Once activated from combat potential, combat power is applied with two complementary aims to accomplish the mission. One is application to own-force elements to move them to fulfill the mission. This is accomplished through the internally directed processes. The other is application against the enemy to remove his opposition, which is accomplished through externally directed processes. In this chapter we examine the dynamics of applying combat power to these complementary ends.

Primary combat processes. The structure of combat incorporates a set of primary combat processes which, taken together, are defined as encompassing all activity of combat. To reiterate, a primary combat process is combat activity of any kind that produces a common generic result. It is through the processes that combat power produces results aimed at achieving a mission. The results are those that actually occur, not those intended to occur by one side or the other. The primary processes were judiciously selected as suitable for describing combat; we assert no theoretical basis for choosing this particular set.

Any single action will normally produce more than one category of result and therefore involve more than one primary combat process. Here, however, we intend that each process be mutually exclusive of all other processes so that there is no commingling among them nor any gradation from one process to another. All destruction results, for example (and hence all destruction processes), are thus distinct and separate from all suppression results, all disruption results, all communication results, and so on, and consequently from all those processes. As an illustration, well-delivered air bombardment will normally result in some destruction, some suppression, some disruption, and often some degree of demoralization. By making each of these result categories distinct, we can, in principle, tabulate each category separately, although an observer would see them mingled. Considering the processes to be mutually exclusive enables us to provide a more orderly description of what occurs in combat.

Although internally directed processes are just as important as externally directed ones, it is only through external processes that the enemy can be directly affected. The internal processes provide the enabling basis for external processes, in addition to providing their own essential contributions to mission completion.

In his book, Living Systems, James G. Miller describes nineteen basic processes as common to all living systems from cells to supranational entities (such as the United Nations and the European Community). Although he uses a different nomenclature, all of his nineteen processes can be related to one or more of the thirteen primary combat processes. For combat (involving, with the two opposing sides, a double subset of Miller’s living systems), the thirteen processes are adequate to encompass all actions.

A single element taking an action against a single element will produce one or more results that fall under one or more of the primary combat processes. More often, an action will impact more than one object element and produce multiple results among each of the object elements. In the larger view, the elemental activities contributing to each process are aggregated to produce aggregated results under that process. At both the individual and the overall levels, all or most processes of combat will be in play by each side at any instant of time.

Combat results intended will always be favorable but actual results, and hence processes, can often, for many reasons, be unfavorable. The externally directed processes will generally be favorable (though only for the moment, because subsequent situations may render an initial gain disadvantageous in the longer run). Internal processes that work through cognitive elements—motivation, command-control, communication, and information acquisition—are especially susceptible to producing unintended adverse results.

The costs of processes. Every process has costs. These can be the obvious costs of expending resources—fuel consumption, ammunition expenditure, materiel wear and tear, human fatigue—but they can also be more subtle costs, such as the information given to the enemy by virtue of process execution, the time needed to execute the process, and friction losses incurred. These are costs borne by the party initiating the process. In addition, there are, of course, own-force costs in losses of men, materiel, and time attributable to the external processes carried out by the enemy. The efficiency of any process might be determined by weighing the costs against the results achieved; however, the mixing of process results and the indeterminate nature of costs would render any such calculation merely an abstract judgment.

Primary combat functions. Distinct from the primary combat processes are the primary combat functions. Like combat processes, the set of primary combat functions (listed in Chapter 6) is arbitrarily defined to be all-inclusive: every action undertaken in combat will, by definition, fall under one or another of these primary functions. Combat processes create the actual results achieved in the two-sided give and take of combat, whereas functions are the actions taken by each side to achieve intended results.

To illustrate, a commander will use the land battle functions of maneuver and fire (along with other combat functions) with the intention of achieving results to further his mission. His opponent will do likewise. The fire and maneuver functions undertaken by each side will combine to create results that become the new actual situation. The new situation will certainly not be what both commanders intended, and usually will not be exactly what either intended. Regardless, both sides share the new situation, and depending on their perceptions of the situation, will initiate further actions. With both sides separately performing their functions, each side will have been carrying out processes that produce destruction, suppression, demoralization, protection, movement, communication, and so on, the actual results from the processes differing in some degree from what each side had sought. The combat environment will also have an effect on the shared results.

Thus processes concern actual results while functions concern intended results. Secondly, processes are output oriented in that they relate to effects, while functions are input oriented in that they relate to causes. Finally, processes concern the actions taken by all three parties to combat while functions are actions undertaken by each opponent separately. Combat functions are applied as energy vectored to fulfill the mission; combat processes are the consequences of the combined energy applied by both sides, as further modified by the environment.

A discussion of how the various combat functions are utilized and combined for best effect is not called for here. The voluminous literature on doctrine, tactics, techniques, and materiel is a far better source for describing how to wage combat. This theory of combat is in no sense a "how to" book.

To understand how combat processes work in the dynamics of combat, it is first necessary to explain each process and how it contributes to combat power, keeping in mind the differences between processes and functions and that each process is defined to be separate and distinct from all others.

Table 6 repeats the list of primary combat processes discussed earlier.

Demoralization process. The process of demoralization leads to breaking or reducing the will of the enemy force to continue its opposition. It operates solely on cognitive, not physical elements. The results range from doubt by individuals about continuing the fight to abject loss of will within the entire force. The most singular impact occurs when the commander of the enemy force is demoralized, but demoralization can occur from the bottom up even though the commander and his principal subordinates have retained a strong will to fight. To some degree, the process affects many combatants in every combat situation. When the process affects the command structure or becomes widespread among the rank and file, combat power can be catastrophically reduced.

With loss of will, the purpose and values of waging combat tend to be discarded in favor of the primal impulse to survive, hopelessness, and desire for psychological palliation. The vectoring effect of mission is diminished and in the extreme, no longer acts to focus combat activity. A force may disengage from combat for reasons other than demoralization, such as excessive fatigue or the need to preserve the force for a subsequent mission, but when the cause is loss of will, the demoralization process is at work. If demoralization has not progressed too far, the effects can be arrested and even reversed by forceful leadership.

The principal instruments for carrying out the process are fire and maneuver. Surprise, whether by fire or maneuver, can be an especially powerful demoralizer. The shock effect from a sudden, forceful penetration, an envelopment, or massive firepower, while often of short duration, leads not only to severe disruption but often to catastrophic demoralization. But demoralization can also result through gradual attrition of will from extended fighting and losses. Other combat functions besides fire and maneuver also contribute to the process, notably psychological and deception operations.

Destruction process. The destruction process works on all physical elements, both animate and inanimate, but not on intangible cognitive elements. The process also includes disablement and damage (partial destruction), even though subsequent repairs may be made during the course of combat. Similarly, wounding of personnel is included. The cumulative effect of the destruction process over time is attrition.

In modern combat, destruction is carried out almost entirely through the function of fire. Firepower of every kind is included, from small arms to bombs to chemical and nuclear weapons. Knives, bayonets, hand grenades, mines, incendiary materials, and many other weapons and devices are also used in the destruction process. At times, the combat environment may be the cause of destruction, as when ships are lost in a storm or tanks in a river crossing.

The destruction process contributes to combat power by physically reducing enemy elements—human or material—thereby directly decreasing the enemy’s available means, and hence his ability to apply combat power. The destruction process is the most clearly discernible and measurable of all processes, so much so that it is often the only process examined in analyzing combat. Sometimes a combat mission will be stated as "destroy the enemy," but this is rarely meant literally; the true intent is more often to nullify the enemy capacity to fight through a combination of destruction and demoralization that will lead to catastrophic loss of force integrity.

