John R. Brinkerhoff
J. Rosser Bobbitt, III
Edmund L. Dubois
Charles F. Hawkins
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
Roger Mickelson
Greg Wilcox
March 2000
Contents
This description of the military command function was drafted initially by John Brinkerhoff, a member of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI), as part of a broad program to develop a series of papers that improve the public understanding of the nature of military conflict. It was then subjected within TMCI to a peer-review process that resulted in considerable modification and the addition of several co-authors. The Board of Directors has approved this version as a TMCI publication.
TMCI is a public service, non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of the general knowledge of military conflict, war, campaigns, and military combat to reduce the likelihood and dangers of warfare. Its volunteer members pursue the goals of TMCI with no compensation other than professional and personal satisfaction. TMCI was formed in 1979 by a group of military operations research analysts and historians who had concluded that then-current models and simulations of war and combat were inadequate and did not reflect a robust understanding of military conflict in many of its complex dimensions. Since then, members have prepared and presented research papers dealing with several aspects of military conflict, war, and combat. Over the past few years, the emphasis has been on understanding and summarizing a theory of military combat, and this paper is the result of that focus.
The overall structure adopted by TMCI to organize and present its findings considers military conflict in the context of war, campaigns, and combat. These domains form a general hierarchy and are interrelated, yet separate. As with any taxonomy of human endeavors, the TMCI definition of domains into constituent parts is logical, but somewhat arbitrary, and there are exceptions and "fuzzy" boundaries in the structure. There is a question as to whether war or military conflict should be paramount in the ordering of domains or whether they are relatively equal in importance. War includes some activities other than military conflict, and military conflict exists outside of war. TMCI has chosen to include war within military conflict as a general case, recognizing the paradox above. Campaigns and military combat are similarly included within war, with again some exceptions.
The theories, philosophies, axioms, and principles developed by TMCI and its members provide systematic intellectual structures that explain fundamentals and the way things work within specified boundaries of the phenomena of military conflict, war, campaigns, and combat. They are descriptive and explanatory but are not necessarily predictive or prescriptive. These theories incorporate quantitative aspects and use some mathematical notation to portray complex quantitative relationships but are not entirely mathematical in nature. TMCI has identified seven broad, cross-cutting functions (command, personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil-military affairs, communications and information, and technology) that apply to each of the major domains in varying ways with differences in application.
TMCI invites readers to send comments to the authors of this paper at jbrinkerxx@aol.com or to the TMCI Chairman, Roger Mickelson at TMCI6@aol.com. Readers interested in advancing knowledge of military conflict and who are willing to work on TMCI products are invited to visit our web site at www.militaryconflict.org.
Dr. Don Marshall, President of TMCI, initiated this work by assigning me to present a paper on Command in Combat to be presented at the 18th General Working Meeting in December 1995. I had worked on several other areas of military conflict—primarily logistics and operations, but had never focused particularly on command. I accepted the assignment and went to work. Fortunately, at this same time Wayne Hughes, Ted DuBois, and Larry Low had just completed their work on A Concise Theory of Combat, and it was their way of approaching combat that allowed me to develop a new way of approaching the command function. The first version of this paper received supportive comments from the group that led to a revised and expanded paper at the 19th General Working Meeting in June 1996.
I am particularly indebted to Chuck Hawkins and Rosser Bobbitt for two ideas of particular importance to this paper on command. Hawkins presented a paper at the June 1996 TMCI Meeting on a Theory of Leadership, pointing out that combat leadership was an art rather than a science. At the same meeting, Bobbitt presented a paper on the problem of inducing military personnel to kill opponents. I added their key ideas to this paper. During the review process, Greg Wilcox pointed out that time and trust should be mentioned as key factors in command and leadership respectively. The treatment of leadership also benefited from papers on unit cohesion, morale, and leadership authored by Dr. Guy L. Seibold, Army Research Institute.
This is a collective effort by TMCI. Roger Mickelson, Wayne Hughes, Ted Dubois, Greg Wilcox, and Rosser Bobbitt were kind enough to review earlier drafts of this paper and provided many detailed comments, most of which were accepted. Other members of TMCI have also helped by their comments.
As the primary author, I accept responsibility for flaws and faults in this description of the military command function. This is a work in progress, and as other TMCI products appear and new knowledge is gained, this paper will be revised and improved.
John Brinkerhoff
This paper describes and explains military command within military conflict. This description of the command function is based on the organization of military conflict stated in An Overview of Military Conflict and on the definitions and relationships established in A Concise Theory of Combat.
Command is one of seven fundamental functions of military conflict identified in the Overview. The other military conflict functions are personnel, information, operations, logistics, civil-military affairs, communications, and technology. All of these functions apply across the three military conflict domains—war, military campaigns, and military combat.
Military conflict includes the use of military forces to accomplish missions other than war that involve combat or the threat of combat. The command function is exercised similarly in the three domains of military conflict, albeit with major differences in scope and emphasis.
All persons who direct or order military forces exercise military command. Most commanders are military personnel, but some are civilian officials or employees. The normal mix of civilians (some with little or no military training or experience) in high positions in government and war ministries requires them to exercise military command at the strategic level. In the U.S. Civil War, President Lincoln acted as a military commander, due both to his Constitutional role as commander-in-chief and his perception that he had better take charge to get something done. Winston Churchill was a military commander in World War II as a civilian politician, albeit one with considerable military experience. Civilian officials exercise military command often in war, seldom in campaigns, and rarely in combat.
