Nevertheless, we have sought to be as scientifically objective as the state of knowledge permits. While military practice will undoubtedly remain much in the realm of art, our description of combat dynamics is not so much art as a holistic explanation of the workings of combat. We believe that, in principle, the dynamics could in the main be substantiated—quantitatively in many parts and qualitatively elsewhere—if the data of combat were somehow vastly expanded. For the present, we must be content to provide a descriptive explanation. The subject is presented more as a source of insight than as an explanation with predictive power. Poincaré, addressing the difficulty of expressing solutions to problems, stated, "What we can always do, or rather what we should always try to do, is to solve the qualitative problem so to speak, that is to try to find the general form of the curve representing the unknown function."

The concept of combat power is central to understanding the theory of combat. Axiom 4 states that commanders create combat power from combat potential in furtherance of a mission. It is combat power that produces results in combat.

We begin the discussion of dynamics by explaining the meaning of the term combat power as used here. Each side brings energy to bear in the form of combat functions with the aim of creating combat power, but it is only through the fundamental processes of combat that combat power is actually produced and results achieved. As stated in previous chapters, the results of combat processes are not determined by each side unilaterally; they are formed by the interactions of the two sides, as further modified by the combat environment.

Commanders and their forces are judged by how well they distribute the combat power developed and how successfully they vector that power toward mission fulfillment. The cumulative effect of combat power over time is called combat output. This corresponds to the work done in trying to accomplish the mission in the face of enemy opposition. It is the combat output of one side relative to the combat output of the other side that determines which side has done better at the conclusion of combat.

Combat power has different meanings to different audiences. An explanation of the term as used here is presented below.

Combat power, the agent by which results are achieved in combat, is the means of translating the purpose of combat into the desired outcome. The combat functions of each side are unilaterally applied to remove the enemy’s opposition and to achieve mission fulfillment. In the resulting interactions between the two sides and the combat environment, combat processes, reflecting actual results, form the combat power achieved by each side. Since combat power derives from the basic components and structure of combat, it inherits their characteristics and translates them into the dynamics of combat. Thus, such properties as vectored control and aggregation-disaggregation, described earlier in the static sense, carry over to the dynamic nature of combat power.

Although combat power cannot be seen any more than can gravity its results can be observed, and in some degree measured. It is very real to commanders in combat and to every combatant. Like a force field, combat power does not exist as a single entity such that each side has a lump sum of combat power that is applied against the other side’s lump sum. It is a distributed quantity that is continuously being formed and aggregated (from finite bits) throughout the combat area, waxing and waning here and there as the battle progresses. Each side forms and distributes its own combat power, but it cannot do so unilaterally, for its combat power is affected by the opponent’s actions and by the combat environment.

Definition of combat power. Combat power is the realized capability of a force at any instant of time to achieve results in combat in furtherance of a particular mission against a specific enemy force in a specific combat environment. Combat power is the actual instantaneous capability brought to bear in any manner that influences the combat situation. It exists as elemental combat power contributions that can be aggregated and distributed in time and space by command and control actions. Combat power encompasses capabilities that are both internally-directed (affecting the friendly force) and externally-directed (affecting the opposing force). It does not depend unilaterally on the actions of a force, but rather on the combination of those actions and interactions with the opposing force and the environment. Because of this, the results of combat power are not necessarily the useful results expected by one side taking an action, but instead are the actual results that occur in the amalgam of both sides taking action, each for its own purposes.

Combat power directly impacts elements, not actions. As with the element-action-element activities described in Chapter 5, combat power is brought to bear both on physical elements (tanks, trucks, aircraft, fortifications, ships) and cognitive elements (commanders, other personnel, the fighting spirit of individuals). It does not directly affect actions (shooting, moving, firing, feeding, and so on), but actions are impacted indirectly through the combat power effects on elements.

Vector characteristic. Since combat power is the means of realizing intentions, it has the nature of a directed agent. The combat power of each side is directed toward the accomplishment of that side’s mission, and thereby operates as if vectored to achieve the mission. But since each side’s combat power is affected by the opposing side and the environment, the vectoring does not guarantee that results will align with the vector. In addition, vectoring can be weakened by ineffectual internal activities of the friendly force, and friendly and enemy activities external to the combat arena can impinge on the vectoring by each side.

Trilateral dependence. Combat power is generated from available combat potential. But whereas the combat potential available to each side is unilaterally dependent on the actions of that side, the resulting combat power is dependent on the actions of the enemy, as well as those of the friendly side, and in addition is affected by the combat environment. The trilateral dependence of combat power is fundamental.

Granular characteristic. The ebb and flow of combat power on each side may appear to be a continuous function, smoothly changing over time. Actually, combat power is granular; it is composed of minuscule "grains" of combat. Viewed at the micro level, combat power would exhibit countless ebbs and flows, ups and downs. We say "countless," but the number of grains is finite nonetheless. The bits of combat power come from the great many individual element-action-element couplings that combine to give the appearance of continuously flowing activity. Each granule contributes its share to combat power, and in this sense, the contributions can be thought of as akin to the quanta of quantum mechanics. Combat power is granular in time and in the three dimensions of space, even though it appears in the macro view as continuous. Yet, while remaining faithful to the micro granularity, the theory must address the aggregation of grains of combat power into the amorphous-appearing nature of combat dealt with by combatants in battle.

An instantaneous quantity. Combat power acts as a rate. It is the capability to achieve results at any instant of time, and thus it is seen as the time rate of change of the states of elements (own force, enemy force, and environment). At the lowest level, it is the capability to achieve results at a particular granular element of space at one instant of time At the overall level, it is the aggregate capability over many elements of space at one instant. The cumulative impact of combat power over time is produced as combat output.