Suppression process. The suppression process operates only on cognitive elements (humans), unlike the destruction process, which operates only on physical elements (both human and material). The effect on cognitive elements from suppression differs from that of demoralization in that suppression does not involve a loss of will to fight. It is primarily the threat of death or injury, leading to fear, that is at work in suppression. Even in the absence of fear of bodily harm, suppression can occur out of concern for preserving the materiel of a unit. The result involved in the suppression process is the curtailment of enemy combat activity that follows from the perception by individuals of danger to them or to other persons or materiel. That is why the process affects only cognitive elements.

The curtailment of activity is transitory and encompasses a great variety of degradations of combat power: infantrymen may keep their heads down to avoid being hit, thereby firing less frequently or less effectively; artillery batteries may cease firing and relocate if enemy counterbattery fire becomes too intense or is expected; an aircraft crew may take evasive action to avoid air defense fires, thereby reducing its attack effectiveness; a ground unit may cease a maneuver and take cover if enemy aircraft appear; a radar may be turned off or operated intermittently to avoid detection and engagement by the enemy. Yielding to suppression is a rational act. A fearless combatant might not be suppressed, but he could be killed as a consequence; a seasoned, trained combatant may temporarily be suppressed but live to fight on.

Whereas the destruction process leads to physical damage and loss of elements, suppression causes neither damage nor losses; instead, it diminishes the amount and efficiency of the actions of enemy elements and thus decreases the opponent’s combat power. The degree of suppression is the degree by which combat activity is rendered less effective. Suppression is less discernible and measurable than destruction, but is more prevalent on the battlefield and probably has a greater cumulative effect in most combat situations.

Whenever the destruction process occurs, the suppression process will usually also occur: if an individual is killed, others observing this will take cover and be suppressed. The converse is not true—the suppression process never has the result of destroying or damaging. Another distinction is that suppression may occur from firepower or threat of firepower, while destruction necessitates the physical delivery of firepower (or some other physical action).

Neutralization process. The neutralization process contributes to combat power through negating or denying the enemy’s capability to bring all or part of its combat power to bear. Whereas destruction and suppression act to diminish the combat power of portions of the enemy force, neutralization totally negates a significant fraction of the enemy force, or sometimes the entire force for a period of time. The process frequently depends on successful use of the maneuver function to isolate the neutralized force so that its power cannot be usefully applied. Other ways to carry out the neutralization process include:

In all these cases, manipulating information acquired by the enemy is a key aspect, and the processes of destruction, suppression, disruption, and deception may have preceded and contributed to neutralization. The neutralization process resembles demoralization, but differs in that the cause is something other than loss of will. A force that retains the will to fight but cannot do so because it has been isolated is neutralized but not necessarily demoralized. Surrendering is sometimes a consequence of neutralization by isolation.

Disruption (of a force) process. This process includes activities that interdict the flow of enemy materiel and manpower, and also activities that disturb and delay enemy processes of command-control, information acquisition, protection, and sustainment. Since disruption usually has a transitory effect, duration of delay, along with the magnitude of the force disrupted, is a measure of enemy combat power reduction. If a bridge or rail line in the combat area is destroyed, thus delaying enemy forces or supplies that would affect the combat, then the process of disruption has been carried out together by the process of destruction. If the bridge or rail line is not destroyed, but forces have been delayed by an act of sabotage involving misinformation about the supposed destruction, disruption would have occurred in conjunction with deception but not destruction.

Electronic warfare and other information warfare actions provide means to disrupt enemy control, communication, fire direction, and information gathering activities through interference, jamming, and usurpation of communication links and control systems. Electronic warfare also contributes to the internally directed processes of information acquisition and protection. The distinction is that the disruption process utilizes electronic and other information warfare actions offensively for severing and interrupting enemy activities, whereas internally directed processes use electronic warfare to protect and enable internal actions. The disruption process differs from that of deception in that it does not involve a result of deceiving. Clearly, however, deception information warfare actions frequently will entail both deception and disruption processes.

Deception process. The deception process reduces enemy combat power by misleading the enemy’s information acquisition process, and through this conduit, his command and control functions. It operates entirely through cognitive entities, striking at the enemy’s central directing system. Techniques include directed misinformation, excessive information, ambiguous information, imitative communication deception, manipulative communication deception, decoys, fake materiel, ruses, demonstrations, feints, and the like. Many of these techniques are classed as information warfare.

Motivation process. The motivation process is the converse of the demoralization process. It works solely through individual cognitive elements of the friendly force. Where demoralization has occurred, motivation is the restorative, and where demoralization has not yet occurred, motivation is the guard against its occurrence. Motivation instills a force with the will to fulfill its mission in the face of deadly threat from the enemy. More than that, it instills will to overcome normal societal mores and inflict death, destruction and demoralization on the enemy. All internal and external processes support the process of motivation insofar as they are perceived as succeeding, that is, leading to favorable outcomes.

The degree of motivation (or conversely of demoralization) is a crucial attribute of every cognitive element—every individual. Just as there are no aggregated cognitive elements, motivation works only through individuals. The motivation effect on units occurs through commonality of the motivation effects on individuals. This point also applies to all other processes that operate on cognitive elements.

The primary means for motivating during combat is the command function, supported by the functions of control and communication. Motivation is a key responsibility of all in the command chain. This top-down influence is buttressed by the bottom-up peer bonding that leads to motivation through cohesion. Just as essential are the ingrained motivations that individuals carry into battle. These stem from political indoctrination, training and discipline, military traditions and customs, national history and culture, family and home, and the broader purposes and values attached to the war effort.

Command-control process. The command-control process, working entirely through cognitive elements, directly and strongly affects all combat activities and thus all processes. The process encompasses not only the crucial decision-making and directing that emanate from the command function, but also the forms of control that every human in combat exercises on his own, as well as the preprogramming that humans have entered into weapons systems. Guidance commands to a missile from a console operator are included, as are the built-in commands of a homing missile. The decisions a truck driver makes in going from point A to point B are included. The inclusiveness is such that no action can occur in combat without a command-control process except natural phenomena and acts of chance. The process involves the organizing and weighing of acquired information—own-force information, intelligence information, prior knowledge and experience—and the development from this of decisions, directives, orders, estimates, plans, and all other forms of control.

Information acquisition process. This process has three components: acquisition of information about enemy forces, own forces, and the combat environment. Primary acquisition means are the human senses and technical sensors (radar, laser, sonar, electronic intercepts, magnetic detectors, infrared detectors, seismic devices, and many other systems). Secondary acquisition means are verbal and written reports and data in many forms that are acquired after information has initially been communicated from senses and sensors. Acquisition also encompasses information and data gathered during combat from sources such as field manuals, standing operating procedures, and computer files. Information acquired prior to combat such as a precombat estimate of the situation or analysis of own-force strength, contributes to combat potential and is not involved in this combat process.

With regard to own forces, the process includes information acquired from higher echelons and adjacent or nearby forces in addition to that from elements within the force. Information acquired about the environment includes data on weather, road conditions, cross-country trafficability, rivers and harbors, urban areas, and the civil populace. Although the act of acquiring intelligence information is aimed at the enemy, its purpose is for use internally within the friendly force and therefore the process is classed as internally directed. Acquisition of intelligence will often result in a direct impact on the enemy, but that impact occurs through one or another of the externally directed processes. As an example, the principal process for a unit on a mission of reconnaissance by fire is the internal process of acquisition of information (about the enemy), but external processes of destruction, suppression, and possibly deception and disruption will usually accompany the acquisition process.