There is no more important function of military conflict than command. The very word, however, invites misunderstanding and unnecessary elaboration, which has been plentiful. There is common and tacit agreement that command is critical to success or failure, but there is no consensus on why this is so. History abounds with examples in which effective command was the primary factor in victory and other examples in which ineffective command was the main cause of defeat, yet there has been no general explanation for these historic examples. This general description of military command establishes a comprehensive framework that can be applied to all kinds and levels of military operations to facilitate the search for an explanation.
The command function comprises a set of related processes, called vectors, that use friendly elements versus enemy elements in combat to accomplish a mission. Each of these vectors of command is itself a set of related actions initiated by a limited set of elements and designed to affect the total set comprising the commanded force (or a much larger set) of elements on both sides of the combat. These vectors are the methods that commanders use to carry out the function of command.
The command function is related to the domains of military conflict as follows:
Military Conflict is an antagonistic state between two or more parties in which military forces and weaponry of each of the parties are used or are available for and intended for use if needed.
Military Combat is purposeful, controlled violence carried out by direct means of deadly force between opponents, each attempting to carry out a mission, the achievement of which has value to that side and the achievement of which is opposed in some way by the other side.
Military Force is any body of persons that combines for the purpose of waging or threatening to wage aggressive of defensive military conflict with respect to any other body of persons.
Combat Potential is the pre-combat latent capability of a unit or force to achieve useful results in combat.
Designed Combat Potential is the latent capability of a unit or force when it is organized, staffed, trained, equipped, supported, and led in accordance with the specified unit and force designs against a design threat
Available Combat Potential is the latent capacity of a force with its existing organization, personnel, training, equipment, support, motivation, and leadership.
Combat Power is the realized capability of a force at any instant of time to achieve results in combat in furtherance of a particular mission against a specific enemy force in a specific combat environment.
The Axiom and Corollaries of Command
Command is defined In Axiom 4 of A Concise Theory of Combat as follows:
The commander on each side activates combat potential
to create combat power for the furtherance of the mission.
From this axiom, the following six corollaries are derived to establish a foundation for describing the command function:
Corollary One. Command is infused with purpose by the assignment or derivation of a mission that describes a desired final or intermediate state. There is no command without mission. Command in peacetime has a mission to prepare for war or other military activities. The quality of a mission has no bearing on its validity. A defective or misunderstood mission, or even a mission to do nothing but exist, is still a mission that provides direction for command.
Corollary Two. The Commander’s function is to convert sufficient combat potential into combat power to accomplish the mission. It is seldom possible to convert all potential to power because of friction and uncertainties, but one measure of the effectiveness of a commander is the extent to which he or she is able to translate combat potential into combat power.
Corollary Three. Command is exercised at all levels in a military organization. At each level of aggregation, the persons in charge—the commanders—are responsible to accomplish the mission. Even a primitive element—a single combatant—has the responsibility to generate his or her own combat power to accomplish a mission.
Corollary Four. Command is a complex function accomplished in a purposeful manner by vectors, sub-processes, and activities. Commanders at all levels integrate all of the vectors, sub-processes, and activities toward mission accomplishment.
Corollary Five. Command operates to align the vectors of subordinate elements or element sets to achieve a desired final or intermediate state established by the mission. The seven vectors of command include direction toward mission accomplishment as well as size and location of included elements.
Corollary Six. Control is a part of command. Effective command requires measures to control the actions of subordinate elements and assure that all of the vectors of command are at all times aligned toward mission accomplishment.
The methods and purposes of command differ as follows among the four distinct levels of command: national; strategic; operational, and tactical.
National Command specifies war aims and outcomes that constitute satisfactory bases for conflict termination. At this level, national commanders (presidents, kings. and war ministers) establish designed combat potential and, assisted by ministers and legislatures, establish also the proportion of design potential that will be funded and maintained as actual combat potential.
Strategic Command specifies campaigns to defeat, deter, or exhaust active or possible enemies in war. At this level, the available combat potential is allocated among one or more regional commanders responsible for fighting campaigns.
Operational Command conducts military campaigns and other activities that achieve strategic objectives in a theater of operations. At this level, the regional (or theater) commanders employ and sustain combat potential made available by the national commanders and strategic commanders to gain advantage and reduce the effectiveness of enemy forces.
Tactical Command conducts combat operations to achieve campaign objectives by fighting enemy forces. Commanders at this level activate their allocated combat potential and apply combat power to destroy enemy forces, control specific terrain features, or intimidate the enemy into inaction or surrender.
Command is what commanders do. The commander’s function is to transform sufficient combat potential into combat power to accomplish a mission. The dynamics of combat not only explain the way in which two forces interact in combat to achieve combat results, but also describe what a commander does and to measure how well a commander does it in the domain of combat. The following presentation is based on A Concise Theory of Combat, extended to apply dynamics to the command function.
Fundamentals of Military Combat
A military force (F) is a set of organized elements that are activated in combat. To constitute a military force the elements must be capable of delivering lethality. A term for the value of a force is its personnel strength.
