This chapter brings together the components of combat and the internal and external contexts into a structure descriptive of the combat phenomenon. The structure unites external and internal contexts, functional relationships among the components, mission, and the outcome of combat with space and time dimensions.

Combat does not occur as a closed or isolated system. Its conduct is affected by the initial conditions shaped by the external context at the commencement of combat. As combat proceeds the external context continues to exert an effect. The external context provides the initial impetus and constrains combat to conform with the campaign and war levels and with political factors. Thus, before and during combat it forms the boundary conditions that influence the course of events.

The external bounding influences have become increasingly significant as combat has become more dependent on forms of multiservice support and weapons systems remote from the combat arena. Intercontinental transport of forces, satellite systems providing intelligence and positioning information, and long-range missile and aircraft systems are a few of the remote capabilities that now interface with local combat. Advances in communications enable near-real-time injection of controls from command levels far from the combat area and near-immediate feedback of combat progress to those levels, complicating command during combat.

Table 2 lists some of the variables that contribute to the boundary conditions; many additional factors also come into play. Boundary conditions are formed by the purpose-value-mission framework of the war and the campaign, together with capabilities and constraints from the external geophysical environment and the general situation vis-à-vis the enemy. The more immediate initial conditions are those existing just before the preparatory phase of combat—the forces about to be involved (with their combat potential at the time), the mission or task assignment, the enemy force expected to be in opposition, conditions created by the environment within the combat arena, and the information available about all of these factors.

Development of combat structure starts with single elements acting on single elements, or small units of only a few elements acting on other small units, all subject to influences of the boundary conditions. The smallest animate element is a single soldier. Examples of the smallest inanimate elements are a vehicle and a howitzer. Aggregation of single entities into small units and of small units into larger units is governed by commonalities of the attributes and functions of elements. A squad and an aircraft crew are examples of small unit aggregations. Working with individual elements and small unit aggregations, we will describe a micro-structure of combat—structure as it occurs at the lowest level of combat.

Figure 5 illustrates the basic ingredients of combat structure at the micro level. The external context acts on and influences the form and flow of combat activity over time, represented in stylized fashion by the rest of the figure. Mission provides specific internal direction to combat activity and vectors it through command and control.

The figure illustrates a microcosm of combat in which an element engages in an action that affects itself, affects one or more other friendly force elements, one or more enemy elements, or environmental elements. The effects of the actions are labeled "RESULT." As stated in Chapter 5 the attributes of an element determine its state. The result of an action is a change in the attributes of the object elements (those being acted on), and thus their states. To the extent the agent element (the one performing the action) changes its own attributes (therefore its state), it becomes both object and agent element. In some cases, an action results in destruction of an element, and the change of state then becomes that of physical elimination.

The actions and the changes of state occur over a small but finite period of time (shown in Figure 5 as D t). Changes of state are indicated in the figure by dotted arrows directed from the "result" symbol to the "element" symbol.

As indicated in the figure, element-action-element sets with associated results constitute the combat activities defined in Chapter 5. These fall into a few basic categories:

At this fine-grained level, combat structure is the assemblage of many such element-action-element activities in various combinations. In Figure 5, the explicit independent variable is time, progressing from top to bottom. The actions and the changes of state of each activity take place over a small but finite time interval. Spatial changes of the elements (in three dimensions) are implicitly tied to events in the figure as time progresses.

In principle, any combat can be decomposed into elemental activity chains, creating figures of great complexity. Using a simple hypothetical firefight scenario, such a construct has been made in Figure 6. Force element sizes have not been specified in the scenario, nor have the constraints of geophysical environment and external contexts. However, elements and their actions in the scenario can be thought of as aggregations of single units within limits of element homogeneity and commonality of individual actions. In aggregating to any degree there is a loss of precision and detail in defining battle activity.

Two procedures are needed to produce a generalized fixed-time cross section of combat. One calls for examination of combat structure from the bottom up and the other from the top down. The two procedures parallel the bottom-up and top-down approaches to determining the components of combat.

Elements of like kind

Actions of like kind

Activity results of like kind

Influences from the external context of like kind.

In addition, elements and actions of the geophysical environment affecting each adversary are similarly aggregated into like groups.

To guide arrangement of the groupings into a meaningful pattern of forces, actions, results, environment, and context, we must draw on knowledge of combat and the traditional organization of resources used in combat. The latter is provided by a top-down view.