Once acquired and transmitted, intelligence information is weighed together with own-force information in decision-making by commanders. This mental working of acquired information is part of the command-control process, not the information acquisition process.

Communication process. The communication process is a transmission activity (moving information from one point to another), in contrast to the information acquisition process, which is solely a procuring and receiving activity. A staff officer who obtains information from any source (say a computer file or a map) is engaging in information acquisition. If then, having put this information into a memorandum (part of his command-control process), he transmits the memorandum to another staff officer, he is engaging in the communication process; and when the second officer receives the memorandum, he is engaging in the acquisition process. The communication process entails any and all means of transmitting information, from oral to written to telecommunications and even smoke signals, hand signals and body language.

One of the final steps of the command-control process is the mental formulation of an order or a plan of action. When a commander writes out the order or plan, this is still part of his cognition in the command-control process. When he hands the written order to someone else or states it orally, he is using the communication process—information is moving from him to others. The same would apply if he was transmitting a plan, his concerns, or merely his ruminations.

Movement process. The movement process pertains to physical movements of all kinds in three-dimensional space. An infantryman crawling toward an enemy bunker is as much involved in the movement process as is a convoy of ships at sea or a squadron of aircraft flying toward a target. Trucks hauling supplies to reserve units far behind the front line are included.

A combat maneuver is a special case of a function performed by using the movement process (and usually other processes as well). A maneuver is an action intended to influence the enemy through a crucial positional advantage. The maneuver is not itself the result intended. Thus maneuver is an important function, but not a process. The 1986 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states:

A maneuver may put several processes to work: external processes of demoralization, neutralization, suppression, and deception; and internal processes of movement, protection, command-control, and motivation. Firepower, using a combination of the processes of destruction, suppression, and neutralization, can be employed as a form of maneuver by fire.

Protection process. This process encompasses a broad set of activities that have the common result of protecting the force from the enemy’s external processes and from his internal process of intelligence information acquisition. The most direct protection activity is fortifying against enemy firepower. Sea, air and land forces all employ armor protection and use screening measures, camouflage, dispersion, cover, and concealment to avoid enemy firepower. Electronic jamming that denies enemy interception of friendly force communications is another protective measure (but jamming of the enemy’s internal communications falls under the disruption process). Electronic and physical countermeasure activities of many kinds contribute to the process. A broad range of protective measures is available to deny information to the enemy and is of increasing importance because of the critical value of information in modern combat. Protective measures against adverse environmental factors, such as storms, flooding, extreme temperature conditions, and nuclear or chemical contamination are included.

Other processes indirectly help in protecting a force. Destruction, suppression, neutralization and the other externally directed processes protect own forces indirectly by diminishing enemy combat power. Because the protection process directly wards off enemy actions, its contribution is to prevent the decrease in combat power that otherwise would occur from the enemy actions.

Sustainment process. This process supports all other processes. It involves sustaining all fighting, support, information acquisition, and command-control elements. The process embraces the broadest interpretation of what is included in the terms "logistics" and "support." It includes both manpower and material forms of support, such as personnel replacement, materiel resupply, medical care, morale, food supply, hygiene, transportation, ammunition replenishment, repair, maintenance, equipment retrieval, and field engineering.

Sustainment pertains to all echelons and locations of activity. A front-line soldier hauling ammunition or refilling canteens for the squad is engaged in the sustainment process. When he completes his task and begins shooting, he is back to the destruction or suppression process. A truck driver delivering rations in the rear of the combat area is performing sustainment (as well as movement). A surgeon working in a mobile field hospital is sustaining. An engineer battalion improving a road is sustaining.

Processes enable combat dynamics to be examined in light of the actual results that occur in the amalgam of both sides using combat power, each seeking its own desired end. Using process in the sense of any and all sorts of activities that lead to a single generic set of like results enables the aggregation of elemental activities into a manageable set of result categories. Thus all sorts of separate actions that a force may take that cause destruction (and damage)—use of maneuver, firepower, electromagnetic operations, disruption operations, blockade, whatever—can be aggregated into destruction results at any instant of time or over a period of time. Similarly all the actions that lead to destruction in one sector of fighting can be aggregated at any instant or over a period of time into destruction results in that sector; or one can aggregate just the results of artillery destruction in the sector. Likewise, these same actions can be examined to aggregate suppression, neutralization, deception, or other process results. Processes also are amenable to disaggregation: the total results of destruction or suppression in a given sector over a given time interval can be broken down into the contributions from certain weapons or in certain subsectors. The same properties of aggregation and disaggregation apply to the internally directed processes (although it is difficult to envision how to aggregate motivation, command-control, and communication).

External and internal processes serve the mission in different ways. There is no priority of one category over the other, nor of any one process over any other. All processes are used in concert with the aim of mission fulfillment.

Any single process represents a category of combat results. All categories of results occur simultaneously within the combat arena, but at any one time and in any one place, certain processes will dominate because of the particular combat activity that one side has initiated at that time and place and the counteractivity that the other side responds with. The consequences of the two sets of input activity are the processes with their associated results.

Process relationships. Each process bears a relationship to the other processes, and these relationships differ for each process. Figure 18 depicts, in simplified fashion, the general nature of the relationships. The description of the processes presented above provides additional insights. The figure should not be considered a flow chart of combat activity; it merely shows the principal ties of one process to another. There are additional cross ties not shown.

The upper part of Figure 18 shows the processes of the Blue force; the lower part shows those of the Red force. Each side is, of course, drawing from the same assortment of processes (as well as the same functions) to further its ends. As noted in Chapter 6, there is structural symmetry in the processes (and functions) between opposing forces, but obviously there is never symmetry in the dynamic application of functions and consequent processes by the two sides. Structural symmetry does not mean symmetry of combat capability. The process relationships shown in Figure 18 remain identical through all hierarchical echelons from individuals to complete forces.

Information acquisition from a higher echelon outside the combat arena serves as a starting point in the figure. The information acquisition process impacts other processes only through the command-control process. The first step in the command-control process is to translate acquired information into meaning as deduced by the recipient of the information. From this step, the command-control process proceeds through many cognitive activities internal to the person which lead to the process of communicating with individuals and units and to motivating others. The motivating and communicating processes in turn lead to the processes of moving, sustaining, protecting the force, and acquiring further information. In due course, they lead to the external processes of demoralizing, destroying, suppressing, neutralizing, disrupting, and deceiving enemy force elements, thereby degrading the state of the Red force. All Blue internal

processes impact the Blue force, changing its state, while the Red force external processes are also impacting the Blue force, causing other changes in its state. Elements of the Blue force detect the changes in the Blue force state, and perceptions of these changes are communicated back into the loop once again through the information acquisition process. The same applies to Blue detection of changes in the Red force state and the feedback of perceptions of these changes.

The processes work in a continuous flow, but the flow need not cycle through all the relationships shown in Figure 18. A commander working the command-control process may interrupt his thinking to check a map, using the information acquisition process, then return to the command-control process. The external processes tend to occur in episodic peaks, whereas the cognitive-oriented internal processes are active almost continuously.

