, and "cooks, litter bearers, road builders and staff officers" stemmed the onslaught. See: The Thousand-Mile War, Brian Garfield, Doubleday, New York, 1969.
3. "A Conceptual Foundation," Gregory D. Foster, a chapter in Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process, James C. Gaston, ed., National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., April 1992, p. 58.
4. These ideas are from Dr. Janice Fain, who expressed them during research at the Historical Evaluation & Research Organization in 1987-88.
5. The Mask of Command, John Keegan, Elizabeth Sifton Books-Viking, New York, 1987.
6. Analysis of Historical Factors That Have Influenced the Outcomes of Battles and Wars, Historical Evaluation & Research Organization, a study prepared for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, June 1983. Commonly called the Land Warfare Data Base, an expanded collection of data of nearly 700 combat engagements is now held by Riverside Research Institute, Arlington, Virginia.
7. "Leadership," International Military & Defense Encyclopedia, Trevor N. Dupuy, editor in chief, Brassey=s (US), Inc., McLean, Va., 1993, p. 1460.
8. This is a paraphrase of the definition for senior leadership found in Field Manual 22-100: Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., June 1987, p. 3.
9. Asian experience of military leadership is largely ignored in the West, although lip service is often paid to Sun Tzu and occasionally to Mao Zedong. We ignore such experience and study at our risk, and this brief paper admittedly does nothing to correct the situation.
10. Lt. Gen Ulmer wrote the introduction to Jon W. Blades’ book, Rules for Leadership, a 1986 publication of the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Blades tackles the difficult task of quantifying data of small unit leader and follower skills and motivation to form the analytical basis of his "rules for leadership."
11. Naval Doctrine Command 1-00-001, Norfolk, Va., June 1995.
12. This is understandable. Having O/Cs (captains and majors) at the NTC provide unfavorable ratings to battalion and brigade commanders would tear at the basic fabric of the chain of command and military discipline. Still, there are ways to address this matter unthreateningly and without sanction.
13. One study in literature is Mission Accomplishment by Divisions and Their Component Maneuver Elements: A Feasibility Study, Gay Hammerman and Vincent B. Hawkins, prepared for Jet Propulsion Laboratory by Data Memory Systems, Inc., January 1987.
14. QJM is now a proprietary product of Riverside Research Institute. A substantial database of historical combat supports the model factors and parameter values. About 40 percent of the engagements are division-level, and the model gives best results for this echelon.
15. Human Collective Dynamics: Two Groups in Adversarial Encounter, Donald L. Sandoval, Francis H. Harlow and Kent E. Genin, Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-11247-MS, Los Alamos, N.M., April 1988.
16. Chapter X, The Theory of Military Combat, in draft, John R. Brinkerhoff, TMCI, 18th General Working Meeting, Alexandria, Va., Dec. 7-9, 1995.
17. Chapter X: Command in Combat, The Theory of Military Combat, op. cit.
18. Otherwise, should we not have a single, unified Theory of Leadership and Command?
19. Keegan, op. cit.
20. A National Defense University publication, James C. Gaston, ed., Washington, D.C., April 1992.
21. Kissinger=s meaning is related in Brassey=s International Military & Defense Encyclopedia, op. cit.; Eccles= meaning comes from Foster in Grand Strategy, op. cit.
22. Foster=s chapter in Grand Strategy, op. cit.
23. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, op. cit.
24. Warrior’s Words, Peter G. Tsouras, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1992; Abrams’ quote taken from Military Review, April 1985.
25. This accords with Brinkerhoff’s work, and adds the individual level.
26. Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington, Vintage Books, New York, 1957.
27. "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," a chapter in Essays on Strategy IX, Thomas C. Gill, ed., National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., August 1993.
28. On War, Karl von Clausewitz, O. J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., Random House, New York, 1943.