Governments have, since early times, organized and armed combat forces in consistent task-oriented patterns of four general functional areas: fighting, support, information acquisition, and command-control. Of these, it is the fighting function that primarily impacts the enemy. In a modern force, a major part is applied to support, information acquisition, and command-control functions, and a minor part to fighting.

By decomposing, we can identify in the top-down approach layers of hierarchical structure from the level of national command authority down to the individual combatant.

This process of decomposing, in conjunction with the process of aggregating from the bottom up, leads to a useful construct of combat structure. The top-down view connects the detailed individual view of structure to the larger geopolitical picture and the war. The bottom-up view provides the underpinning necessary to understand combat structure and dynamics. The two views are complementary and non-contradictory.

Using concepts outlined above, a diagram can be constructed that represents a generalized fixed-time cross section of combat structure—a slice in time, so to speak. This is shown in Figure 7 which consolidates categories of forces, activities, and results of the two opposing sides and the shared combat environment. The result is a time-instantaneous diagram of structural relationships that is universal for any form of combat and for any level of combat, in effect, a snapshot of combat. All the forces, activities, and relationships shown are present at every instant of time in combat, but in varying degrees as conditions change with time. The quantitative and qualitative specifics of forces, activities, and results will vary widely from one combat to another. Information acquisition is carried out not only by those force elements specifically charged with this task, but also by support forces and fighting forces. Every individual in combat will engage in information acquisition at one time or another.

Force and functional relationships. The generalized forces and functional relationships shown in Figure 7 are composed of myriads of the elemental forces and activities illustrated in the firefight of Figure 6. All the actions of the two sides and the combat environment interact in the "Combat Interaction" block of Figure 7 to form the interactive combat processes (discussed later). Actions of the fighting forces and the intelligence gathering elements of one side interact with those of the other side in a direct, confrontational manner. Forces carrying out other actions interact primarily with own-force elements and only indirectly with enemy forces.

From the interactive processes, the actual results of combat are formed, indicated in Figure 7 as changes of state in the Blue and Red forces and the combat environment and the degree of mission accomplishment by each side. Information about the results is acquired and perceptions based on the information are fed back to the command element. The figure, taken as a whole, represents the three-sided combat situation at a moment in time.

Figure 7 (landscape) goes here

Structural symmetry and hierarchical congruency. There is complete symmetry of structure between the two opposing sides. Obviously this does not translate into symmetry of capabilities of the two sides. In addition, the two sides share the results of combat, the combat situation, and the geophysical combat environment. And obviously, the effects on the two sides of the environment, results, and situation are never symmetrical. The environment, for example, may favor or handicap one side, and one side may be more susceptible than the other to certain environmental impediments. Although both sides share the combat situation, each side has incomplete and only partly correct information of the emerging results and the actual states of both sides. Each side therefore works with perceptions of reality, rather than with absolute reality. This is a universal feature of combat structure.

The relationships of forces and activities shown in Figure 7 are hierarchically congruent through all levels and kinds of combat: they are independent of the combat force echelon (the figure applies equally to squad-size and to larger forces) and independent of the combat domain (land, sea, air, space, or any combination). The Blue and Red commanders and staffs shown are situated within organizational hierarchies that include superior, lateral and subordinate commands, and each has a mission or task that likewise is part of the mission hierarchy. At every echelon, each side has manpower and material resources at its disposal to perform command-control, fighting, support and information gathering functions, which may or may not be adequate for the mission imposed. Each side is bounded and influenced by its own external context.

Perception versus reality. The actual combat results at any instant are measures of the degree of mission accomplishment by each side—in effect, incremental measures of effectiveness for each of the opposing forces. The cumulative results over time of these instantaneous snapshots will be cumulative measures of combat accomplishment and mission achievement for each side. But actual results will differ from results as perceived by the two sides. Perceptions of physical and cognitive results are derived from friendly situation reports and from scouting, reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence activities, all of which are subject to analysis and interpretation and thus all are less than perfect. Perceptions of combat—not the reality—are used by both commanders and all other combatants in planning, decision-making, controlling, and all other cognitive actions.

The command-control, support and information acquisition actions are generally similar for all military forces but differ in the details of implementation. There are, of course, major differences in the fighting actions. Part of combat support and information acquisition may come from external pools of manpower and materiel, but most is embedded within the combat force structure itself.