The cognitive processes. The process of command-control is ubiquitous and, together with motivation, is paramount in combat. Excepting chance events and actions caused solely by the combat environment, no combat activity of any kind, and therefore no combat process, occurs except as a result of an initiating command-control process. Furthermore, no activity (and hence no process) can support the mission effectively without the prior process of motivation. These points apply to everyone in combat—low ranking individuals as well as all in the chain of command. Command-control and motivation directly influence only friendly force elements. Neither a commander nor any other individual directly controls or motivates the enemy, but through these same processes, a commander and his force will indirectly seek to demoralize, destroy, suppress, neutralize, disrupt, and deceive the enemy. Facilitating the command-control process in its use of the external processes are all the other internally directed processes.

The command-control process, while paramount, nevertheless depends on information acquisition to make good decisions and on communicating to get the word to the troops. In addition, the motivation process works with the command-control process as a sort of a qualitative enhancer. These four internally directed processes—information acquisition, command-control, motivation, and communication—work principally through cognitive actions. They are the agents of the corresponding functions of command-control and information acquisition.

Other internal processes. The sustainment and movement processes contribute to all other internal processes. The protection process may either be enhanced or reduced as a consequence of movement, but the protection process does not conversely contribute to movement. Protection acts solely to mitigate the impact of the enemy’s external processes and intelligence gathering.

External processes. With regard to the external processes, destruction will almost always have suppression and disruption associated with it, and sometimes neutralization, but suppression, disruption, and neutralization often occur without destruction. The deception process works through the opponent’s information acquisition to reduce the efficacy of the enemy’s command-control functions, whereas the demoralization process acts in a broader sense to infect the will of many or all human elements. Suppression impacts only human elements, while destruction, disruption, and neutralization affect both human and material elements.

It is common wisdom that for every combat action there is a counteraction. This is valid for combat processes as well, but the counter to any single process usually involves several processes. The countering of combat functions works in the same way: the counter to any single combat function will normally entail the exercise of more than one function by the opponent.

By way of recapitulation, the following are key points regarding the role of combat processes in the theory of combat:

Uncertainty. Axiom 6 states that uncertainty is inherent in combat. We define uncertainty as a state of doubt about the combat situation, including its outcome. Uncertainty in combat is pervasive. It enters combat by its effect on the cognitive states of all combatants, and hangs like a fog affecting everyone, especially those in the chain of command. Commanders and their men have no choice but to learn to live with uncertainty, and chance. Commanders do their best to reduce uncertainty, yet only a foolish commander expects to eliminate it; and all commanders try to maximize uncertainty on the part of the enemy to obtain a relative informational advantage.

Chance. We define chance event as an event that occurs without discernible human intention or cause. With this definition we take a narrow view of what can pass as chance. An event that could have been anticipated and avoided is not a chance event, even though its occurrence was only a remote possibility. In the old maxim that starts "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost" and ends "for want of a battle, the kingdom was lost," the loss of the horseshoe is not strictly a chance event because with any message so critical to the kingdom, duplicate messages ought to have been sent by two riders. A sentry falling asleep, thereby allowing the enemy to take his unit by surprise, is not a chance event, nor is the death during battle of a commander with a known heart condition. An earthquake is a chance event but a predictable heavy snow storm is not. These examples put a fine point on what should be viewed as chance in combat. The wise commander anticipates and prepares for unusual events that others might class as chance, while an inexperienced commander will blame all sorts of surprises on chance or bad luck. Chance plays no favorites, and it can create opportunity as well as ill fortune.

Nevertheless, small non-chance events in combat can lead to large effects. The failure to detonate explosives to demolish the Remagen Bridge in World War II (not a chance event) expedited the Allied Rhine crossing. Chaos theoreticians found there are countless minuscule points in a chain of events where a small perturbation can magnify to ultimately produce very large changes. Combat is likewise filled with many such seemingly small unforeseen happenings, each with the potential for causing drastic changes in the situation down the road. More recently, chaos theoreticians have discovered that they can sometimes manipulate the perturbations and stabilize the system back into predictability. Those who command in combat have likewise learned to react to and often control unforeseen happenings in order to minimize their effects and sometimes to channel them to favorable advantage.

Did the loss of a nail on the shoe of the horse carrying the rider unalterably determine that the battle would be lost? Clearly not, for any number of possible actions could have intervened to alter the chain of events. There is no evidence to indicate that combat is deterministic, no evidence that indicates the present state of a single element or the present aggregated state of an aggregated element absolutely determines any future state. An assertion that combat is deterministic would, by extension, seem to claim that the initial conditions at the outset of combat inevitably establish the outcome, and by further extension, that the universe is set on a sequence of predetermined events and outcomes. If combat were wholly deterministic, it should be totally predictable. But as chaos theory shows, nonlinear dynamic systems that seem to meet the characteristics of determinism are not deterministic because they can be utterly unpredictable. Combat, which involves two-sided, interactive, nonlinear dynamics, and which furthermore is not isolated from external influences, and further still, is more biological in character than physical, cannot be classed as predictable.

Yet, from a broad perspective, much of what can be observed of combat appears to be a priori deterministic for most practical purposes and much appears to be predictable within rough but useful ranges of accuracy. Just as the finite amount of encoded information contained in a fern spore predictably results in a nonrandom, fractal-like fern leaf, so the finite number of elements and actions in combat act in nonrandom fashion to produce (reasonably) predictable fractal-like patterns in combat. They do so because they involve the consistent encoded forms of military training, discipline, indoctrination, and traditions that control much of human behavior in combat. Also, because of the large numbers of combatants, weapons employed, and munitions and supplies expended, expected or average values from innumerable stochastic or quasi-stochastic events begin to override the details of individual events. CEPs (circular errors probable) make sense in large numbers, if not in the drop of a single bomb. Another factor contributing to seeming determinism and rough predictability is the intuition that good commanders bring to combat, which tends to lead to self-fulfilling outcomes; they prefer combat conditions where the outcome is likely. Competent commanders become expert in dealing with the fuzzy facts and situations that abound in combat and in translating fuzzy information into non-fuzzy orders.

Having recognized the frequent appearance of predictability in the aggregate view (for most practical purposes), we must acknowledge that this pertains only where expectations seem strongly to favor a correct prediction. Commanders seek situations where they expect to succeed. They assess risks and avoid, when they can, situations where success is marginal or unlikely. Predictability is low in cases of small marginal advantage and can go off the scale where chance or an unforeseen event intervenes significantly.

In summary, we assert that combat is fundamentally nondeterministic and unpredictable, but that, for many reasons, much of combat can be viewed in the broad perspective as seemingly being determinable from preceding events and hence being predictable within tolerable limits of accuracy. In other words, there often can be a high order of probability as to outcomes. This view must not be treated too universally: we mean only that there is, in apparently clear cases, rough predictability of overall results, provided that significant unforeseen events do not occur. There is not predictability in detail and not predictability in general.

Pervasive uncertainty affects every combatant from start to finish. Combat proceeds on the basis of perceptions of reality rather than reality, and these perceptions are skewed by many factors: incomplete information, inaccurate and erroneous information, apprehension, fear, disinformation, deception, the biases and predilections of individuals (particularly those in the command chain), and other conditions afflicting cognitive elements. All of these factors result in what can be called the cognitive entropy of combat: the measure of uncertainty, confusion and disorder perceived by each combatant.

Let us postulate a situation that we know cannot exist: a situation in which, at a moment in time, every combatant has complete knowledge about everything in the combat arena—about every person, every material element, the location and every attribute of all these elements, and every action being taken at that moment. Uncertainty would still exist, for there are "uncertainty principles" that say you fundamentally cannot know, within certain limits, all dimensions of some things. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics says we cannot simultaneously know both the exact velocity and the exact position of an object. The linear time-invariant uncertainty principle of information theory says that there is a basic uncertainty in what we can know about both the frequencies and the time duration of a signal. However, these and other uncertainty principles become significant only when we are concerned with measurements requiring great precision. Therefore, to put this point in perspective, in combat, scientific uncertainty principles become lost in the noise, even at the most elemental level. While the uncertainties exist, they are so overridden by the grossness of combat activities that they become inconsequential.