Property of aggregation-disaggregation. Another characteristic of combat power is that elemental combat power contributions can be aggregated into clusters of combat power, and these in turn into larger clusters. Conversely, combat can be dissected into smaller groupings of combat power and on down to elemental contributions. This property derives from the corresponding property of elements and actions.

Combat power exists only during combat. Combat power exists only in the face of an opposing force while combat is in progress. Before combat commences and after it terminates, the capability to achieve combat results exists as combat potential, not as combat power.

Combat power exhibits self-similarity within the hierarchical structure of combat. Combat power works at the lowest echelons of combat in the same way it works at the highest echelons. This is determined by the fractal-like hierarchical character of combat structure. In principle, the combat power of a tank brigade is exerted in the same manner as the elemental combat power exerted by a single tank.

Since combat power causes a rate of change of state, its effect acting over time is cumulative changes of state, which we call combat output. Combat output is the cumulative results (measured as the new states of elements of both sides and the combat environment) of combat power acting over time on the combat situation. Combat output is simply the time integral of combat power. It is equivalent to combat work accomplished against an enemy and in furtherance of a mission. It differs from the physics definition of work in that much of combat work is cognitive in nature rather than physical. Combat output is not necessarily fully useful to either side. It can be favorable or unfavorable depending on how well it advances the mission. The combat power results integrated as output are those actually occurring (as distinguished from results perceived by each side to be occurring).

The following definitions stem from the nature of combat power and combat output, and from the axioms set forth earlier.

Combat result is the changed state that occurs in a single or aggregated element from an elemental or aggregated combat activity. The new state is the changed condition of the single or aggregated element being acted on as reflected by its attributes, including its spatial conditions. One possible combat result is destruction of an element, in which the state change is from existence to nonexistence (the state change for a truck that has been destroyed but whose parts are salvaged is nonexistence as a truck element plus conversion of the truck into separate truck parts elements).

Combat situation is the totality of the states of both sides and of the environment at any point of time during combat. "Totality" means the aggregation of the states of all elements. The combat situation is the reality of what exists in the combat arena, not what is perceived to be the situation by each side. The combat power mixture of the two sides produces a rate of change of the combat situation at any instant of time. Combat output produces accumulated change of the situation over time.

Designed combat potential is the pre-combat latent designed capacity of a force to achieve useful results in combat when organized, trained, equipped, supported, motivated, and led according to the force design against a design threat. Designed combat potential represents a nominal state of combat capacity unencumbered by shortfalls in combat readiness and undegraded by enemy action. It is a unilateral characteristic of a force rather than one that is influenced by the actions of a particular enemy in a particular combat environment.

Available combat potential is the latent capacity of a force to achieve useful results in combat with its existing organization, training, equipment, support, motivation, and leadership. This represents a combat capacity taking into account real-life shortfalls, but as yet undegraded by a particular combat environment or by enemy action. Immediately before combat commences, available combat potential is what each side has to draw on for conversion to combat power. During combat, potential not yet converted to combat power remains as available potential. Because of degradations from enemy actions and the environment, available combat potential is rarely, if ever, transformed fully into combat power.

Combat energy. Although the term "combat energy" has not been given a particular definition, energy in the broadest sense of the word is what is expended to produce combat power and combat output. Specifically, energy is expended by each side in performing combat functions to create combat power by means of the processes formed in the three-sided interactive mix. The human energy expended is both physical and cognitive. The material energy is in the form of expenditure of fuel, ordnance, and other consumables, and overcoming impediments of the combat environment.

Granting questions about the validity of using mathematical expressions to characterize a subject as complex and as subject to the human element as combat, it may nevertheless be useful to try to express the essence of combat power in a mathematical analogy. This may help in understanding the subject, and, if nothing else, the attempt may test the concept by trying to state it in mathematical terms. Beyond that, some ideas may begin to take shape for further exploration.

We begin by setting down some terms.

Then, as a first step, in simplest terms we can express the generalized concept of combat power (in part) as:

. (1)

But Equation Set (1) cannot represent the complete notion of combat power, since, by our definition, the combat power of each side is modified by the opposing force’s combat power, and so an expression must be included to reflect this. The enemy combat power can impact only elements (not actions), and in impacting elements, it will change the attributes of those elements, thus changing the state of the elements. Therefore we postulate the instantaneous changes of state in the following expressions:

. (2)

In Equation Set (2), g again stands for "a function of." And again, we do not know the nature of this function except that it is conceptually the same for Blue and Red forces and is different from that represented by f. We also make the assumption that Red combat power, , has a negative effect (as indicated by the minus sign) on the change of state of Blue forces, while has a positive effect, and the converse is true for the change of state of Red forces.

We do not know how the elemental bits of combat power (as affected by elemental bits of enemy combat power) can be rigorously combined into aggregated combat power. We assert that the summation process is not linear; that is, aggregated combat power is not the arithmetic sum of elemental bits of combat power. Granting the lack of a methodology for aggregating, we nevertheless suggest that conjugate Equation Sets (1) and (2) can be considered as a mathematical analogy for the concept of combat power at both elemental and aggregated levels of force.

Axiom 3 states that combat potential, the latent capacity to achieve results in combat, is embodied in military forces. Prior to combat, forces are organized, prepared and indoctrinated, sometimes hastily and sometimes over many years, with the potential to carry out combat when called upon. The development of combat potential begins when raw manpower is recruited, material is turned into weapons, and doctrine and tactics are developed. It continues with training, preparing, and developing readiness until the latent capacity is activated and discharged during combat. While combat is under way, forces outside the combat area not engaged in combat retain their combat capacity as combat potential, and the capacity of some of the forces within the combat arena may also be retained as potential. Once combat has terminated, residual capacity reverts to combat potential.