A simplified cross section of combat. Figure 8 presents a simplified version of Figure 7. Here again, the structural symmetry in elements and functions of the two sides is evident. But, as stated earlier, structural symmetry should not be taken to mean symmetry in carrying out functions in a given combat situation. Asymmetries arise from all sorts of differences ranging from the external context to every aspect of dynamic interaction.

For each grouping—functions and processes—we select the minimum set of categories that will cover all actions and all processes of combat. In both cases, the selection of the minimum set is arbitrary, but in both the set is defined as encompassing, respectively, all functions and all processes that occur in combat. It is possible to argue for more or fewer categories in each set, or to subdivide functions and processes almost indefinitely, winding up with a vast number that differ only slightly. Nevertheless, these two sets, chosen arbitrarily but judiciously, seem well suited for the purpose of describing a theory of combat.

The difference between combat functions and combat processes is that the processes are oriented to results actually achieved against object elements in the three-sided amalgam of combat, whereas functions are oriented to results that agent elements intend to achieve by their actions. Functions are the means—the actions taken by elements—unilaterally employed by each side to obtain desired results. Processes, in contrast, are the activities of all three parties in combat that create actual results—the new states of object elements. Thus, combat functions are the input-oriented actions directed by commanders, while processes are the output-oriented accomplishments of the actions, taking into account what the enemy and the environment may do to attenuate the effect.

Figure 9 illustrates the difference between function and process, using a combat activity in which the actions of both sides and the combat environment play their parts in determining the result. The process is formed by the interaction among the three parties.

A primary combat function is defined as a generic category of like actions taken by elements of either adversary in combat to achieve an intended result. Primary combat functions at the lowest level (individual elements taking individual actions of like kind) are aggregated into primary combat functions being carried out by aggregated elements taking actions of like kind at that moment in combat. Some functions are performed internally to support own-force activities, while others are directed against the enemy, in both instances the functions being directed toward mission fulfillment. The enemy, in turn, performs appropriate functions to further his own mission and to counter his opponent’s actions.

Action is the enabling mechanism for combat functions. It is undertaken by an agent element impacting an object element with some particular result intended by the agent that may or may not be realized. The reasons for disparity between intent and outcome include imperfect execution of agent action, environmental interference, counteraction by the object element, unrecognized conditions of object state, and so on. Combat process, relating as it does to what is actually obtained as results, is not affected by uncertainties and unknowns afflicting forces, and thus is the reality of combat. Nevertheless, the cause of all combat activity is the performance of functions—the actions initiated by commanders and carried out by forces.

The Primary Combat Functions. Any list of combat functions will vary from source to source, depending on terminology, specificity, the kind of forces they pertain to, and the sort of combat involved, but all lists reflecting modern joint warfare will resemble one another. Two lists of combat functions are shown in Table 3, one based on the Universal Joint Task List (Tactical) and the other adapted from the 1986 edition of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. From the two lists, we have developed a generalized set of four primary combat functions (Table 4) that are broad enough to include every function of combat. The same primary combat functions are available to both sides, and each side uses them to further its mission and to counter actions by the opponent.

The command part of the command-control primary function is performed by all in the command chain (including anyone assuming command) and their staffs. This involves the weighing of information, the formulation of decisions, and the dissemination of decisions and directives. The control part of the function is performed by all other persons who carry out command decisions. The function also includes signals that control weapon systems, such as guidance commands to a missile, and those that interface with humans, such as electronic warning to an air crew of an approaching enemy missile. Communicating is part of the command-control function. The fighting function includes all the actions directly carried out against enemy forces: delivery of firepower, maneuvers, deception actions, offensive electronic war actions, and many other offense and defense actions. The support function encompasses not only longer-term forms of sustainment, but also provides for the immediate needs of fighting forces. It includes sustainment of both manpower and materiel resources, encompassing health and medical support, maintenance and repair of equipment, providing munitions and fuel, transporting, engineering support, and the like. The primary combat function of information acquisition includes the gathering of information about the enemy, about the friendly force, and about the combat environment—in short, the gathering of all information about the combat situation. The processing of both own force and intelligence information to formulate combat decisions falls under the command-control function.

