Military combat is a subset of the broader category of military conflict, which in turn is a subset of human conflict in general. As we use the term, military combat is defined as purposeful, controlled violence carried out by means of deadly force between opponents, each attempting to carry out a mission, the achievement of which has value to that side and denial of which has value to the other side. Wars of course involve deadly force, as do campaigns within wars, but it is only in combat that deadly force is directly and actively applied against the enemy. Combat is the active agent of warfare, the crucible in which war aims are decided.

We include within combat’s boundaries the preparatory steps taken by each side immediately before active use of deadly force and the disengagement actions before interaction between the two sides ceases. The phrase "use of deadly force" encompasses the threat of deadly force when it has an effect on combat. We do not bound the scope of combat by the kinds of weapons employed nor by the size of forces or geographical area. Intercontinental delivery of cruise missiles and ICBMs is a combat action on a grand scale. Contiguity of mission is the best determinant of what constitutes combat.

Military combat cannot be treated apart from the campaign and war of which it is a part, and so we include within our purview the external context that forms the boundary conditions for combat and affects its course. Before combat commences and while it proceeds, combat activity is influenced by the direction, impetus, and constraints imposed by the external context, and combat results feed back their influence upon the external context.

As foundation for the theory, we have narrowed a larger list of possible axioms of combat to the following six:

Mission is the governing factor that vectors activities in warfare, translating purpose into intended action throughout the hierarchical command structure. At every echelon, the mission is meant to be responsive to the echelon above, and to the extent this is so and the missions are properly understood, there is powerful vectoring from top to bottom of the entire force toward its war aims. To the extent the hierarchy of missions is unclear, inconsistent, ambiguous, or misunderstood, vectoring is weakened.

Values underlie the purposes of war, and the purposes of campaigns and combat. At every echelon a value is attached to the outcome of each mission. At the termination of any mission, the value achieved is weighed against the broader picture—never a simple "win-or-lose" analysis. Associated with these values are the costs in attempting to achieve the mission. The value after mission termination is rarely the same as the value before the mission commenced; the very pursuit of the mission has itself caused a dynamic change in the situation, and the cost may have been excessive—or lower than anticipated. This purpose-value-mission-outcome-cost relationship extends through every echelon of warfare and, as with congruity of mission, congruity of purposes and values facilitates commonality of war effort. Every soldier and sailor will have some sense of purpose and value to himself or herself that corresponds—although obviously differing in particulars—to the sense of purpose and value of the theater commander and the civil authorities.

Viewed from the bottom up, combat comprises myriads of things that have attributes and carry out a variety of actions. All activity in combat can be described in terms of these three basic, independent components:

elements

attributes of elements, and

actions taken by elements.

These three components exist in minute detail, and they exist also as combinations of elements with combinations of attributes carrying out combinations of actions in ever larger agglomerations up to the highest levels of combat. Working in reverse, one can disaggregate the combinations of combat activity into smaller combinations of elements, with their attributes, performing lesser actions, and so on down to the most elemental level. Viewing combat from the top down, we see aggregated elements formed into the traditional units of military forces carrying out aggregate actions in the form of fires, maneuvers, searches, screens, deceptions, maintenance, and so forth. But in all cases, these traditional units and actions exist as combinations built up from elements, attributes and actions at the lowest level.

The component element is any material or intangible thing, animate or inanimate, that exists in combat which can act to change the state of another element or itself. This includes obvious physical entities such as guns, persons, ships, and aircraft, but also less obvious objects such as trees, hills, seastate, wind, rain, and sunlight. Elements exist singly and as aggregated elements of related single elements. A rifle and a truck are single elements. A squad armed with rifles is an aggregated element. A truck with driver carrying a load of ammunition is an aggregated element.