The dividing line between combat potential and combat power is determined by the question of influence. If an element, regardless of location, exerts any influence on the combat situation, it is contributing to combat power. If not, it remains combat potential. For example, a strategic intelligence acquisition system available outside the combat area has combat potential, but if it feeds in tactical intelligence about the combat situation, then it contributes to combat power. If a unit within the combat area is held in reserve, it nevertheless contributes to combat power, since its availability influences the force commander and his subordinates in their decisions (and may also influence the opponent if he is aware of the reserve unit). Similarly, reserve stocks of ammunition and fuel available to each side have an influence because, if stocks are ample, commanders know that their combat actions will not have to be limited; or, if stocks are low, they know the force will have to curb combat action to hoard supplies. An infantryman who participates in heavy combat action but never fires his rifle contributes to combat power because his presence affects those around him. In all these examples, however, most of the capacity of the reserve unit, the unused portion of reserve stocks, and the infantryman’s capability remain as combat potential.

The extent to which any particular unit may be counted as potential rather than combat power is not significant in itself; the influence on the situation is the significant point. The difference between combat potential and combat power is analogous to the difference between potential energy and kinetic energy in physics. In physics, work can be accomplished by converting potential energy to kinetic energy; in combat, work (combat output) can be accomplished by converting combat potential to combat power. Combat potential is latent capacity, while combat power is active, realized capability.

Designed combat potential is a nominal potential based on how a force is designed and the environments and threats it is designed to be used against. The force’s potential for use in combat situations different from the intended environment and threat will vary, usually on the down side. Its potential for achieving results in combat can be estimated by considering the numbers of force elements and the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the elements based on both hard and approximated data (subjective to some extent) and various methods of computing force effectiveness against a specific or generic threat. Weapon effectiveness is usually based on laboratory tests, field tests, simulations, maneuvers, and past combat experience using the weapons. The effectiveness of individuals and units is based on similar data sources. Yet even with voluminous data, determining the combat potential of a force is difficult; there is no widely accepted method for summing the combined capability of all force elements. Extrapolation from experience remains the most reliable input to such estimates. Designed combat potential thus represents an estimated nominal capability that does not take into account particular force readiness degradations, nor degradations from the actions an enemy might take or an unfavorable combat environment might impose.

Available combat potential, on the other hand, incorporates all the real-life degradations to which a force may be subject. These can include poor leadership, inadequate training, low morale, fatigue, equipment in poor repair, inoperative communication links, shortfalls in manning and equipping, deficiencies in tactics and doctrine, and countless other exigencies. It is with its available combat potential that any force starts into battle. Before combat a commander has opportunities to improve his potential, but when combat commences, his available potential is what he has to draw on. Available combat potential is his to unilaterally mold, but once combat has begun, the combat power he is able to activate from that potential will depend not only on his choices but also those of his opponent.

As stated in axiom 4, commanders activate combat potential to develop combat power in furtherance of their mission. Activation of combat power begins during the preparatory steps at the outset of combat and intensifies during its course, with residual capability reverting to combat potential when combat terminates.

During the preparatory phase, combat energy is developed unilaterally by each side through the combat functions needed to initiate the mission. Preparatory actions include issuing initial orders, positioning forces and supplies, and observing the opponent. At this stage, the development of combat power from combat potential is largely unencumbered by enemy action. Thereafter, during the active phase when combat functions lead to interaction with the enemy, the combat power that a force generates is degraded from its potential by virtue of the enemy’s actions in opposition and by any disadvantageous aspects of the combat environment. Figure 15 illustrates the degradation of combat capacity from designed potential to available potential to the capability to achieve results during the course of actual combat.

Activation of combat power is initiated solely through cognitive actions. The force commander on each side takes various command actions, primarily using the processes of command-control, motivation, and communication, to vector and control his force to accomplish his mission. Subordinate commanders extend the command function and the same processes throughout the force. Noncommand personnel respond to commands with countless cognitive decisions of their own to get their parts of the operation going, and these noncommand decisions further extend the vectoring and controlling. Thus the activation of combat power results from innumerable cognitive actions by all individuals in combat. The process of command-control operates through all individuals, though it is manifested as a top-down process initiated by a single combat commander. This extended process of command-control obviously is subject to inefficiencies (seen as friction, to be discussed later) as it stretches farther from the combat commander.

In addition to this array of direct cognitive actions, there are many cognitive actions that fall under a preprogrammed class of automatic response to situations. These stem from training, indoctrination, culture, and ordinary good sense of what needs to be done. In a well-trained unit, a commander may state an order in only a few words. The unit takes over and knows the many things that must be done. At every decision node, innumerable actions are taken because of the vast built-in comprehension of what is wanted. The implicit content of the control system far outweighs the explicit content. The cognitive states of individual combatants have had inculcated in them the knowledge, information, understanding and motivation that vectors their decision actions properly, for the most part. A unit that makes such automatic responses correctly is described as well trained and as having cohesiveness and force integrity.

Creating combat power from potential is subject to the faults mentioned previously that can arise in the extended control mechanism. A multitude of other factors can also have negative effects. The combat environment can be a major degrading factor. Severely adverse weather and terrain, for example, can greatly reduce the effective power activated from potential. Likewise, constraints imposed by higher commanders or by local conditions (such as interference from noncombatants in the area) can curtail the activation of power. Uncertainty about the situation can lead to faulty judgments. Chance events can have an impact.

On the positive side, given a particular level of combat potential, the activation of power can be enhanced in many ways. When a force is properly organized for a particular combination of mission, situation, and environment, a kind of combat power synergy results. High morale, force integrity and cohesiveness are enhancing factors. Commanders, starting with the force commander but also including the rest of the command chain, have a paramount effect, for good or for bad.