A more significant reason why complete knowledge would not eliminate uncertainty is that, given the nondeterministic character of combat, what happens next and what will happen later on cannot be known exactly. Even if every person on one side could know exactly what he will do the next moment, none of them knows what any person on the other side will do, nor even what the person standing next to him will do. Even if complete knowledge of the present down even to molecules or atoms were possible in combat, uncertainty would remain as to future states.

But to return to a realistic plane, uncertainty as to the present situation is seen everywhere. There is uncertainty as to many of the present-state attributes (location, morale, capability, posture, force integrity, and so on) of both the friendly force and the enemy force; uncertainty as to the validity of information; as to whether orders have been carried out; as to the combat environment; as to what losses have been sustained—in short, uncertainty as to much of the current state of forces on both sides and of the environment. The longer the train of sequential events since the last bit of information, the greater the uncertainty and the more the information is mistrusted.

Compounding the problem of uncertainty is what can be called negative information. It too is pervasive in combat. It includes information that does not result in uncertainty in the sense of doubt about the situation, but it can have an even greater influence. Negative information includes disinformation and deception intentionally planted by the enemy, as well as own-force misconceptions, misapprehensions, and other inadvertent own-force disinformation. Further, it includes ignorance, particularly by those in the command chain. A commander (or any combatant) may have no doubt in his mind about the situation, yet be completely ignorant of the true circumstance. He would be better off knowing nothing and realizing he knows nothing. The effect of negative information is to warp the perception of what otherwise should have been factual information.

The degree of uncertainty about the present combat situation can be thought of as a measure of the cognitive entropy of combat. We are not speaking here of thermodynamic entropy, but entropy in the sense of information theory. Thermodynamic entropy could not apply because combat is not an isolated, closed system and it involves biological systems that are self-regenerating and self-controlling, and hence cognitive entropy can be reduced by factors both internal and external to the combat arena. The informational uncertainty involved in cognitive entropy pertains to more than just the physical situation, for it includes uncertainty as to the mission and orders and, on a more abstract plane, as to combat purpose and values. This conceptual sort of entropy is extremely hard to pin down. It might be called fuzzy entropy, since we are dealing with fuzzy sets of information. Although the actual situation is not fuzzy, what enters the minds of combatants is clouded by uncertainty.

Conceptually, we can define this fuzzy cognitive entropy as the ratio of what is not known about the combat situation to complete knowledge of the situation, the unknown relative to the knowable. In this sense, it is a measure of the confusion, disorder, and uncertainty experienced by combatants. Everyone in combat is at all times trying to minimize his own cognitive entropy and that of his fellows. At the outset of combat, the collective entropy (the sum lack of information by all combatants) of each side is usually low for friendly forces but may be high or low about enemy forces. As combat proceeds, entropy normally increases (the so-called fog of battle), but will wax and wane as correct information is acquired or fades and as it is correctly or falsely interpreted and understood. In the worst case, when individuals have lost all interest in the mission and know only what they can see with their own eyes, cognitive entropy is at a maximum. At the conclusion of combat, cognitive entropy in regard to friendly forces decreases and in regard to enemy forces generally increases.

From this discussion, two points seem to emerge. First, cognitive entropy has useful meaning only when considered separately for each side. The total entropy in the combat arena, being the ratio of what is not known by both sides to the complete combat situation, tells us little about the dynamics of combat, whereas the entropy experienced by each side separately clearly has a significant bearing on force capability. Second, cognitive entropy in combat probably exists only in the mind of each individual, just as there are no aggregated cognitive elements, only cognitive individuals. Nevertheless, cognitive entropy, as it affects each side, can be conceptually thought of as the combination (but not the arithmetic sum) of the cognitive entropies of all individuals of that side.

The gray world of command and control. Given the pervasiveness of uncertainty in combat, all who engage in command and control functions— which includes every active combatant—operate in a world where most available information is uncertain and ambiguous. Added to this is the occasional unforeseen event that ramifies to unexpected significance and the rare chance event that upsets plans. From this fuzzy world where facts are gray or missing, decisions must be made and communicated in clear, black and white terms. For those not in the command chain most decisions are made largely by rote in accordance with what the individual has been trained to do. Those in the command chain, however, weigh choices that are often difficult, but when made, need to be communicated positively and decisively. As General Maxwell D. Taylor said, citing the Bible, "If the trumpet give an uncertain voice, who shall prepare himself for war?"

Thus command necessitates converting conditions of uncertainty into unambiguous orders and actions. This entails sorting through uncertainties and possibilities of chance and unforeseen events, and then filling in the unknowns based on experience and probabilities. From this cognitive exercise, the commander communicates his decision. The command function has the intent of making a right decision and enunciating it firmly and clearly. The command-control process leads to a decision that may be good or bad and that may be disseminated clearly and forcefully or not.

Experience and probability in command and control. Wise commanders, realizing they cannot know everything about the combat situation, do not delay action while seeking ever more information, but sense when they know enough to act. Commanders operate much like the brain, which, observing a developing pattern, interprets the partial pattern based on experience, and when sufficient pieces of the pattern have been received, anticipates the full picture, weighs options and decides. The commander will make a judgment about the probability of what the developing pattern represents and about the likelihood the pattern will not change. Included among the probabilities will be the commander’s view of what his opponent will likely do based on knowledge of that opponent’s past actions. Many other probabilities will be weighed and ranked to produce an overall probability. This calculus of partial patterns and weighted probabilities is at the heart of decision-making, not just in combat, but in all manner of human decisions. The commander finesses unpredictability in detail by working on probability in the larger picture. And successful commanders convey decisions in terms that reflect neither improbability nor unpredictability.

Experience obviously is a paramount factor in command and control. Everyone in combat carries in his mind the accumulated residue of his experiences in life. But it is experience more directly related to military life and to combat that dominates command and control. Here the specific purpose-value system of combat overlies and must contend with the deeper purpose-value system of culture. Continuous information feedback to all combatants is weighed against these specific and broad purpose-value systems, leading to cyclic decision-making. All in the chain of command, and less directly all others, are guided by decision rules that derive from the behavioral incentives and penalties of higher military and governmental echelons.

The esprit component of command and control. Axiom 5 states that domination is the ultimate means of achieving an objective. It is certainly not the sole means, for only destruction will defeat a force that fights to the last. Domination is a defeat of the human spirit. In combat this means one force imposing its will on the other force, with the commanders on each side, aided by their subordinate commanders, being the principal imposers and principal recipients of domination. There are instances of a demoralized force becoming dominated by the opponent regardless of its commander’s strong will to resist, and other instances where a force remained undominated even when its commander had been reduced to abject helplessness.