The component action is an act performed by a single or aggregated element with the intent of changing the state of one or more other elements, its own state, or both. Elements and actions are of two kinds: physical and cognitive. The only elements that are cognitive are humans, who have thoughts and emotions; but humans are also physical elements, since they have weight and size. The only actions that are cognitive are ones taken by humans that derive from mental capacity. A tank firing a round performs a physical action. The decision by the tank gunner to fire the round is a cognitive action. Cognitive elements and actions, however, do not exhibit the property of aggregation that applies to physical elements and actions. This is because the thoughts of a group of humans cannot be combined into a single aggregated element that functions as if it had a single mind. This is not to say a well-functioning unit or staff does not generate thoughts that are so closely coordinated that they have the appearance of coming from a single mind.

The component attribute is a quantitative or qualitative descriptor of an element. Attributes include spatial conditions (location, orientation, and motion), physical properties (characteristics that can be physically measured, such as size, weight, and capacity), and qualities (nonphysical descriptors, such as reliability, manpower intensiveness, and clarity of orders).

At every moment of time, the combination of a single or aggregated element and its attributes is the state of that element. Every person, rifle, hill, river, ship, squadron, and force has a present state, but that will change during combat because of the actions taken by itself, by friendly elements, by enemy elements, and by environmental elements.

At the lowest level, an element performing an action will impact one or more other elements and usually also itself. The element taking the action is the "agent element" and the one being acted on is the "object element." An agent element’s action alters the object element’s attributes in some way, and thus changes the state of the object element. We designate the element-action-element triad, together with its results, a combat activity. Combat is made up of countless numbers of such elemental activities, some involving single elements impacting single elements but more often single elements impacting multiple elements, including the agent element itself.

As with elements and actions, combat activities have the property of aggregation-disaggregation. Thus we see aggregated elements (a ship and crew, for instance) taking an aggregated action (firing a salvo) against an enemy aggregated element (a fortified position or an ammunition dump). Those who wage combat see and experience the aggregated level, but in all cases it is at the elemental micro level that every action and every result in combat begins. The overall structure of combat derives from the primary structure of elements, attributes, and actions.

Considering all categories of aggregated forces and activities, we can construct a generalized functional cross section of combat at any fixed moment. The cross section includes the states of the two opposing forces and the shared geophysical combat environment, as well as the external contexts that impinge on each side. This fixed-time snapshot of combat is universal: it pertains to every form of combat at every echelon, high or low, and pertains to forces operating on land, in the air, at sea, or in any combination. For any one echelon of combat—say combat involving battalion-size forces on both sides—the fixed-time snapshot is subsumed within combat involving larger (say brigade-size) forces and in turn the battalion-size fixed-time cross section subsumes combat involving subordinate (company-level) forces at that moment. Each fixed-time cross section is structurally like all others at higher and lower echelons. Moreover, the types of forces and types of activities of the two opposing sides are structurally identical with each other, and both sides share the combat environment in common. The structure applies even though one side is attacking and the other defending, for example. This mirror imaging of type forces and type activities between the two sides does not mean equality between the two sides as to number and capability of forces and activities. There is never equality. The congruent nesting of type forces and activities from the lowest to the highest echelon and across all forms of combat illustrates a universal characteristic: military combat is structured as a nested hierarchy of forces and activity with functional repetition of the pattern throughout the hierarchy.

Each side prosecutes its effort through its own combat functions. A combat function is a category of like actions taken by force elements; the complete set of combat functions is each commander’s bag of tricks, and each side in general has the same kinds of functions (though not with the same capabilities) and employs them to achieve results intended to support its mission. As both sides carry out their functions, the combat activity causes three-sided interactions that create combat processes. It is through these combat processes that actual results are determined in the form of altered states of force elements.