Interdependence of Functions. The symmetry of forces and functions between the two sides is clearly shown in Figure 7. Less apparent is the interdependence of the four primary functions for each side: active fighting, support, information acquisition, and command-control. This is better illustrated in Figure 10, where for the sake of simplicity, the fixed-time cross section of combat is shown in abbreviated form for only one side. The command-control function, working through the chain of command, vectors fighting forces to move toward mission accomplishment and to remove enemy opposition. At the same time, the command-control function directs the acquisition of information needed and directs support forces to enable fighting forces to proceed in their tasks. All four functions must be carried out successfully to achieve the mission. Each depends on the other three, as symbolized by the linked rectangles in Figure 10. The command-control function is essential to initiate purposeful actions by the other three, and depends on information being acquired; the fighting function must be sustained by the support function to continue its tasks. What results from the combat functions of one side is affected by the combat functions of the other side, and from this interactive mix come the combat processes and the actual results of combat.

In addition to these four interdependent functions, we must introduce the notion of counter-functions that can be engaged in by the other side. The counter-function to command-control includes all measures taken by one side to disrupt, confuse or destroy the other side’s capability to make sound decisions, disseminate information and control forces. The counter to information acquisition is keeping own-force information secure. These are aspects of information warfare. Counter-support takes the form of interdiction and destruction of the enemy’s capability to sustain his forces with weapons and other materiel, including sustainment from outside the combat arena. Similarly, there are counters to all of the activities involved in the fighting function.

The primary combat processes, listed in Table 5, are either externally or internally directed. External processes (and only these) change the states of enemy elements; internal processes change the states of own-force elements, and do not affect enemy elements. Both types of processes occur over time during combat, each waxing and waning in intensity as the circumstances of combat change. At a fixed instant of time, most or all of the processes will be ongoing for each side across the structural panorama shown in Figure 7. Combat processes apply to both sides, although the effectiveness of their application can differ markedly for the two sides.

As with the command-control function, the command-control process includes not only planning and decision-making by the command chain, but controlling actions by all other combatants. The information acquisition process entails acquiring information on both the friendly and the enemy force, as well as on the combat environment. Although acquisition of information about the enemy (intelligence gathering) has an externally directed aspect, the process is classified as internally directed because its purpose is to provide information to commanders for use in the command-control process. The communication process differs from information acquisition in that the latter involves reception of information while the former involves transmission of information. Protection is an internally directed process because its purpose is to preserve the friendly force from enemy action, rather than to harm enemy elements. Movement is a process that involves all actions changing the spatial location of own-force elements. Sustainment includes both materiel support and support to personnel. Motivation involves the mind and spirit of friendly force combatants. It is the opposite of the externally directed demoralization process, which acts against the mind and spirit of enemy personnel. The destruction process includes damage to materiel and the wounding of combatants, in addition to outright destruction and killing. Suppression involves the reduced efficiency of combatants by raising fear of harm. Neutralization means that part or all of the enemy force is placed in a position where they are completely unable to support their mission. Disruption involves delaying or denying enemy execution of actions, including support activities. Deception works through the enemy’s information acquisition process to his command-control process to misperceive the combat situation. The processes are explained in more detail in Chapter 7.

The relationships among actions, functions, and processes are shown in Figure 11, in which we use the notational convention of Figure 6. Five Blue force units are firing at five Red force units with the intended result of destroying all of them. Simultaneously, one Blue unit feints a maneuver intended to deceive a Red unit The actual results of the firing are two Red units destroyed and three suppressed. The actual result of the decoy maneuver is that one Red unit is deceived to the point that it moves to a position that isolates itself from the battle, and thus is neutralized. Firing and maneuvering are actions. A Blue force element firing against an enemy element with an associated intended result, is a combat function. The combination of (1) a Blue force element firing against a particular enemy element; (2) the enemy’s simultaneous response affecting that particular Red Force element; and (3) the combat environment’s impact on both Blue and Red force elements leads to the actual results that come out of all these interactions. This is a combat process. For simplicity, the Red force and combat environment impacts are omitted from Figure 11. The figure is further simplified by not showing all the results (and thus not all the processes) of a real engagement.