A military force is designed by a military service, joint headquarters, or subordinate commander to provide a certain output of lethality, called its designed combat potential (Cd). Designed combat potential is a function of resources provided and the doctrine prescribed for the organization and use of those resources. Designed combat potential is a given input to the commander of a force, although the commander may influence the design and the amount and type of resources provided by a higher commander.
Development of combat power is a two-stage process, in which the stages overlap. The commander must first transform designed combat potential into available combat potential (Ca) and then when engaged in combat transform available combat potential into combat power (P), which is the realized capability of the force at an instant in time to deliver combat output.
Combat output is aggregate combat work, measured as changes in state of the enemy. When summed over time, combat output is the cumulative productive results achieved to date by the combat power of the force.
Based on this explanation of military combat, the purposes of military command are to:
Establish the designed combat potential for a force or a set of forces that comprise the armed forces of a political entity. This purpose applies to all three domains of military conflict but is most important for the domain of war.
Minimize the difference between designed combat potential and available combat potential. This purpose applies to all three domains of military conflict but is emphasized for the domains of war and campaigns.
Maximize the amount of combat power that is transformed during combat from available combat potential. This purpose applies only to the domain of military combat.
Combat potential is a function of the number and types of personnel, the number and types of equipment, the way the resources are organized, and the doctrine for the use of the personnel and equipment.
Designed combat potential comprises a set of physical elements (resources) and cognitive elements (doctrine) that are intended to be in a force. Physical elements are provided by a legislative process that is expressed in a military authorization and military budget. Cognitive elements are prescribed initially by service headquarters that design units, promulgate doctrine, and train the troops. With considerable outside assistance, military services establish unit authorizations for personnel by grade and skill, equipment by make and model, and allowances for consumables and munitions. They engage actively in development and procurement of weapons and equipment. They also establish doctrine for the employment of units, formation of organizations, composition of forces, training, education, and indoctrination of personnel, the operation and maintenance of weapons and equipment, and the employment of all the elements of a force. Although it does not capture the mix of weapons, one useful measure or descriptor of the designed combat potential of a force is its wartime authorized strength.
When planning and preparing to accomplish a mission, combined, joint, or service commanders establish the designed combat potential of subordinate forces by allocating resources to them. The initial amount of designed combat potential available to a political entity depends on the amount of money appropriated for military forces and the way in which that money is spent. Looking at it another way, the total designed combat potential of a political entity is determined by the composite actions of the legislature (funding and guidance), the executive (organization and allocation), the military services (organization and doctrine), and subordinate joint and service commands. At each transaction, the amount of designed combat potential diminishes due to inefficiencies inherent in breaking up larger forces into smaller forces. No subordinate commander can have more designed combat potential than his higher commander has available to allocate. The process continues down the hierarchy of military command as each commander in turn organizes forces and allocates resources to accomplish missions assigned to subordinate forces.
Available combat potential is a function of the resources actually on hand in the force during the period in which combat occurs. It is usually less than designed combat potential because the personnel actually ready for duty are often fewer in number, with different skills or less experience than called for, or in poorer condition than called for in the authorization documents. Equipment on hand may consist of older models or be in poor operating condition compared to the equipment called for in the authorization documents. Available combat potential may also be less than designed combat potential because there is imperfect understanding of the correct doctrine or a lack of collective training in the force. Finally, as combat potential is divided and allocated to smaller forces, friction degrades available combat potential further, even when it is not actually being engaged in combat. A useful measure or descriptor of the available combat potential of a force is its present for duty strength.
One measure of the effectiveness of a commander is the extent to which he or she can maintain available combat potential at or near designed combat potential. This may not be an entirely fair measure of commander’s worth, for assigning missions and allocating resources to forces is the responsibility of higher commanders. Moreover, the support systems of a military service may not intend or be capable of filling all authorizations with the designated personnel or equipment. So shortages or substitutes for resources that ought to be on hand are often not the fault of the commander. Nevertheless, it is the job of commanders at each echelon to maximize available combat potential because that is the basis for development of combat power. Each commander has to do the best with what he or she is given.
The designed combat potential of a force is not a maximum or even an optimum, but only a doctrinally based estimate of what a given set of elements is expected to provide in the way of combat power when activated. On the other hand, designed combat potential is not necessarily an average, but is more likely to be a somewhat above average expectation. Although available combat potential is almost always below design combat potential, there may be situations in which it is possible for available combat potential and/or combat power to exceed the designed combat potential. A good commander might be able to cause the available combat potential of a force to exceed the designed combat potential for short periods of time during crises.
Available combat potential is transformed into combat power (P) when the force is committed to combat. Combat power is the realized capability of a force at an instant in time to achieve results in combat. This paper will not reiterate the discussion in A Concise Theory of Combat about how combat potential is transformed into combat power or how the combat power of both sides of a battle interact to expend combat energy and achieve combat results. It is sufficient to note that these transformations are responsibilities of commanders at each echelon.
In effect, commanders are provided sets of elements to do work, and it is up to them to extract a high level of output in the form of combat energy. This is perhaps a more demanding task than minimizing the difference between designed combat potential and available combat potential.