We define a combat process as combat activity of any kind that produces an actual generic result. The distinction between combat functions and combat processes is that functions are actions oriented to results intended to be achieved by each side, whereas processes are oriented to results actually achieved in the give and take of combat. Each side unilaterally applies combat energy to perform its functions to fulfill its mission, but the opponent has a say in the matter and tries, by performing other functions, to thwart the other side’s efforts and achieve its own mission. In addition, the combat environment can affect each side. From this three-way interaction comes a set of processes that are reflected in the actual results achieved by each side. The results, seen as the new states of each side’s force elements, are the new combat truth that pertains to both sides, although neither side ever fully knows what that combat truth is.

Granting there could be an extremely large number of combat processes, each differing in some small degree from the next, we have settled on a small list of primary combat processes that, by definition, encompass the totality of combat activity. Every single element-action-element activity at the lowest level and every aggregated element-action-element activity will contribute to, and thereby fit into, one or more of these primary combat processes, as determined by the results actually achieved. In the normal case, any one activity will involve several processes, including those that affect the acting element itself. The processes fall into two categories: those that impact only enemy force elements, which we designate externally directed processes, and those that impact only own force elements, designated internally directed processes. The primary combat processes are:

Destruction (and damage) Command-control

Suppression Information acquisition

Neutralization Communication

Disruption Movement

Deception Protection

Sustainment

Combat processes, like the elements and actions that are part of those processes, exhibit the property of aggregation-disaggregation. For example, elemental processes of destruction, suppression, and protection at the lowest level are blended into aggregated processes of destruction, suppression, and protection at the higher levels. Since combat processes relate to results obtained, the labels used for them are descriptive of combat results rather than combat actions such as fire and maneuver.

Within the fixed-time cross section of combat—which itself remains time invariant—all forces and actions of both sides, along with the external contexts and geophysical environment, are in continuous flux. In the time continuum, there is a sequence of these cross sections, differing as to particulars of the situation from one instant to the next and ending in the final outcome of combat. The differing particulars are the new states and it is the processes that bring these about.

The dynamic aspects of the theory of combat rest on the concept of combat power. Combat power, like gravity, cannot be seen, but combat commanders and everyone else subject to it senses what it is. As we use the term, it is the agent by which all results are obtained in combat. We define combat power as the realized capability of a force at any instant of time to achieve results in furtherance of a particular mission against a specific enemy force in a specific combat environment. Combat power is the action agent by which forces seek to translate the purpose of conducting combat into a desired outcome. Energy in the form of combat functions is applied by each side to its own forces to fulfill its mission and simultaneously to the enemy force to eliminate his opposition. The realized capability that each side is able to achieve in the two-sided clash of actions is the combat power that side has managed to produce. Combat power is an instantaneous function (that is, a rate) which, acting over time leads to cumulative results (cumulative changes of state). We use the term combat output to refer to the accumulations.

Combat power is derived from the basic element-action-element activities described earlier, and therefore inherits and expands upon characteristics from that structure. Thus combat power:

A commander in combat is an individual who causes his forces to take actions that are vectored by the commander in furtherance of the mission. There is a hierarchy of commanders in every force, from the officer in tactical command down to a pilot who flies his aircraft, an individual soldier who commands only himself and his rifle, an operator of a radar who scans it and reports contacts, or a sailor who steers a ship, each doing so in conformance with an explicit or implicit task assigned. The vectoring (the order or command) is temporal (when to act), spatial (where to act), and functional (what action to perform), done to achieve a purpose that may be explicit or implicit. We say a commander activates his forces to create combat power from available combat potential. Insofar as the theory is concerned, the key to recognizing the commander at every echelon is not based on lawful, organizational, or even doctrinal authority and responsibility, but identification of the individual at that echelon who receives and acts on a mission or task and causes forces to take actions (perform functions) to fulfill it.

Combat potential is the latent capacity to achieve results in combat. The development of combat potential begins when raw manpower is recruited and weapons are acquired, and development continues, for the particular force involved, until combat begins. At this point, combat potential is converted into combat power; then, after combat ends, unexpended capacity reverts to combat potential. The combat potential available to a commander when he engages in combat is often less than he would wish because of shortages in manning and equipping and deficiencies in morale and training, but the situation at the time circumscribes what he has to draw on.

