Chapter 2
AXIOMS OF COMBAT

2.1 THE AXIOMS

A foundation of any theory rests on a set of axioms. Axioms are self-evident statements asserted as indisputable facts. We have sought to keep the set of axioms underlying this theory of combat to the absolute minimum, and we believe the important tenets of our theory should and can be traceable to these few axioms.

Axiom 1 Military combat involves deadly interaction between military forces.

A military force is defined as a set of elements that are activated for the purpose of engaging in combat. Deadly interaction includes the direct use of deadly means and the threat of using deadly means. Insofar as nonlethal weapons may be used, they are always backed up by deadly means should the latter be needed.

Axiom 2 In combat each side seeks to achieve a goal, called its mission, which has perceived value.

The mission of a force is the specific task assigned it by higher authority or presumed by the commander of the force based on guidance from higher authority. Combat is not undertaken for its own sake in isolation from other activities; it is conducted as a purposeful activity within the broader goals of entities external to combat.

Axiom 3 Combat potential is embodied in military forces.

Combat potential is the latent capacity of a military force to achieve results in combat.

Axiom 4 The commander on each side in combat activates combat potential to create combat power in furtherance of the mission.

Combat power is the realized capability of a military force at any instant of time to achieve results in combat.

Axiom 5 Domination of the opposing military force is the ultimate means of accomplishing a mission.

Domination is the result of imposing the will of one force on the opposing force through all the interactions of combat, especially those affecting the will and spirit.

Axiom 6 Uncertainty is inherent in combat.

Uncertainty is a state of doubt about the combat situation, including its outcome. Uncertainty is distinguished from chance, which concerns unpredictable events that happen without discernible human or other cause.

2.2 PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The principles of war are empirical precepts formulated as guides to the conduct of war and combat. Versions of principles have been set forth by many writers and by official military organizations. The versions differ in detail as to the number of principles and wording, yet there is remarkable similarity. In effect the principles represent wisdom developed over many years by those who have engaged in battles—the distilled lessons learned from successes and failures.

The principles by themselves do not constitute a theory of combat, but they do represent broad, prescriptive counsel to commanders, and as such the theory ought to be consistent with them.

The following is one version of the principles of war, taken from the 1993 issue of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. (The manual includes additional discussion of each principle, which we have omitted here.)

Principle of the Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Principle of the Offensive - Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Principle of Mass - Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.

Principle of Economy of Force - Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Principle of Maneuver - Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Principle of Unity of Command - For every objective, ensure unity of effort.

Principle of Security - Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Principle of Surprise - Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.

Principle of Simplicity - Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

The Army manual on operations adds discussion of three concepts critical to campaigns and major operations. Since these also apply in some degree to combat, we include them here in greatly abbreviated form.

Concept of the Center of Gravity - Operations should concentrate against those enemy components that are particularly vital, thereby unbalancing the entire enemy structure and producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness that may result in complete failure or will leave the enemy vulnerable to further damage.

Concept of Lines of Operation - A line of operation is the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy; it is the linkage between a force’s objective and its bases of operation. A single line of operation is preferable to multiple lines of operation when available resources are limited, but when resources are adequate, multiple lines of operation can disperse the enemy’s efforts. Operating on interior lines (operations that diverge from a central point) benefits a weaker force, whereas operating on exterior lines (operations that converge on the enemy from more than one direction) can benefit a stronger force by offering the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker opponent.

Concept of Culminating Points - Unless an offensive operation is decisively successful, a culminating point will be reached sooner or later where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender. The art of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before a culminating point is reached; the art of defense is to hasten the culmination point, recognize its advent, and be prepared to go over to the offense when it arrives.