A second, and perhaps more important, measure of the effectiveness of a commander is the amount of available combat potential that can be transformed into combat power when needed and maintained thereafter. The transformation of combat potential into combat power is the most difficult aspect of the command function to understand and accomplish.
The most demanding test of command occurs at the moment when combat potential is transformed into combat power. It is at this moment when distant premonition is transformed into instant danger. The transformation occurs, for example, when a column of troops on an approach march is taken under fire and must deploy into combat formations to participate in a meeting engagement. Or, the transformation can occur when a ship that has been steaming on a routine basis is attacked by enemy aircraft. Or, it can occur when aircraft cross from neutral or safe airspace into a defended zone and gets indications that it will be fired on. Or, it can occur when one side launches an attack. All of the steps taken previously to maintain a high level of combat potential are taken to provide a high level of combat power at these moments and, even more difficult, to sustain a high level of combat power if combat continues beyond the opening moments.
The seven vectors of the command function determine the nature of the process and its outcomes. The relative importance of the vectors of command for a military operation depends on the mission, level of command, and situation. The vectors of command are:
Time and space affect all of the seven vectors of command but are not themselves vectors. Depending on the situation, time and space may be resources that assist mission accomplishment or constraints that hinder mission accomplishment. Time and space are related by velocity. The faster physical elements (troops, platforms, supplies) move, the greater the distance that can be covered by a force in a given period of time. Military conflict in all domains is conducted in accordance with explicit or implicit time schedules, which are affected by the spatial relationships of the forces and resources and the velocity at which force elements can move.
Each commander receives a mission from a higher commander, interprets and augments that mission, and goes through the process of making an estimate of the situation, deciding on a course of action, and preparing a plan, the product of which is a set of missions for subordinate commanders. Mission is defined in Axiom 2 of A Concise Theory of Combat:
In combat each side seeks to achieve a goal, called its mission, which has perceived value.
The mission of a force is the specific task assigned it by higher authority or presumed by the commander of the force based on guidelines from higher authority. Combat is not undertaken for its own sake in isolation of other activities, but is conducted as a purposeful activity within the broader goals of entities external to combat.
There is always a mission. Without mission there is no reason for the existence of military forces. There are different kinds of missions. There are poor missions, good missions, feasible missions, confusing missions, and impossible missions—but there is never an absence of explicit or implied missions. When observers say that a military force "lacked a mission," they mean instead that the mission was one of which they disapproved or that the mission was poorly stated, doomed to failure, or simply not important. The mission is inherent in the operation. In peacetime, the mission is preparing for military operations, and in wartime, the mission is a part of the overall scheme for achieving political ends. The natures of missions differ according to the size, level, and scope of the commander issuing the orders.
At the national level, the mission is stated in global terms in a political context, in which military concerns are but one of several factors weighing on what it to be accomplished. It is at the national level that war aims or conditions for conflict or war termination are (or ought to be) considered. A mission of achieving decisive victory or limited aims is made at the national level by expressing one or more acceptable end states or outcomes. National level missions are mostly political in nature and establish the context for military operations. They are usually continuing in nature with no definite time for accomplishment.
At the strategic level, the mission establishes the desired conditions for fighting successful campaigns and denying to the enemy the opportunity to take the initiative and wage his own successful campaigns. Strategic missions are mostly military in nature and usually are stated in broad terms relative to the national missions received from the political leadership. The time allowed for strategic missions to be accomplished is usually stated in general terms.
At the operational level, the mission focuses on destroying the enemy forces or making them incapable of resistance. Ground forces do this by taking terrain features that either allow fires to be brought to bear on the enemy, dishearten the enemy forces, or cuts off the enemy forces from supplies and support. Air forces do this by gaining air superiority or air supremacy and by attacking the enemy forces, infrastructure, and industry to weaken the capability and the will to resist. Naval forces do this by gaining maritime superiority or supremacy and by reducing or eliminating the enemy’s capability to use the seas as avenues of reinforcement or supply. At the operational level, military forces conduct campaigns. They are always assigned a starting time and in many cases given a period of time in which the missions are to be accomplished.
At the tactical level, the mission is stated in specific terms. For ground maneuver elements the tactical mission is stated in terms of terrain features that are to be taken, occupied, or defended. For fire support elements, the tactical mission is stated in terms of targets that are to be fired on, destroyed, damaged, or suppressed. For naval forces, the tactical mission is stated in terms of enemy naval or land targets to be destroyed or neutralized. For air forces, the tactical mission is stated in terms of targets, such as enemy aircraft, air defenses, air bases, and industrial and economic facilities, to be destroyed, damaged, or neutralized. At the tactical level, military forces fight duels, skirmishes, engagements, and battles. These military operations are almost always assigned a definite starting time and a definite, desired time for completion.
Missions change in their nature as they proceed from the top down through the hierarchy of command. They change from the general to the specific and from the intangible to the tangible. This attribute is a natural result of the process by which disaggregation of a mission is accomplished at each succeeding level as part of the command process At the lowest level of aggregation, missions are narrowly defined, short in duration, and relatively simple. At the highest level of aggregation, missions are broadly defined, of long or indefinite (continuing) duration, and very complex. In effect, a hierarchy of missions is established as the broadest mission is conceived at the national level and repeatedly disaggregated into simpler, lower-level missions to be passed down to lower levels of command. This hierarchy of missions is the reason why there is always a matching hierarchy of organizations, which also proceeds from the top from large and complicated to small and simple.