Some of the most critical positive and negative influences are discussed below. The influences pertain both to the activation and the subsequent application of combat power.

A major degrading influence on combat power is what has been described as "combat friction." It appears to be ubiquitous, but its cause is only vaguely explained.

Defining combat friction. When applied to warfare, the term friction can have a variety of meanings. Among these is use to denote what might be considered the "grand friction" of war: friction that arises in the conduct of campaigns, in theater-level actions, and in national and coalition war activities. Clausewitz has used friction in this broad sense. We are concerned in this document only with the narrower significance of friction in combat.

Combat power often appears to be reduced due to causes that cannot clearly be laid to enemy action nor to own-force deficiencies. The cause of this reduction can be called combat friction. It is desirable, however, to limit as finely as possible what is included under the rubric "friction," avoiding the temptation to lump all manner of elusive factors that cannot easily be explained or quantified within a catch-all bucket called friction. Nevertheless, because understanding of the phenomenon is as yet nebulous, a degree of arbitrariness is necessary as to what is counted as friction and what is not. Friction is defined and described here conceptually rather than explicitly.

We define combat friction as unproductive energy expended on any wasteful result that occurs in a force when an agent element carries out an action. In the aggregate, combat friction at any time is the summation of wasteful results occurring from many elemental actions. Every element-action-element activity has associated with it not only an intended useful result, but possibly also unintended friction results, which in combination are combat friction in a force.

A theoretical basis for combat friction. In accordance with the definition above, friction in combat arises from the countless interactions that occur among combat elements. The results are similar to encounters between physical objects: when one physical object strikes another, there is a wasted loss of energy, or more precisely, the conversion of a portion of useful energy into nonuseful energy. The kinds of energy waste in combat are more complex than those in the world of physics, however, since human as well as material elements are involved.

Interaction between any two combat elements of the same force can result in friction. Every pairing is a potential source. This notion of friction is more easily seen in regard to pairs of single elements (such as two individuals or a truck and the mud it is driving through), but by extension, we can consider the friction between aggregated-element pairs (such as two platoons or the operations staff and the logistics staff of a headquarters). Friction may, of course, also result from an element taking an action that interacts with many other elements.

Friction only occurs as a byproduct of activity. It is the action that takes place in the element-action-element pairing that results in friction. Elements on the battlefield not taking any actions at a given time are not causing friction at that time. Whenever and wherever they act, there may be friction.

Combat friction is internal to a force, not the direct result of enemy action. We say this because friction is associated with the elements that are taking actions. When an element of one force takes an action that impacts an enemy element, that enemy element will, in response, often take actions that are wasteful, thus producing friction internal to the enemy force. One aim in combat is to magnify the opposition’s friction, and even when this is not a specific intent, activities effectively directed against the enemy will inevitably lead to increased friction within the enemy force.

Sources of friction. The sources and results of friction are extremely varied. They are best described through illustrations:

In all these examples, the actions described have led to a partial loss of combat power because of nonuseful results. This is combat friction.

To generalize the many sources of combat friction, we can say that friction arises from inefficient and disorganized activity, redundant activity, damping effects of the combat environment and other constraints, wear and tear and fatigue in individuals and materiel, and (perhaps most important) faults in the functions of command, control and communication. We can also say that most of the causes of combat friction are amenable to reduction.

Quantifying Friction. From the concept of friction as the wasted results of countless elemental activities in combat, it follows that the more activity, the more friction. Moreover, it is clear there is a proliferation of friction because the wasteful action of one element can result in friction in the follow-on actions of several affected elements. This observation parallels that seen earlier in the structure of combat, where we saw a compounded cascading of combat activity as the number of element pairs increased with increase in force size. We are led to the conclusion that combat friction increases in a non-linear manner as force size increases. In other words, the number of instances of friction arising in a division-size force in combat is disproportionately greater than in a brigade-size force.

There seems to be no way at present to quantify the many kinds of combat friction, but it is a good thing to try. The effect of particular sources of friction will undoubtedly vary widely from case to case. Nevertheless, it appears that many sources of friction can be identified in general terms, and means to ameliorate adverse effects can be addressed. It will be worth investigating whether the gross effect of friction—the total loss of combat power from all sources of friction—could be quantified in some manner for forces of, say, battalion and larger size where the various friction effects may average out. If gross friction can be quantified in some degree, then we can begin to calculate average or expected values.

Any reduction of friction losses is to the good. Even though quantifying friction may be an elusive goal, study of the sources and ordering them by degree of seriousness appears worthwhile. Identifying which sources are conducive to reduction can provide a basis for minimizing friction losses.

The prior discussion of combat friction points to a theoretical basis for compounded losses in combat power due to friction as force size becomes larger. The amount of loss may well be substantial, as suggested by Trevor Dupuy in Understanding War. The following discussion summarizes a hypothetical qualitative tool for envisioning the extent by which friction losses aggregate.

If every element in a force were causing friction by impacting all other elements of the force, then the upper limit of friction losses would be proportional (approximately) to the square of the number of elements in the force. But, since each element cannot impact all other elements, nor can every impact be expected to result in significant friction, we can say that the friction losses should be proportional to the number of elements actually causing friction raised to a power between 1 and 2 (because not every element causing friction will interact with every other element). In equation form, the friction losses would be:

(3)

With our present limited understanding of combat friction, this equation can do no more than indicate the exponential compounding of friction as force size becomes larger. If it were possible to estimate average friction losses per combat interaction, or to determine that most friction losses come from only certain kinds of interactions, then a quantitative approach might become more tractable.