Domination works on the cognitive elements of the enemy. The means to achieve domination comprise all the external processes, with demoralization as the primary tool, and destruction and deception likely to weigh more heavily than the others. The shock effect of surprise magnifies the impact. Resistance to domination puts all the internal processes in play, but especially motivation and command-control. The esprit component of command and control has been expressed by Wayne Hughes in Combat Science in these words:

The episodic nature of combat. Combat rarely proceeds at a uniform pace, nor in a gradual build-up to a single climax followed by a winding down. There usually are peaks of heightened activity followed by periods of relative quiet. As the common saying has it, "war is moments of stark terror between long periods of utter boredom." The episodic nature of combat is seen in all its aspects: there are times when information gathering is the primary focus, times when positioning forces is the main object, times when maneuvering is key, times when firepower is dominant, and times when recuperation is called for. The decision-making system, from commander down to private, all trying to cope with uncertainties and unknowns, requires time to ponder, and thus generates its decisions sporadically rather than continuously.

Although combat power comprises innumerable quantum-like elemental contributions, it is not seen that way by commanders nor other combatants. To further his mission, a commander views combat power as being brought to bear by aggregations of forces and actions that he must control in time and space. Even though unity of effort and concentration of forces are watchwords of command, never in the real world would a commander treat combat power as if it were a single lump sum. Instead, he distributes and redistributes it by allocating forces and directing their actions here and there in a continually shifting pattern.

Once a commander has turned available combat potential into combat power, the two most crucial responsibilities for him and his subordinate commanders are (1) propitious distribution of combat power in time and space and (2) vectoring that combat power to achieve the mission. Commanders normally will also ensure sufficient residual potential to fight again, unless the force must be sacrificed for some higher goal. In carrying out these responsibilities, the commander and every combatant will be expending energy—usually prodigious amounts of it and often to the point of exhaustion.

Distribution of combat power takes place in the dimensions of space and time. Spatially, the vertical dimension extends from ocean depths to outer space and it may include subterranean space. The horizontal dimensions can extend anywhere within the combat area. At the micro level, combat power distribution is in finite granular bits, power being made up of the many separate individual processes occurring on the battlefield. On the macro scale, distribution has the appearance of bundles in time and space.

Spatial distribution. Figure 19 presents a fine-grain snapshot of Blue force combat activity within a small slice of the combat area during a short period of time. A complete picture would include Red force combat activity as well. The dots represent individual elements. The solid arrows represent physical actions taken by the elements, which impact other elements, either Blue or Red, and the dotted arrows represent cognitive actions. Thus each dot-arrow-dot corresponds to one individual element-action-element activity with a consequent result. Most of these activities involve multiple impacts and multiple results. The small circular arrows indicate impact on the element itself (such as a change of state due to a movement or to ammunition expended).

Since combat power is defined in terms of results achieved (leading to changes of state), the point in space and the instant in time that a result occurs is the location where and time when an element of combat power is created. The word "point" should not be taken here to have the mathematical meaning of infinitely small, but rather to mean a finite yet very small volume; similarly, "instant" does not mean an infinitesimal segment of time, merely a very short segment. Hence in Figure 19 a micro bit of Blue force combat power is created at each of the impacted dots (as noted above, Red force activity has not been displayed). Internally directed processes create supportive combat power only within space occupied by elements of that force, since by definition these processes only impact friendly force elements, while similarly, externally directed processes create aggressive combat power against the enemy only within space occupied by enemy elements.

At the individual level, every element that affects the combat situation, whether through physical action or through cognitive influence and whether affecting enemy or friendly force elements, contributes to combat power. The elemental bit of combat power is formed in the processes in which one or more agent elements impact an object element, including interaction with any enemy element that may impact the same object element. A maneuvering tank and its crew that is firing at an enemy armored personnel carrier while receiving return fire is normally engaging in several external processes and could simultaneously be engaging in all internal processes except sustainment, all contributing to combat power, some against the enemy personnel carrier and some within the friendly force tank. Where the process result occurs is the where combat power is exerted.

The object elements, where elemental combat power is being created through changes of element attributes, can be any own-force elements (including the agent elements themselves), elements of the enemy force, and the combat environment. Furthermore, the object elements are not necessarily those intended to be the objects of an action, and often are objects against which the action was quite unintended. In instances of friendly fire casualties, for example, the objects are own-force elements fired on in error—an instance where combat power has a negative consequence. Civilian noncombatants and civilian infrastructure can become objects of collateral civil damage either intentionally or incidentally. In area fire or aerial carpet bombardment, the objects are not discretely targeted elements, but are any and all elements affected by the area fire or bombardment in addition to those for which damage was intended.

Each of the elemental combat power contributions is part of the overall distribution of combat power on the battlefield at that moment. In principle, for every spatial point in the combat arena, it would be possible to combine all the elemental power contributions at that one point at one instant. A mapping of all these elemental power combinations over the combat area would, for each adversary, represent a picture of the total spatial distribution for that side at that instant.

Figure 20 illustrates such a mapping over a portion of the combat area. The figure represents overall distribution of Blue force combat power at one instant of time. As a simplification, the figure does not include Red force combat power. A complete portrayal would show power of the two sides superimposed but distinct from each other. For each side the combat power at every point results from the interactive combination of both sides’ activities that impact elements at that point at that instant, plus any effect that the combat environment has. Although a demarcation line is shown between the areas occupied by Blue and Red forces, there often is no firm separation of forces. Some Blue forces can be operating (and creating combat power) within the area where Red forces predominate.

Since external processes will at times create more of the total combat power than will internal processes, Figure 20 shows a greater portion of Blue’s combat power within the Red force area. This will not always be the case. During preparation for an attack, for example, most combat power will be distributed within the friendly force area.

A diagram similar to Figure 20 could be made for the spatial distribution of combat potential for the Blue force. A major difference would be that combat potential would be distributed only within the area occupied by the Blue force, since potential, by definition, does not involve actions against the enemy. Once combat is in full swing, most of available combat potential will normally have been converted to combat power.

The conceptually simple presentation of spatial distribution presented above is unfortunately belied by the complexity of real-life combat. There is not as yet any way to mathematically combine the combat power contributions of a mixed bag of processes, nor even to quantify completely the contributions of a single process. Hence it is not possible to produce a mapping like Figure 20 for a real combat situation, even though we can envision it. Yet commanders in combat, drawing on experience and training, intuitively accomplish the task of summing combat power and visualizing it in time and space. Superiority of one force over another is the result of skillful distribution of elements and actions that are decisive in space and time. Experienced command leadership and a high degree of combat readiness are essential for this to happen.

The vector aspect of combat power. Figures 20, 21 and 22 display combat power as if it were a scalar quantity without regard to its vector-like characteristic, yet the vectoring of combat is a powerful means of channeling effort. The vectoring, however, while always intended to be favorable, is not always so in actuality, and so this negative aspect of distributing combat power must be examined.

In Figure 23, both Blue and Red experience periods of unfavorable state changes, the consequence of the combat power vector having been adverse. For each side in combat, favorableness or unfavorableness is generally inversely related to that of the other side, but there is not a one-for-one inverse correspondence either in space or time because the missions of the two sides are not necessarily in one-for-one direct opposition. In addition, there can be other reasons than enemy action for combat power being unfavorably vectored, such as errors, inefficiencies, and bad decisions on the part of the friendly force. In most such cases attributable to the friendly force, the fault does not lead to the vector being totally reversed, but rather to it being skewed away from full support of the mission. In the example cited above, a faulty judgment about the terrain might result in a slowing of the advance and thus a less favorable vectoring, but not a retreat.