All military missions include both military and political (non-military) components. At the tactical level, the military component is paramount, but some consideration is given to the political component. At the operational level, the military component predominates but there are substantial political considerations. At the strategic level, political and military considerations are both equally important. At the national level, political considerations are paramount, with some consideration given to the military component.
In addition to the mission, the situation has eight major elements: the conflict, the environment, enemy forces, friendly forces, resources, organization, and administration. The command function invites input about the situation but, as history indicates, can proceed without it—usually to a disagreeable end state. As with the other vectors, of command, the nature, degree of detail, and emphasis differs according to the level of command being exercised.
The nature and scope of the larger conflict (battle, campaign, war, or other form) is part of the situation. Political objectives, personalities, traditions, and the conditions set by both sides in the conflict affect the ways in which wars, campaigns, and combat are conducted. The possible use or non-use of particular weapons, such as mines, lasers, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, is an important consideration at all levels of conflict. Also, the kind of war—guerrilla, civil, all-out, limited—being waged also affects the command function.
The environment includes the physical, political, and cultural features of the area of operations. At the national level, the focus is global and regional, with political and cultural considerations dominating. At the operational level, the focus is on regional and theater considerations with infrastructure and regional support considerations dominating. At the tactical level, the physical features of the area of operations are the major consideration. The environment is sometimes said to be "neutral" because it affects both sides the same way, but this is deceptive. A good commander tries to understand the environment and to take advantage of it better than the opponent.
Information about the enemy is a primary input to the command process. Combat is a two-sided affair, and knowledge of what the enemy can do (capabilities) and what the enemy would like to do (intentions) is important. A good commander studies the enemy commander and the enemy forces to take advantage of perceived weaknesses and to blunt the effects of enemy strengths.
Information about friendly forces is also essential for the command process. Friendly forces include those of national other services or commands and those of allies. Information and understanding of allied forces requires the same kind of effort and study that is needed for enemy forces. Information on friendly forces is not automatically available, particularly if the forces are in another military service or another command. Commanders need to assure that they are informed of the condition and readiness of subordinate, adjacent, and superior friendly forces.
Intelligence is the name applied to information about the environment, enemy forces, and neutral forces that may influence the conflict. The intelligence process converts data into usable information by assessing credibility and placing the information into general context. The commander makes intelligence relevant by placing it into the context of the mission.
The commander must appreciate the situation and how the situation affects his ability to accomplish the mission. The adage that "it all depends on the situation" is trite, but nonetheless true.
All physical elements in the friendly forces and many in the environment are resources of one kind or another, and these have to be marshaled by commanders at all levels to support mission accomplishment. Actions that involve resources are management, mobilization, logistics, and personnel management. People are an important—perhaps the most important—resource for military conflict and they are addressed separately from materiel (things) in military staffs. People are treated as resources in this discussion but as human beings in the discussion of leadership below.
Management is the process of allocating resource elements in such a way as to contribute to mission accomplishment. Management responds to the imperatives of efficiency and effectiveness. Effectiveness is measured by the extent to which the resources contribute to mission accomplishment. Efficiency is measured by the ratio of achieved value to potential value for a resource element or a set of resource elements. Efficiency is directly related to effectiveness, for efficient) use of resources makes more resources available to contribute to mission accomplishment. Ceteris paribus, efficiency promotes effectiveness, although the converse is not true. Management of resources is a command responsibility at all levels of command.
Mobilization operates at the national level and involves developing, producing, and distributing war materiel (goods and services) over and above that available at the initiation of a war or included military operation. At the national level, the command function involves making the necessary plans and taking the appropriate preparatory actions to assure that potential military power residual in the economy (technological and industrial base) of the political entity can be transformed into additional available combat potential when needed.
Logistics is concerned with the use of existing materiel or that already in development, production, and stocks to generate and sustain combat potential. Mobilization is concerned with the generation of additional combat potential. Logistics operates at all levels of conflict.
Strategic logistics involves the development, procurement, storage, and distribution of materiel to support military forces both in their homelands (the zone of the interior) and in various theaters of operations. The most important activity of strategic logistics is the allocation of total resources among the various theaters of operations. At the strategic level, commanders seek to allocate available resources to campaigns commensurate with the objectives of the campaigns.
Operational logistics involves the receipt, distribution, and effective utilization of materiel introduced into a theater of operations. The two important activities of operational logistics are development of the theater infrastructure and allocation of resources to support the theater campaign plan. At the operational level, commanders seek to assure that resources available to carry out campaigns plan are commensurate with the conditions and objectives of the campaigns.
Tactical logistics is concerned with supply, field services, maintenance, intra-theater transportation, and the many functions of personnel support and administration. Tactical commanders seek to assure that resources to initiate and sustain combat and achieve acceptable results are available and used properly.