Figure 16 shows how combat power loss due to friction changes as force size increases. The magnitude of combat power friction loss in the figure has no quantitative significance except to demonstrate the compounded increase as force size increases.

Conclusions. It is clear that combat friction, as defined herein, is a widespread phenomenon on the battlefield. Considering the variegated sources and likely frequency of friction, the following are advanced as general conclusions:

Military forces are organized in a multilayer hierarchy of units, each unit composed of two or more smaller units. In this way, forces (and hence combat power), are aggregated into larger and larger sizes. A crucial point is the manner in which combat power aggregates as force size increases. As the hierarchy of forces is built up from individual elements, can the combat power of the aggregate force be taken as the sum of the combat powers of the elements of the force, or is there some other basis for summing combat power? In a linear theory, it is conceptually possible to add the separate parts to get the whole. But combat in no sense conforms to a linear theory; it is a dynamical, nonlinear phenomenon, with a multiplicity of cross-connected factors within and between the two opponents. Summing the separate parts does not give the whole, nor does summing the combat power contribution of the separate parts lead to the combat power of the whole. We have already noted the compounding of friction losses as forces become larger.

Synergism from mutual support and reinforcement. To approach the problem of aggregation, we first consider a hypothetical force composed entirely of like elements. The only such forces today would be small units, such as a platoon of identical tanks or a flight of identical aircraft. In ancient warfare, one can picture larger forces of like elements—perhaps hundreds of warriors all trained alike and armed with identical spears, daggers, and shields. In a battle where each warrior fought independently of the others (in a melee, for example), the combat power of the aggregate force might well be the sum of the combat powers of all the individual warriors (disregarding friction).

If we combine the actions of individual warriors tactically in a phalanx that operates in a concerted manner, the combat power of the aggregated force then appears (from historical evidence) to be greater than the sum of its parts, since it can defeat a same-size force not organized as a phalanx. The explanation lies in the mutual protection and reinforcement (physical and psychological) that each warrior now receives from nearby warriors when operating in unison as a phalanx. Combat power synergy has resulted from a tactical improvement. Clearly, where there is mutual reinforcement and protection in a force, the aggregate combat power of the force is greater than the sum of the combat power of the elements of the force.

If, however, this homogeneous mutually supporting force comes up against a force of equal size that not only employs mutual support but also has a greater variety of weapons (some of the warriors, let us say, armed with longbows and arrows instead of spears and daggers), the homogeneous force can now be at a disadvantage if it is vulnerable to any of the new weapons. Any single weapon system, even though powerful when standing alone, may be defeated if it cannot defend against all opposing weapons (in the example case, stand-off use of the bow and arrow). The point applies as well to a force using a single tactic against an equal-size force using a variety of tactics. By further extension, the point also holds even where a disparity exists in the capabilities of similar weapons. These cases exemplify, in simple form, the concept of combined arms. The term is used here in the most general sense of combination both within a single military service and across service lines.

Depending on how vulnerable it is, the side deficient in weapon or tactical variety can be outweighed in combat power by an opponent inferior in force size. There comes a point, however, where the sheer magnitude of the weapon-deficient and tactics-deficient force develops enough combat power to overwhelm a smaller force that is richer in weaponry and tactics.

Synergistic effect of combined arms. Over the centuries new weapons and tactics have been added to armed forces in the attempt to impose new vulnerabilities on the opposition and to compensate for own-force vulnerabilities created by the opposition. Modern forces must cope with a great variety of weapons and tactics, some meant solely for attack, some for defense, some for deception, some as counters to enemy weapons and tactics, and some as counters to counters. Fundamental to military forces has always been the necessity to defend as well as attack. For this reason, it is not possible to maximize combat power by arming a force only with highly potent offense weapons. A case in point is overdependence by the Israelis on offense aircraft and armor at the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. A force could be designed for maximum potential by loading it with only the most powerful offense weapons and tactics, but it will fail in combat against a force armed with weapons and tactics which it cannot counter.

Throughout this process of proliferating weapons and tactics, the key to success has always been combination into complementary mutually supporting systems. This is the concept of combined arms. Weapons and units are used in supportive combinations such that the capabilities of each are maximized while the weaknesses are minimized. Each weapon and tactic has a role, and it is the combination of all working together that enhances the capability of the force as a whole. If any weapon or tactic is missing or deficient, force capability is weakened. We are led to the conclusion that built-in mutual support results in a combined arms synergism that increases combat power.

In modern military forces, the combined arms concept is applied at all force levels. Forces are constituted as combined arms teams within larger combined arms teams within still larger teams from the smallest unit to theater forces. The principle of mutual support is applied universally: weapon systems protect other kinds of weapon systems and are protected in turn; there is support between like units and unlike units; support between ground, air and naval units; support between higher and lower echelons; support to the front and the rear; support laterally and vertically; and so on. To the degree that the principle of mutual support is followed, the combined arms synergism is felt throughout the aggregate force. Through synergy, the combat power of a force exceeds that of the separate elements of the force. James G. Miller, in Living Systems, arrives at a comparable conclusion regarding the parts of living organisms versus the whole.

As noted, however, a combined arms force has necessarily sacrificed offense combat potential that could exist were it not necessary to divert some capabilities to the defense. The existence of an enemy has forced the diversion of a fraction of combat energy away from the offense. The combined arms synergism thus starts from a reduced level of usable offense combat power. The synergy of combined arms should therefore be viewed not so much as an additive or multiplicative effect on combat potential and combat power, but rather as a partial restorative from the negative effect of vulnerability to the enemy. It is more accurately a quasi-synergism.

Properly used, the combined arms concept provides the commander with flexible means to cope with a multitude of combat tasks against a variety of opposing forces. It compensates for the deficiencies and vulnerabilities of any one force system by using the advantages of others.