A commander, through the command function, begins to convert the latent energy of combat potential to the active energy of combat power by the many steps he takes preparatory to the active phase of combat, such as acquiring intelligence, issuing orders, positioning forces, and exhorting his troops. Once active fighting commences, combat power is determined by the combination of the commander’s actions and the interactions with the enemy and the environment. In addition, there are other factors that a commander can only partly control in exerting combat power. On the negative side, the actions of his force will be degraded by wasted energy arising as combat friction in the countless interactions among own-force elements. On the favorable side, to the extent the units are suitably organized and operated as a balanced combined arms force, he can benefit from synergism from mutual support and reinforcement. The commander also may benefit from strong force integrity and cohesion, or, under adverse circumstances, his force could be subject to catastrophic loss of cohesion. Over and above such particular factors, there is a powerful positive influence toward self-regeneration embodied in military units in combat. Under extreme life-threatening stresses and in the face of adversity and disorder, most military units exhibit strong adaptability for survival and reconstituting combat capability.

The set of primary combat processes is inclusive of every kind of result occurring in combat. Through the property of aggregation, we can in principle lump together all the destruction results and all the suppression results and so on for all the other processes, from whatever cause and in whatever sector and over whatever period of time. Our current state of knowledge, however, does not permit us to do this quantitatively beyond crude estimations.

The external processes directly alter the states of enemy elements and thus act to remove enemy resistance to the mission. The internal processes are equally essential to advance the mission and to support the external processes. Some processes operate only on cognitive elements. The internal process of motivation and the counterpart external process of demoralization clearly do so. The command-control process encompasses not only the cognitive decision-making that stems from each person in the chain of command, but also the lesser decisions that every individual in combat makes. The command-control process is so ubiquitous that essentially all action in combat originates by it, except for acts of nature. The command-control process is, in turn, fully dependent on the information acquisition process to take sensible actions.

A brief example may serve to clarify how processes work. A scouting patrol observes (the information acquisition process) an enemy force assembling. Through several steps of the communication process, the information reaches the combat commander. He weighs the information and his options and decides on a course of action (all of this the command-control process). Through the communication process, his order reaches an artillery battalion commander, who directs a salvo to be fired. On a hand signal from a sergeant (further communication process), soldiers make the decision to yank the lanyards of their howitzers (command-control process in response to the sergeant’s signal), firing the guns. When the artillery rounds land in the target area, enemy soldiers are killed and wounded and trucks destroyed and damaged (the destruction process); other enemy personnel cease their actions and take cover (suppression); still others are frightened and run away (demoralization); and the enemy unit’s assembly preparations are delayed (disruption). The illustration is a simplification; many additional processes would be occurring at every stage.

The sixth axiom states that uncertainty is inherent in combat. Uncertainty imbues every participant with doubt about the present situation, about what will happen next, and even about what has already happened. Combat is not deterministic, yet experienced commanders and others tested in battle learn to read the partial patterns and forecast future events with enough accuracy to determine the likely direction combat will take. Some succeed at this far better than others, but in all cases it is experience that fills the gaps of uncertainty, and when experience is lacking, training, doctrine, and good sense compensate. Good commanders sense how much they need to know about the situation, and because time is precious they act as soon as enough pieces of a pattern are in place. They proceed not on the certainties but on the probabilities, fully aware that unforeseen events may occur and ramify unpredictably; and they convey their orders with conviction despite the uncertainties.

Within this gray world of incomplete, ambiguous, often biased, partially erroneous information and disinformation, the principal task of every combat commander is to direct the actions to apply energy through combat functions (fire, maneuver, force protection, and so forth) that will manifest themselves as propitious distribution of combat power, vectored in time and space to fulfill the mission.