Personnel support is concerned with the management and administration of military personnel and auxiliaries, including civilian employees and contractors. At the strategic level, personnel support is concerned with the supply and quality of people available for military service and those available in the economy to support a war effort. The manpower process determines the numbers and kinds of people needed to serve in or support the military forces. The personnel process accesses the required number of people into service and tests, classifies, trains, and assigns them to authorized positions (billets) in military units. Once people are in service, the personnel system reassigns, promotes, educates, and separates them. At the operational level, the personnel system provides to theater commanders the military personnel and auxiliaries (including local workers) needed to support military campaigns. At the tactical level, the personnel system provides the service members needed to attain full wartime strengths and replace combat losses. At all levels, the personnel system keeps records on military members and auxiliaries, pays them, provides them benefits, and provides services such as morale and welfare activities, legal assistance, and religious support.
Resources need to be available when needed. Bullets that arrive too late are of no use to the defeated force. Logistics depends not only on how much and what kind of supplies and services can be made available but when they can be made available. This requires careful consideration of time and space factors, including lead times for production and delivery.
The organization vector assembles the elements of combat into meaningful aggregations. Elements are either cognitive or physical. They may exist as single entities or as aggregated entities. The commander at each level organizes the elements of the command into meaningful aggregations in order to facilitate the transformation of potential combat power into actual combat power.
The concept of element is the basis for the dynamics of combat. Actions are defined as acts performed by single (primitive) or aggregated elements intended to change the state of one or more other elements and/or to change its own state. Thus, the entire result of combat is determined by actions of elements acting alone or in concert with other elements.
Without command, the likelihood that elements in the combat area will act purposefully and individually to accomplish any mission is zero. As single, primitive elements, they will simply act randomly or not at all. A given set of elements that happened by pure chance to be in the same vicinity might indeed cause a useful change in state of themselves and other elements, but this is as likely as a bunch of monkeys on computers typing out the Encyclopedia Britannica. Purpose must be provided to these elements by the command process. The elements must be directed toward the mission, and to do this, they have to be organized into meaningful aggregations.
Aggregations are multi-level, and there are aggregations of aggregations. No matter how this is done, the result of aggregating elements will be hierarchical. If not, there will be no pattern or order and no way to cause purposeful actions. The primitive elements have to be aggregated (organized) into coherent sets in which both membership and order are important. Membership implies that an element is linked to other elements; order implies that the element is linked to the other elements in a certain way.
The manner in which elements are aggregated has great influence on the manner and extent to which they can be persuaded to yield combat power from combat potential. The concept of design potential implies some scheme of aggregation, and the pattern of aggregation in potential state sets the limits and possibilities for actual combat power.
Prior to, during, and after combat, each commander establishes a pattern of aggregation for the elements under his purview. This organization must be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances, rigid enough to provide stability for members, and robust enough to withstand changes caused by enemy elements. There is no inherent virtue to particular schemes for aggregation of elements, which are dictated primarily by the characteristics of available technology and secondarily by cultural mores. However, it is hard to change organizational schemes because of the inertia caused by being used unchanged for many years. The ability of a commander to aggregate the elements of his command is limited by doctrine, prescribed organizational rules, training, and resource availability.
There are two basic levels of aggregation: unit and force. Units are sets of physical elements and cerebral elements (e.g., doctrine) that are the fundamental building blocks of military forces. Forces are sets of units associated by a common mission. Sub-units may be detached from their parent units as part of task organization for an operation. Units and sub-units of a force are usually subordinated to intermediate commanders (headquarters) to provide control during a campaign or combat.
Units are established by documents (tables) authorizing the numbers and kinds of personnel, equipment, and supplies that may be ordered and on-hand. They are designed for roles that specify what they are intended to do—although they may do other things if required to do so by specific situations. They perform a coherent set of functions specified by their designers. Units operate together even if they are employed in a dispersed mode. They provide measured amounts of different kinds of outputs that contribute to combat potential. In modern terminology, units are ships, air squadrons, battalions, companies, and detachments.
Sub-units are designed to act within the framework of their parent units. Sub-units include individuals, teams, squads, sections, platoons, departments and flights. Many sub-units are commanded by enlisted leaders. Most of them are relatively fixed in their composition, and all tend to be focused on a single narrowly defined function and are assigned relatively uncomplicated missions.
Forces are sets of units aggregated to accomplish a single mission. Since missions exist at all levels of command, each aggregation of units is in effect a force. At the lower levels of command, a force may consist of an individual, a sub-unit or a single unit. At higher levels, a force consists of a set of units of dissimilar types. At the tactical level, a force is a set of dissimilar units designed to carry out a specific military operation. (The name "task force" embodies the concept.) At the operational level, a, the force is a set of units (often from several services) available to carry out a campaign. At the strategic level, a force is the set of units available to accomplish strategic objectives. At the national level, a force structure is the set of units available to achieve national objectives. Forces may or many not provide the right numbers and types of units to accomplish the missions for which they have been designed.
Three general types of units may be used to compose a force: combat, support, and headquarters. Combat units provide the entire combat potential of a force. Support units provide the goods and services needed by combat units to establish and sustain combat potential. Headquarters provide control over sub-sets of force units to align their vectors of toward the overall mission.
The input to a force is the aggregate of the resources demanded by all included units. The output of a force is the combat potential available for transformation into combat power.