Although the combined arms concept is of long historical standing, the modern version imposes great complexity on force design. Moreover, with expanding variety of weapons and tactics has come greater specialization in weapons and units. At the highest echelons, for example, different engineer units are available for bridge building, airfield construction, port construction, mine laying, and other tasks. Yet within the fractal-like hierarchical structure of military forces, we can find equivalent (though rudimentary) engineering functions down to the lowest echelons, where individuals may perform in a simple manner what specialized battalions do with great complexity at the higher echelons.

The key to obtaining a high level of combat potential is finding the best balance in both offense and defense weapons and associated tactics and doctrine to deal with a variety of anticipated situations and possible enemies. Since combat situations vary widely, proper balance within the constraints of designed potential and available potential will depend on flexibility to adapt the combined arms balance to each situation. There is no universal optimum for combined arms balance.

The concept of combined arms balance has innumerable parallels in nonmilitary activities. Balanced combinations of offense and defense capabilities are essential in sports, for example. Perhaps the best example of balance is the biology of animals, where the capability of the body functioning as a whole is obviously greater than the sum of the capabilities of body organs, which in turn is greater than the sum of the capabilities of cells. The biological reason also parallels that of combined arms: organs and cells are specialized to provide coordinated mutual support, with considerable ability to shift support as needs demand.

Conclusions. In aggregating combat power, we can summarize the discussion above in the following conclusions:

It has long been recognized that a combat unit needs coordinated, integrated teamwork to develop a high order of combat power. It is also recognized that even a moderate loosening of force integrity can lead to a large loss of effectiveness. The term cohesion has recently been used to describe the binding effect that holds a unit together despite the stresses of combat. Force integrity and cohesion as used herein are essentially synonymous except that force integrity can apply to forces of any size, while cohesion is a characteristic primarily of smaller units and is seen only vestigially in large units.

Unit cohesion is a key ingredient in achieving the synergistic, mutually-supporting effects of balanced combined arms. Cohesion holds force elements together. It acts as a binding strength, cementing units and individuals. The opposite of cohesion can be called disjunction, which acts to loosen connectivity within a unit, encouraging a tendency to come apart and lose force integrity. The terms are defined as follows:

Cohesion is the condition of a combat unit whereby its elements are united in a common purpose and goal that is understood by all and its elements are in place, functionally connected, and operative. This means that the unit is functioning as a unified system with connecting linkages not only available, but with their proper functioning understood and effectively carried out, a consequence not only of force design but of training and indoctrination. In other words, the unit is functioning cooperatively as the team it is intended to be—it cleaves together as a unitary whole. From the definition, it can be seen that cohesion signifies unity both structurally and as to purpose.

Disjunction is the condition of a unit whereby it has in some degree lost unity of purpose or goal, force elements, functional connectivity, or any combination of these. It is the opposite of cohesion. Disjunction involves the loss of any—or all—of the characteristics essential to cohesion. A unit can incur disjunction because of, for example, a loss of unity of purpose without any loss of its elements or linkages. Conversely, a unit may retain commonality of purpose but suffer disjunction through loss of force elements.

Before combat, a unit may be subjected to disjunction for reasons not connected with combat, but we are here concerned only with disjunction in combat.

Cohesion and disjunction are attributes of units, not of individuals. The term unit here refers in a generic sense to all manner of military organizations from small teams and crews to more formally organized larger units. Through lateral and hierarchical linkages, cohesion in a unit can induce cohesion in other units. In like fashion, unit disjunction can spread disjunctive effects to other units. Cohesion does not fully exhibit the property of aggregation, however, because its effects become dissipated as unit size becomes larger. It is a significant characteristic of smaller size units only.

Determinants of cohesion. One ingredient for the existence of cohesion can be designated a structural determinant, since it requires that a unit have the essential elements of its structure intact, properly linked together, and operative, with proper functioning understood by unit personnel and with the common purpose comprehended. This determinant entails force structure, matching doctrine and training, readiness, and mission understanding. It works from the top down, imposing unity of direction and organization from higher echelons.

The other ingredient can be designated a behavioral determinant, since it concerns how individuals and units behave in combat in response to the mission and the common purpose. The behavioral component of cohesion works principally through person-to-person bonding in small units. Bonding develops laterally within crews, teams, sections, company-size units, and ship’s companies; and it develops vertically between commanders and those under them with whom they deal personally. The bonding results in cohesion. Although some degree of person-to-person bonding may occur in larger units and between a high echelon charismatic leader and his forces, cohesion is seen mainly in groups where face-to-face contact is frequent. This is why cohesion does not aggregate as force size becomes larger. The effect on combat power of the behavioral aspect of cohesion (and disjunction) occurs primarily in the lower echelons of forces, in contrast to the top-down working of the structural aspect of cohesion.

There are many causes that induce behavioral cohesion. Some are external to the unit, but most evolve from the close intimacy of personal contact within a unit, especially contact under the shared danger of active combat. Included are mutual hardship, dependence upon those close by for safety, peer influence, personal pride, affection received and given to buddies, the necessity to shoulder one’s load in the face of a life-threatening situation, and similar influences. These influences predominate in units at lower echelons, particularly those exposed to enemy actions. The stress of combat heightens the bonding, so long as there is perception that all remains in order. Causes external to the unit include commonalities of many kinds: traditional military behavior, mutually shared values, cultural and ethnic homogeneity, religious beliefs, national aspirations, language. Additional external influences lie in common awareness of and commitment to the broad war aims set by the highest authorities. Facing personal danger, the aims of individuals in combat can differ greatly from those of higher echelons, but ingrained values go a long way toward keeping small-unit behavior congruent with higher level wishes. Even more important is the role of all those in the command chain, who act as the agents of higher authority in conforming unit behavior to overall purpose and values.