Combat power exists in the form of minute quanta-like contributions created by countless element-action-element activities at the lowest level. Each of these leads to a change in the attributes of one or more object elements, and thus a new state of those elements. It is at that moment and at the location of the object element that an elemental contribution to combat power is created by the side initiating the activity. The object elements may be physical or cognitive or both, and may be an enemy element or a friendly one (or may be the element performing the action). In the usual case, there will be more than one object element and more than one kind of state change, and therefore more than one process contributing to the elemental bit of combat power.

At any instant of time, these micro-level contributions of each side’s combat power can be aggregated spatially over a small area of the combat arena. Over time, the aggregated combat power in that area will wax and wane as combat activities amplify or die down in intensity. If both sides’ elements are creating combat power in the area, there will be a separate aggregation for each side’s combat power contributions. The combat power aggregations in such small areas can, in principle, be extended to map the combat power for each side over the entire combat arena at any moment, and such a mapping could, in principle, be made for successive time intervals, manifesting itself as a shifting flow of spatially distributed combat power for each side over the duration of combat.

Although the results of combat power are real, when seen in their full complexity there is no known way of representing combat power’s full effects quantitatively, and this theory does not advance one. Assuredly the aggregation of combat power cannot be done by any linear summing. Attempts to depict the capabilities of forces have been limited for the most part to firepower effects, and have failed to combine such disparate factors as movement, suppression, protection, and deception, or the even more difficult factors such as motivation and demoralization. Complicating this picture further is the relationship of combat power to mission. Combat results that do not go fully in the direction of the commander’s vector (that is, fully support the mission) should not be added in the same degree as those that do.

Yet, despite the imprecision, good commanders in combat cope with the uncertainties and accomplish the equivalent of effectively aggregating combat power and distributing and vectoring it to achieve their mission, or give a good account in the attempt. The empirical methods they use have been tried and tested in battle and the lessons set down in doctrinal and tactical manuals, and in broader language in the principles of war. Much of the process is an art, but more than just art and intuition underlies successful command in combat.

Combat is normally episodic. The constantly shifting distribution of combat power for the two sides creates a flow that includes crescendos and lulls. Information is the commodity that controls the peaks and valleys. The flow of information, both as to rapidity and quality, is a crucial aspect in the task of distributing combat power. The side that has the shorter cycle time to acquire, communicate, weigh, act on, and reacquire information has a significant advantage. Similarly, the side that brings the greater accuracy and completeness to the information it acquires has a clear advantage, and likewise, the side that has the faster reaction time in translating decisions into responses has an advantage. These precepts are general; the reality that information and reaction cycle times are continually blended rather than discrete does not minimize their importance.

Throughout combat every participant observes and interprets events as trends, and makes decisions based on his projection of the future. The high value of combat outcome compels such continuing assessment of where the action is leading. It is, however, the perceptions of trends that individuals act on, not the reality. At all times every individual, from commanders down to privates, seamen, and airmen, seeks to improve his future situation by reinforcing favorable trends and altering those he sees as unfavorable. Determining an opportune time for action based on perceived trend projection is an art learned from experience and training.

Commanders must be sensitive to culmination points where the course of battle has shifted for the better or worse, taking into account the time lag between when events were observed and when corrective action can be effected. To miss a critical shift or react too late can have a magnified adverse effect. As noted in the U.S. Army 1986 manual on operations, "commanders must understand that in battle, men and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually."

Combat is perhaps the most complex of all human endeavors. The nature of combat, with its peaks and lulls, its constantly shifting combat power, its uncertainties, and with all its participants subject to great hazard and stress, follows no repeatable pattern that allows for predictability in detail. Despite this, experienced commanders and trained forces find ways to successfully apply combat power and achieve missions. Where many throw up their hands at the complexity and chaos of combat, the ones called on to wage battles make a creditable showing. In the same vein, where some disparage as hopeless an attempt to explain the intricacies of combat, we have at least tried. If nothing else, this is a beginning.