Intermediate organizations are sets of units or sub-units in a force that are aggregated under a single commander to facilitate the control process. In a theater of operations, a force may consist of thousands of units with several hundred thousands of troops. These units are organized by the assignment of intermediate commanders and staffs (headquarters) into a hierarchical structure. Intermediate organizations are established by doctrine but may be modified by commanders during that part of the planning process called task organization.
Doctrinally based intermediate organizations are aggregations of units that stand (exist) in peacetime as the starting point for task organization for military operations. For ground forces, intermediate organizations are battalions, groups, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, field armies, and theater armies. For air forces, intermediate organizations are groups, wings, and air forces. For naval forces, intermediate organizations are groups, flotillas, squadrons, and fleets.
As a result of the planning process, standing intermediate organizations are modified to provide mission-based organizations that conform to the plan. For ground forces, standing infantry and tank battalions are formed into battalion task forces having a mix of rifle and tank companies. Brigades, divisions, and corps are task organized to conform to the plan by adding and subtracting units from standing organizations to the task organization. For air forces, squadrons and flights are reassigned to wings to provide the mix of combat, reconnaissance, airlift, and support units needed to accomplish the assigned missions. For naval forces, different types of ships and air squadrons are assigned to task groups and task forces commensurate with the missions of these forces.
Units of the same or similar types may be formed into functional intermediate organizations, or units of dissimilar but complementary types may be formed into multi-functional organizations. For ground forces, combined arms organizations include infantry, tank, reconnaissance, field artillery, air defense, engineer, signal, and other combat support and service support units. For air forces, composite wings include several different kinds of capability as well as a multi-functional support organization. For naval forces, battle groups are carefully designed to include a mix of ships with complementary combat potential. Multi-functional organizations are used for combat and combat support. Functional organizations are used primarily for support. Figure 1 summarizes the hierarchy of command.
Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Command
Force Structure: A set of units that constitutes the entirety of a military service or an armed force at the national level.
Force: A set of units allocated to perform a mission.
Intermediate Organization: A set of units in a force that is assigned or attached to a common commander to provide control.
Unit: A set of resources, informed by doctrine, that provides a coherent output, currently a ship, air squadron, battalion, company, or detachment.
Sub-unit: A set of physical elements associated to perform a specific function or small set of related functions. These may be a team, squad, section, flight, platoon or similar set.
Element: A military person, weapon, or an item of equipment or supply.
The hierarchy in Figure 1 applies to a single military service, but most military operations are conducted by forces composed of units from several services, and many military operations are conducted by forces composed of units from several difference polities. When a force is composed of elements of more than one service, it is in U.S. and NATO terminology a Joint Force. When a force is composed of elements of more than one polity, it is in U.S. and NATO terminology a Combined Force. The command elements of these forces are termed respectively, Joint Task Forces and Combined Joint Task Forces.
The two basic steps in organization are design of units and design of forces. Units are formed based on doctrine (e.g., infantry battalions), experience (e.g., air squadrons), physical constraints (e.g., ships’ complements), and convenient amounts of output (e.g., truck companies). Forces are formed based on the numbers and types of units considered necessary or available to accomplish a mission. Forces are task organized by the addition of intermediate headquarters to form organizations that are assigned missions and themselves become forces. This hierarchy of commanders and missions is a major output of the planning process.
Planning is the process of preparing a plan (scheme, schedule, methodology, or concept) or a series of plans that state how the organized forces and marshaled resources are to be used to accomplish the mission. A plan is the most explicit output of the command function.
The purpose of a plan is to provide coherence and a basis for unified effort by all subordinate organizations, units, and elements. The plan establishes the rules for control and the measures for success. Plans have to be prepared in advance to initiate operations, and the higher the level of command, the longer the lead time required to allow intermediate organizations to prepare and disseminate their own plans.
There is always a plan for a military operation. The plan may be good, bad, short, long, oral, written, or even implicit, but there is always a plan. Figure 2 shows the generic elements of a plan. .
Figure 2: Content of A Generic Plan
Mission
Situation
Facts
Assumptions
Time
Decision
Concept
Missions for Subordinate Commanders
Coordinating Instructions
The mission is the basis for the plan because it tells what is to be accomplished when the plan is implemented. The mission in the plan is based on the assigned mission but has been revised and expanded by the commander preparing the plan.
Information on the situation is of two basic kinds: facts and assumptions. Facts are data points that are true in an objective sense. Assumptions are guesses that are made to compensate for lack of certain knowledge.
Assumptions are necessary for plans because commanders are never blessed with complete information. Plans are always prospective and project forward into a future that cannot be predicted very well. Also, it is difficult to know all that has happened or is happening when the plan is being prepared. The missions and methods of opponents, allies, or sometimes other elements of our own forces are shrouded with uncertainty.
Assumptions are the key weakness of any plan. A plan that does not rely heavily on its assumptions for success is better than a plan for which the validity of assumptions is critical for success. It is possible to improve assumptions by limiting them in time because the inertia of the past tends to minimize major changes or discontinuities from previous trends over the short- term future. Long-term predictions should be avoided or heavily caveated.
Once the mission and situation have been assessed, each commander makes a decision on what and how his force is to be organized and operated. The decision process usually includes formulation of several different courses of action, which are considered and weighed. After the evaluation of alternative courses of action, the commander selects one and implements it.