All military units enter combat with some degree of cohesion and all will be subjected in some degree to disjunctive influences as combat proceeds. Disjunction occurs when a unit has suffered structural damage or degeneration of behavioral unity.

Structural disjunction. The great variety of combat capabilities, counter-capabilities, and counter-counter-capabilities that technology has brought to warfare necessitates complicated combined arms structures and doctrines, and with them ever more complex mutual support linkages. The problem of complexity is magnified by increased dispersion of forces in combat, which, despite increased communication capabilities, magnifies the difficulty of maintaining personal linkages and bonding.

Whenever there is loss, suppression, or malperformance of elements of the structure, there is concurrent loss, suppression or malperformance of the support links from those elements to other elements. Structural disjunction compounds loss of combat power through simultaneous damage to force elements and to support linkages. It follows that the more complex the combined arms design, the more susceptible it is to structural disjunction. Forces are designed with built-in redundancies and are cross-trained to mitigate this susceptibility, but the basic problem remains. The compounding effect of structural disjunction leads to the following conclusion:

The compounding negative effect can be illustrated by an example in which a unit is composed of five elements, each of which contributes an equal share to unit combat power and each of which depends on every other element to be fully effective. The five-element unit with four support linkages for each element is shown in Figure 17a. Now suppose there is a loss in combat of one of the elements, as shown in Figure 17b. Since loss of combat power results from the loss of support linkages as well as from the loss of the element, the total loss of power is the compounded result of the loss of one-fifth of the elements and two-fifths of the linkages.

The question of how much structural disjunction a unit can absorb and remain militarily effective has been given considerable study. The question becomes something like a sorites paradox: does the loss of one man make a unit no longer effective and thus cause it to break in battle? Two men? Twenty men? Eighty men? And so on until at some critical point the unit is judged to pass from functional to nonfunctional, that is from a unit to a non-unit. The usual parameter examined has been casualty losses in battle, and the break point has often been expressed as a percentage of casualties sustained. Sometimes materiel losses and other complexities, such as loss of leaders, have also been considered. If structural integrity were the only factor affecting unit capability, the existence of definable unit break points could well be a fundamental aspect of a theory of combat. But behavioral cohesion (and, in the more general case, behavioral integrity) is an important factor in unit effectiveness, and so a break point derived solely from historical casualty and materiel losses can only be an average that has built-in (but masked) behavioral factors. We are left with the answer to the sorites paradox: the unit in which Beau Geste (in the well-known story by Percival Wren) was the sole survivor remained functioning, while units on other battlefields fled after only a small fraction had become casualties. As the samurai Miyamoto Musashi stated in The Book of Five Rings, "The way of the warrior is resolute acceptance of death," so that a unit composed of warriors may not break until the last man has died.

Behavioral disjunction. Explanation of behavioral disjunction is more elusive. While structural cohesion and disjunction can be envisioned as working in a more or less mechanistic way, behavioral cohesion and disjunction work in psychological ways. They can result from top-down influences or from person-to-person influences at the lowest combat echelons.

Groups in combat carry out (to greater or lesser degree) directed group-oriented activity rather than random individual-oriented activity. With proper leadership, the group-oriented activity is polarized and vectored (to greater or lesser degree) by the combat mission, which in turn is polarized and vectored by the broader purposes of the campaign and the entire war. This is instilled top-down. Like polarized atoms in a magnetic field, individuals are oriented toward one consistent, unified goal, which contributes to cohesion. When polarization is widespread, the cohesive effect is widespread and units perform their group-oriented activities as intended by higher authority. But when polarizing is weak, vacillating, misconstrued, or implausible, cohesion is weak and misoriented. Disjunction can result whenever the polarizing signals from above are faulty, and fault can be injected at any command level. When it happens at a high level, the disjunction seen at the lower echelons tends to spread widely, although the effects can be ameliorated by good leadership at lower command levels.

Disjunction at the individual level occurs when the personal motivations of individuals begin to override the common goal of the combat mission, and by extension, of the broader war effort. Here the command structure again is critical as the conduit for goals and values. Since behavioral cohesion stems from person-to-person relationships (and therefore, multiple linkages), there tends to be an infectious reinforcement of either the positive effects of cohesion or the negative effects of disjunction. There is therefore a compounding of the positive or the negative effects upon combat power. The compounded infectious reinforcement is especially pronounced in regard to morale and fighting spirit. New personnel arriving in a unit characterized by high morale and belief in the mission will be infected with the unit’s favorable attitude. In the other direction, loss of confidence in the value of pursuing the mission or in a leader can spread infectiously like panic in a crowd. Some factors contributing to cohesion are not readily subject to disjunctive infection, such as ingrained cultural traits and longheld traditions, and these tend to act as a brake on the more transient infectious factors.

Importance of cohesion. Cohesion enhances the aggregation of combat power, while disjunction degrades it, and does so in a compounded manner. Historical examples support the conclusion that the behavioral component of cohesion is more significant than the structural component. There are many instances where a unit in combat with strong structural cohesion was unable—because of behavioral deficiencies—to bring more than a limited level of combat power to bear. In contrast, there are many instances where a unit has suffered extreme structural disjunction, yet has maintained a high level of combat power because (it would seem) the unit retained behavioral cohesion. There are also instances where a force that suffered behavioral disjunction was rallied by forceful leadership. On the other hand, there appears to be few cases where a demoralized unit was restored during combat solely by reconstituting its structural elements.

Conclusions. The following conclusions summarize the role of cohesion in aggregating combat power:

The discussion of force cohesion and integrity highlights one critical aspect of human behavior in combat. The following addresses other aspects that affect the dynamics of combat.