In aggregating elements (with their attributes), actions, functions, and processes from the lowest level up to the highest level within the full combat environment, we gain a perspective of combat from the vantage point of those who participate in it. In doing so, however, we sacrifice detailed information about the states of individual elements, the actions they take, and the effects on the elements acted upon. At the lowest level, a clear input-output accountability conceptually exists for everything that happens in the combat arena. In moving from the lowest level to the higher levels of aggregation, we shift from discrete single activities to substantial interlinkage of aggregated activities. The interlinkage is not only within each force but also arises through interaction with the opposing force. The complexity is of such magnitude that precise tracing of accountability (while remaining possible in principle) becomes inordinately difficult. Although we have defined each process to be distinct from all others, aggregated processes are seen by combatants as an amorphous blend. The impact of one or two processes cannot be examined without considering all the rest. Combat processes, while providing us with a more orderly picture of what happens in combat, are dynamically related in degrees that vary with time and circumstances, as discussed in Chapter 8.

There is a further point to be made. The property of aggregation-disaggregation that we ascribe to combat elements, actions, functions, and processes is used in this document only in a static sense. We conceptually combine elements at a moment in combat into units of larger and larger size, and combine actions such as firing and processes such as suppression into larger and larger agglomerations of firings and suppressions by larger and larger units. And conversely, we conceptually break down (disaggregate) elements, actions, processes, and so forth into smaller and smaller pieces at a point in time. But what we do not—and cannot—say is that anyone can predict how a group of single elements or ongoing elemental processes at any time during combat will be formed into any particular set of aggregated elements or aggregated processes at any later time. Nor can we say that an aggregated element or an aggregated process can be traced back in the past or forward into the future to any particular states of individual elements or to any particular processes affecting the individual elements. The aggregation-disaggregation properties we ascribe have no cause-and-effect accountability over time, and they are without predictive power.

In speaking of aggregations of "like" elements and "like" actions, we do not mean "precisely alike" elements and actions. We mean the aggregations that normally occur in military units and the aggregated actions those units normally take. Thus the aggregation of human elements into a platoon would include personnel trained with many different military specialties, and the aggregation of materiel elements would encompass a variety of equipment suited to the mission of the platoon. Included among the military specialties and equipment would be those for both offensive and defensive actions, for sustaining the unit, for communicating, for moving the unit, and so on. The "likeness" of aggregated elements and actions is related to what the unit is intended to do in combat; it is a functional likeness, rather than a literal one.

To further clarify the role of processes in combat structure, Figure 13 presents an enlarged view of the combat arena of Figure 7. The heavy line identifies the region of combat interaction. Within the region of interaction, the internally directed processes of each side directly affect the forces of that side, and the externally directed processes directly affect the forces of the opposing side. The internally directed processes affect the opposing forces indirectly by supporting the force elements that carry out the external processes. Both internally and externally directed processes are of equal importance; without the internal processes, the external processes cannot be executed. The internal command-control process, for example, is needed to set all other processes in purposeful action. Portions of the forces blocks are shown outside the combat interaction region because at any point in time, certain forces in combat may be performing functions that are not affected by interaction with the enemy.

All of the processes of each side are susceptible to being countered in some degree by processes of the other side. No process is free from the possibility of being countered.

Having examined the fixed-time structure of combat, it is now necessary to consider how these time-instantaneous slices are integrated over the time domain from combat initiation to combat termination.

Figure 14 illustrates how the introduction of time affects the overall structure of combat. The figure indicates that the external context variables for each side influence combat from beginning to end. The initial conditions set by the external context provide the starting boundary for combat, and throughout combat there can be continuing constraints and impulsions, as well as reinforcements into the combat arena and changes of mission directed from outside.

The structural symmetry between the two adversaries—the same pattern of force and activity relationships, the same categories of combat functions and combat processes—is time invariant. However, functional symmetry in patterns and categories says nothing about symmetry of capability between the two sides. Beginning with the external contexts and the starting boundary conditions of the two sides, together with their missions, and continuing through all aspects of combat, every specific element, action, and state on one side will differ from every element, action, and state on the other side. Quantitative and qualitative differences will abound in forces and their attributes, and the differences will change as combat progresses. While both sides have the same categories of combat functions, each will use those functions in its own ways and with its own effectiveness, and the processes that derive from those functions will yield different results for the two sides.

How each side will fare in combat will depend on these differences and the dynamics of how effectively each side can convert its combat potential into realized capability for accomplishing the mission. The means for doing this is combat power, addressed in the next chapter.