The vector aspect of combat output. Combat output, the cumulative effect of combat power over time, is equivalent to combat work accomplished. As such, combat output is reflected in the cumulative results, favorable and unfavorable, which equate to the cumulative states of a force. Since output derives from combat power, it likewise has a vector-like characteristic, leading to the state of the force at times being favorable or unfavorable to mission accomplishment as combat progresses. The measures of combat output are largely in scalar quantitative terms such as cumulative amount of ground gained or lost, casualties inflicted on the enemy versus casualties sustained, and enemy aircraft shot down and ships damaged versus own-force losses. But combat output is also measured in factors less conducive to quantification, such as accumulation of intelligence information versus lack of it, retention of communication links versus loss of them, and increase in fighting spirit versus demoralization. As to both the more and the less quantifiable measures, the vector aspect for each adversary enters insofar as the cumulative measures are favorable or not to mission achievement. Ground may have been taken toward the mission objective, but if the cumulative costs in casualties, loss of unit integrity, and lower morale were excessive, ultimate mission fulfillment may have been set back, and combat output vectoring will have been unfavorable.

Figure 24 shows the changes in vectored combat output over a part of the combat area that follow from the combat power example of Figure 23. In Figure 23, the curves represent the time rate of change of state for each of the two sides. The combat output curves in Figure 24 are the integrals of the combat power curves in Figure 23—the cumulative states, favorable or unfavorable of each side. For Blue in the example, combat output is favorable to mission accomplishment throughout the duration of combat, although it becomes less favorable during the period when Blue combat power becomes unfavorable. For Red, there are periods when net combat output is unfavorable, and Red ends the combat action in such a state. As shown, neither Blue nor Red fully reaches the end-states each sought, but Red’s shortfall is greater than Blue’s.

The propitious distribution of combat power in time and space is a sine qua non for success in combat. Distribution in time and in space is carried out as a single integrated activity, but to facilitate presentation, each will be discussed separately.

Propitiousness as a measure of merit. For both time and space distribution, we use the notion of propitiousness instead of optimality as the measure of merit. Propitiousness involves a range of time and space over which results obtained are, as of that moment in the course of combat, observably favorable. This is not retrenchment from rigor, but rather a recognition that at any time during the course of combat there cannot be an a priori optimum distribution of combat power, since such an optimum presumes foreknowledge of the future effects of enemy and friendly actions being taken, as well as of the ultimate outcome of combat. Combat cannot be presented as equations in closed form in which answers are predetermined when the input variables are known.

Time propitiousness is illustrated in the three cases shown in Figure 25. For each case, the time of actual execution lags behind the time of execution selected by the commander, a common occurrence in combat. In Case 1, the action is not time-critical, so the range of propitiousness is broad, and fortuitously, time of execution turns out better than the selected time. In Case 2, timing is sensitive and the time of execution falls outside the range of propitiousness. Case 3 shows an instance where time of completion is so critical as to constitute a firm cut-off; execution is so late there is no favorable result at all.

Extending the notion of propitiousness to distribution in both time and space becomes more difficult to visualize. Propitiousness in essence is captured in the dictum attributed to General Nathan Bedford Forrest of "getting there first with the most men." But sometimes getting there first even with less is propitious, and at other times getting there with the most even tardily is propitious. About the only ground rule that can be stated is that whatever falls within a range of advantageousness at the moment in light of the course of combat to that point is propitious.

Combat comprises innumerable such single-action degrees of time-space propitiousness or unpropitiousness. The result of every individual action can in principle be characterized by the propitiousness (or lack thereof) as to when and where the action occurred, and the aggregated time-space distribution of many actions can be viewed as propitious in the aggregate or not. The propitiousness of a single action can never depend on the merit of the action in isolation, but must depend on its contribution to the stream of actions there and elsewhere. In the eyes of participants, distribution in time and space (as with all aspects of combat) is viewed in the aggregate and will be seen more as art than science. The principles of war and operational manuals make clear the utmost importance of spatial and time distribution of the combined elements and actions of a force acting in concert.

Information feedback loops and action-reaction cycles. Since combat involves two-sided force-on-force activity, there is a constant cycle of action and reaction and information feedback by both sides, some of it feedback regarding the friendly force and some about the enemy. Within his plan of actions, a commander will incorporate planned reactions to anticipated enemy initiatives

and counteractions, and both his initiative actions and his reactions will be modified as battle progresses. The outcome of combat will be critically affected by the timeliness of responses by the two sides in the action-reaction cycles. To make timely, propitious decisions, commanders depend on timely and high quality input information, and, of course, the efficacy of their decision-making also depends on how well they process that information.

Figure 26 depicts two information loops, one being the own-force loop that starts with own-force information acquisition, transmits information via intermediate nodes to commanders where decisions are made regarding further information acquisition, and then completes the loop back to own-force information acquisition. The other loop involves intelligence information, which is sent to the same commanders for decisions about further intelligence information gathering, and then back to intelligence acquisition. In both loops, communication links all nodes. The two loops operate in parallel and meet at the commander node, where both kinds of information are weighed to produce the outgoing directives for further acquisition and for other own-force actions (these latter actions are not part of the information loops; they are part of the action-reaction cycle). Although the decision node in Figure 26 shows commanders, the loops pertain not only to those in the command chain but to all individuals, since all contribute in some degree to decision-making.

The time it takes for information to cycle through the information loops is critical. Likewise, time responsiveness in the action-reaction cycles is critical. The side that can acquire, cycle, and process information faster and that can react faster to processed information has a great advantage. Figure 27 is a depiction that combines the information acquisition loops and the action-reaction cycle in the form of a horizontal double figure eight, one for the Blue force and one for the Red force. For each force, the length of time, starting from the commander node at the center of the figure eight, out along the information acquisition loop, back to the commander, then out along the action-reaction cycle, and finally back to the commander again, represents total time responsiveness for information gathering, information feedback, information processing, force reaction, and feedback of information about force reaction. The total time responsiveness is conceptually the sum of the two cycles (the total path along the figure eight). In the Blue force versus Red force comparison illustrated in Figure 27, Blue is shown as having the longer information acquisition cycle time and the shorter reaction cycle time.

Within the commander node at the center of the figure eight, information (as perceived) is continually being received, integrated, stored, and processed periodically into orders in reaction to the situation. Information about the

reactions is then returned to the commander, where it is again integrated, stored, and processed for further decisions about information acquisition and force action.

For actual combat, the concept of time responsiveness illustrated in Figure 27 is not possible to reproduce quantitatively, since the flow of information is virtually continuous at and between nodes, with continual mixing of information at every node. In addition, information is subject to storage for varying periods of time and is retrieved and processed sporadically. All of this makes for blended information melded from many discrete initial acquisitions in the manner of a stream accumulating flow from many rivulets. Overlapping and mixing obscures calculation of discrete time lags. Nevertheless, in principle, an element of information could be traced through the system, and the transit time measured. Regardless of the doubtful practicality of accomplishing this, it is crucial to minimize time lags.

What counts, of course, is not merely less time lag in absolute terms, but less lag than the opponent. The combat power advantage of one side over the other will be some function of the time lag differential. The effect is analogous to the advantage of one aircraft carrier over another by virtue of its quicker intelligence acquisition and its shorter turn-around time for refueling and rearming aircraft.

As mentioned previously, there is also a qualitative factor that affects the information loops. Information flowing through these loops is not the reality of the situation, but the perception of reality as conditioned by gaps and other faults in information gathering (about both the friendly force and the enemy) and in communicating. These shortcomings are inherent in both information loops, but are especially critical in the intelligence loop. The qualitative aspects of information flow are as important as time lags.