Variability and predictability of behavior in combat. Axiom 6 states that uncertainty is inherent in combat. One of the most pervasive sources of uncertainty is how individuals and groups will act under the stress of combat. Behavioral variability affects all forms of human interaction. Yet, granting behavioral variance in general, there is, paradoxically, considerable predictability of human behavior in combat, both as to individuals and more so as to groups. Part of this predictability can be ascribed to innate similarities among humans and part to similarity in cultural influences. Additionally, predictability can be attributed to similarities in training, disciplining, and indoctrinating combatants, and the greater the uniformity in these pre-combat activities, the greater the predictability. Moreover, during combat predictability is enhanced by the cognitive inputs that affect all in common, such as the mission, orders, and other information disseminated to all.

The causes of human variability in combat obviously include genetic and physical differences, along with educational and psychological differences arising from cultural and social environments.

There is, however, one paramount distinction that influences individuals in combat differently from individuals acting in most other human endeavors: it is the realization of imminent personal danger. Fear is one dominant result, yet even in combat many factors tend to override what in other human activities often becomes a paralyzing effect. The bonds formed with others in the unit are an important factor in overcoming fear, as are command and peer influences and belief in the purposes of the war. Nevertheless, despite these conforming influences, in combat one human’s response to fear can differ greatly from another’s.

Because of the multiplicity of top-down unifying effects, variability between groups in combat is less than variability between individuals, and hence group behavior is more predictable than individual behavior. In part this is because the individual genetic, physical, and psychosocial differences are averaged out in groups. In addition, variability appears to be inversely related to span of control: a single soldier controls himself (a unit of one) and may act with great heroism or may fail utterly. A platoon commander, on the other hand, controls a number of individuals and acts to integrate them within the plans of higher echelons. As units become larger, behavioral variability between them appears to become less. The averaging out of individual behavior becomes more pronounced and a sort of "law of large numbers" dominates. As units become larger, they progress to more predictable states.

We are led to the following conclusions:

Self-regeneration of units in combat. A unit in combat is in a constant struggle to stay alive and functioning. It must continuously cope with degenerative factors arising from the enemy, the combat environment, and the wear and tear of combat activity. As with all biological entities, a combat unit continuously draws upon dynamic feedback to sustain itself and adjust to survive; it learns as it goes. It must contend with conflicting goals: to fulfill its assigned task and to stay alive. Military units exhibit the same strong survival instinct of all living organisms, but they do so under the paradoxical circumstance of putting themselves at mortal risk.

Some units in combat appear to exhibit an unusually strong ability to recoup from severe stress and regenerate themselves. This may arise in part from the perception that the unit is in mortal danger if it fails to regenerate and continue fighting. In addition, cohesiveness, to the extent it is present, clearly aids regeneration. Peer influence and altruistic dedication to the mission undoubtedly contribute, and also the anathema of being branded a coward. Yet, considering that a beleaguered unit usually has the option of surrendering and thereby precluding the need to regenerate and continue fighting, there appears to be an extraordinary innate capacity to choose otherwise and reconstitute functions essential to remaining viable, despite the danger. A leader steps up to replace the commander who has been killed, new linkages are jury-rigged to replace linkages destroyed, and the unit continues with ad hoc capability. The increase in entropy in a combat unit (in the form of chaotic, disorganized, disordered conditions) is opposed by the tendency within the unit to self-organize, reconstitute itself, and reestablish internal order. Self-regeneration of units in combat appears to be a strongly ingrained characteristic.

Recent work on complexity theory advances the thesis that self-organization of a complex adaptive system occurs at the boundary between well-ordered and chaotic behavior. Too much order stultifies growth and self-organization; too little results in instability and anarchy. Complexity theory offers some hope for a quantitative explanation of why effective fighting forces are neither too rigidly controlled nor too undisciplined. An example of self-organizing in military forces was the latitude given by Admiral Nelson to his captains at Trafalgar. By freeing his captains from the rigid strictures of contemporary doctrine, Nelson allowed them the initiative to self-organize under the stress and chaos of battle, that is, to fight cooperatively in mutual support with a minimum of direction from the top. A unit in combat is a learning machine with a strong incentive for fast learning.

As with cohesion, it is the behavioral characteristics of a combat unit more than the structural that will govern its conduct in battle. Combat is inherently about the dynamic behavior of people as individuals and as groups working with machines in a complex, interlocking system under great stress and for high stakes. It is the norm that stable situations will become chaotic, and it is innate in combat systems that—working at the boundary between order and disorder— they will continuously strive to regenerate themselves.

The property of self-regeneration and self-organizing can be summarized in the following conclusion:

Once activated from potential, combat power is aggregated at the macro level and continually distributed, redistributed and vectored to accomplish the mission. Aggregated and distributed combat power are realities, as any commander knows, yet while conceptually obvious, the present state of knowledge offers no way of mathematically combining elemental combat power into larger agglomerations. Of the many attempts at quantitative summing thus far developed, most use firepower as the factor to be aggregated, ignoring such factors as advantages in leadership, information, maneuver, and morale that contribute importantly to combat power. Even those attempts that aggregate firepower usually focus only on the destructive effects to the neglect of other significant effects, such as suppression and demoralization.

Despite the lack of an accepted quantitative tool for dealing with aggregation of combat power, certain principles offer partial underpinning for a theoretical approach. We have touched on combat friction, combined arms synergy, force integrity and cohesion, and human behavior. These and other factors affect how combat power is aggregated.

Although there is no mathematical model for aggregating combat power, we know from observation that aggregation does occur. The next chapter addresses the dynamics of applying combat power, in both elemental and aggregated forms, to accomplish the mission.