Achieving propitious distribution of combat power. There are no standard formulas to guide commanders in distributing combat power. No two missions are the same, no two situations are exactly alike, and the number of factors to be taken into account is immense. General guidelines are found in the principles and maxims of war. More specific guidelines exist in doctrinal and tactical manuals, training courses, military history, and most important, the hard lessons of combat experience. To these can be added the universally accepted dictums to focus combat power so as to exploit enemy weaknesses, use surprise and shock effect, concentrate force against the enemy’s decisive sources of strength and balance (his center of gravity), take account of culminating points during operations, and observe other time-honored precepts. Implicit in all these guidelines is the advantage accruing to the side that has the more rapid and more effective responsiveness.

With trends we must once again distinguish the real from the perceived. A multiplicity of actual trends is at play at any moment in combat. Sometimes the trends are strong, widespread, and reinforcing. At other times the trends are weak, localized, and disparate. In either case, actual trends derive from the flow of actual events. They exist in reality.

Perceived trends, on the other hand, are derived from information acquired about events, and are subject to all the numerous faults of the acquisition process plus the overlay of subjective interpretation during the multilayered command and control functions. Perception may miss an actual trend until it has gotten out of hand, or conversely, may grossly exaggerate a trend of little real importance. In any case, events are passed through the filter of perception and it is trends as perceived that continually form the basis for each combatant’s projection of the future. Perceptions by individuals are not reached independently; they are influenced by the perceptions of peers and superiors, particularly commanders. Thus, while the perception of trends is an important influence on each individual, these perceptions take on a group coloration in much the same way that cohesion and disjunction infectiously modify group behavior.

Much investigation has been carried out on the effects of trends upon the outcome of combat. A major focus of this has been investigation of mathematical models that represent trends, much of the work concentrating on attrition equations and their many variants, such as versions of Lanchester equations. Often, the models indicate a trend that continues inevitably in the same direction to some point taken as defeat or exhaustion or unit break point. In other cases, solutions may terminate in one or more equilibrium points that act somewhat like the attractors of chaos theory. All these mathematical representations of combat are recognized as gross simplifications of reality.

Nevertheless, the question may be asked whether there are real trends in combat that, once begun, continue inexorably in the same direction. Consideration of a wide variety of trends (for example, in ground gained or lost, motivation or demoralization, cohesion or disjunction, rate of casualties, losses of materiel) leads to the conclusion that the only real trends that might be classed as inevitable and irreversible are those dictated by the process of destruction. Other trends appear to be subject to reversal, given the right conditions. Indeed, this is the basis of culminating points in land combat doctrine. One reason lies in the action-reaction cycles, where perceptions of adverse trends continuously lead to attempts to alter the trends, with at least occasional success. A more significant reason probably lies deeper, involving human behavior and the power of combat units to self-regenerate and self-reorganize.

Destruction can be considered as not subject to reversibility because once an object is destroyed, it ceases to exist and cannot be resurrected. The point, however, is only partly valid, and somewhat trivial, because some losses can be replaced during combat and some damaged materiel and wounded combatants can be restored to battle.

Although trends of real events do not appear to proceed inevitably, perceived trends nevertheless have a pronounced effect on the outcome of combat. In accordance with Axiom 5, the perception by one side that it is achieving domination or by the other side that it is becoming dominated has a powerful cognitive effect that is often self-reinforcing.

It is the projection of perceived trends more than the trends themselves that governs decisions about future actions. This applies at all decision nodes from individuals to the combat commander. A commander who projects that a pattern of events will lead to future trouble will seek to turn the unfavorable pattern to a favorable one, or if unable to do so, may try to disengage from combat. An individual soldier may seek to improve his projected future, or in the extreme, may become disheartened and lose his will to fight. Disparate projections from mixed trends can dissipate combat power in friction.

Because commanders are aware of time lags and faults in information acquisition and the command and control functions, projected trends based on perceived events are susceptible to exaggeration and overcompensation in decision-making. The decision mechanism acts sometimes like a servo system in which imperfect responsiveness results in sometimes overcontrolling, sometimes undercontrolling, and sometimes oscillating between two positions. Poor time responsiveness amplifies the overcontrolling and undercontrolling.

events are such that Red has perceived that a culminating point may be approaching and is acting accordingly. Blue, not anticipating the culminating point, is not only in no position to delay or negate the culminating point but, worse, continues to take actions that eventually lead to his catastrophic failure.

As noted in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, commanders must understand that in battle, men and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually. Figure 28 depicts the catastrophic failure from delayed perception and consequent erroneous projection by Blue of an adverse trend, as distinguished from the timely and correct perception and projection by Red of a trend favorable to him. Military doctrine universally emphasizes the paramount importance of perceiving and exploiting trends toward failure by the enemy and mitigating trends toward own-force failure. Failing to exploit or to mitigate a trend when it is in a commander’s power to do so is an egregious error.

The flow of combat is normally episodic. The constantly shifting distribution of combat power leads to crescendos of violent action often followed by lulls. There is no repeatable pattern to this characteristic. Sometimes there is only a single crescendo, sometimes many spaced over time, sometimes two or more at once. A crescendo may arise from a sudden surprise engagement, or from a gradual build-up of action. A maneuver may cause a peak in the action, or sometimes firepower; more often it is both. The action-reaction cycles tend to give a cyclic character to the peaking and ebbing of combat power, a sort of pulsing of activity. Action-reaction cycles at the macro level are, of course, composed of myriads of micro action-reaction cycles, and it is the vectored reinforcing of these that gives rise to this pulsing of activity. But here again, there is no repeatable pattern, no consistency from one combat situation to another.

In some ways the episodic flow of combat can be compared to the flow of a turbulent stream, with its mix of smoothly flowing water and occasional rapids and whirlpools. The comparison is apt because describing turbulence in liquid flow remains an unsolved problem in physics; there is as yet no adequate theoretical basis to take account of whorls and eddies, or even how turbulent flow begins. Similarly, in combat we are limited in how far we can go in presenting a theoretical basis for combat dynamics. One of the tools applied in an attempt to cope with turbulence in liquid flow is the concept of state space (also called phase space), a conceptual space where each dimension corresponds to one variable of the system. But in combat, there is no discernible periodicity in the way the variables behave, and there are so many variables as to render an approach using state space meaningless. In the extreme, the number of variables equals the number of individuals engaged in combat (plus the combat environment variables), and the state space spreads out in uncountable dimensions.

To recognize that combat is turbulent, in the sense of being generally episodic with intense combat power pulses and lulls, is not to say that at present we can scientifically do much about this characteristic. Yet commanders can and do cope with the turbulent flow of combat. Where the scientist sees random, unpredictable, formlessness in the turbulence of a river, the commander sees useful patterns in the flow of human actions during combat. And others under the commander likewise see patterns that enable the force as a whole to cope with turbulence and chaos and make sense out of combat. A unit in combat thus draws order from a sea of chaos. As the eminent scientist Erwin Schrödinger put it, a living organism has the "astonishing gift of concentrating a stream of order on itself and thus escaping the decay into chaos."

Combat, perhaps the most complex of all human endeavors, is certainly one of the most trying. The nature of combat, with its uncertainties and its peaks and lulls, with combat power constantly being changed in a three-sided mix, and with its human behavioral unknowables, follows no repeatable pattern that allows for predictability in detail. Despite this, trained commanders and forces find ways to successfully apply combat power and achieve missions. Where many throw up their hands at the complexity and turbulence of combat, the ones called on to wage battles make a creditable showing of it. In the same vein, where some disparage as hopeless an attempt to explain the intricacies of combat with any useful validity, we in this document have at least tried. If nothing else, this is a beginning.