The principal product of a plan is a set of missions for subordinate commanders that tell them what to do. These separate missions may fail, however, even in the aggregate, to convey what the commander has in mind.
The part of a plan that gives the big picture of how the mission is to be accomplished is the concept of operations, or in modern terminology the commander’s intent. Although the concept is usually a short section of the plan, it is the second most important part after the mission. The concept presents the commander’s own view of what is to be done by the entire organization. This overview is helpful for the subordinate planners as they prepare their own plans. It is essential as change occurs and confusion sets in during implementation, and subordinate commanders have to act in accordance with their own ideas of the higher commander’s intent.
Missions for subordinate commanders initiate the planning process at the next lower echelon in the hierarchy of command. Upon receiving a plan, subordinate commanders read the mission, revise and extend the mission, estimate the situation, select a course of action, establish a concept of the operation, prescribe coordinating instructions, and promulgate missions for subordinate commanders, which in turn trigger another round of planning at the next lower level. For higher commanders, instructions to subordinate commanders are tasks, but for lower commanders, they are assigned missions.
Coordinating instructions prescribe methods and procedures common to some or all of the elements of the organization. These may be standing operating procedures intended to be permanent, or they may be temporary measures for a particular plan or situation. Control measures to coordinate actions are included in the plan.
Plans are always prepared in the absence of complete information about the situation, and as a result they are often modified before they are implemented and while they are being implemented. This leads some to believe that it does not make sense to plan in advance but to rely instead on ad hoc responses once the situation is known better. However, a plan--even an incomplete plan--provides a better basis for making changes than no plan at all. Adjustments in light of the actual, changing situation are normal and part of the planning process, and the insights and information and insights gained during the process are more important than the plan itself. A plan serves not only as a guide to achieving the mission but as a reference point from which to make changes as the situation changes.
Plans are in essence lists of tasks to be accomplished in accordance with a time schedule. Movement, coordination of fires, provision of support, and sustainment all are governed by time. In turn, time is governed by space and the speed at which elements can move. Since spatial relationships change over time, either in accordance with the plan or for other reasons, planning has to provide for continuous reassessment and revision of the time schedules.
Thus, planning is a cyclic and iterative process affected by enemy actions and changes in the situation. Plans change as they are implemented, in part because they are being implemented. The situation changes as resources are lost, gained, or diverted. The concept or way that a mission is to be accomplished changes. Missions for subordinate elements are always in flux, and the coordinating instructions must keep pace as the plan proceeds. The mission of a force may change as the plan proceeds, either because of success or lack of success. It is the commander’s responsibility to assure that planning and re-planning occur in a timely and useful manner to keep the force focused on the current mission.
Control is the process of observing and measuring the vectors of command to determine the extent to which they diverge from the desired vectors, applying a feedback loop, and issuing the instructions necessary to cause the actual and desired vectors to converge. Control consists of scheduling, coordination, synchronization, communications, feedback, and correction. The term "command and control" is often used in the United States, but this usage implies that command and control are separate, co-equal processes, which is not the correct relationship. Control is but one of seven vectors of command that are all essential to the proper exercise of the command function. Control is the dominant vector during the execution phase of military operations.
Scheduling is the process of arranging actions along a time line to assure that they are taken at the proper times and places to contribute to mission accomplishment. Military conflict at all levels is complex. Some actions are prerequisite to others and some actions depend on others and have to occur later in the time sequence. Assuring that actions occur in the proper sequence in order to build momentum and avoid blunders is a major feature of control. Multiple functional paths have to be mapped, arranged in sequence, and checked for interference or mutual support with actions on other paths.
Coordination is the process of disseminating information vertically up and down the hierarchical chain of command and laterally back and forth among flanking and supporting units and organizations. Although in current staff parlance, coordination implies seeking agreement to demonstrate consensus, this is not its general meaning. Coordination involves communication without approval or disapproval, although coordination may cause actions to clarify differences or seek agreement or even consensus.
Synchronization is a special case of control applied to task forces or combined arms organizations in combat. It is meant to assure that each element of a force contributes to mission accomplishment at the time and place and in the way that maximizes the overall combat power of the force. Achieving optimum synchronization may involve foregoing the maximum capability of one or more of the separate elements in a force. This is a relatively new term used by the United States Army to emphasize and epitomize the complexity of modern land combat.
Communications is a means of sending and receiving information. It is essential for control and, hence, for command. Plans are useless and orders futile if subordinate, superior, and lateral commanders do not know them. The reliability and rapidity of communications determines the speed and credibility of the entire command process. Without communications, a commander is just a single warrior unable to influence the outcome of combat. The complete dependence of command on communications is one reason why the two have been so intimately (but mistakenly) associated as one process. Content is primary in command but secondary to capacity and reliability in communications. The common practice in the United States to aggregate command, communications, and intelligence (along with control and computers) into a single concept and acronym (C4I) glosses over the reality that communications and intelligence are separate military conflict functions that operate quite differently than command.
Feedback is the process of reporting back to the commander by the staff, by neighboring and supporting commanders, and by superior and subordinate commanders of the new state that has resulted from actions up to the time of the feedback. Feedback allows the commander to know what has happened and what is the current situation and outlook. This feedback is the basis for the re-planning process, which consists essentially of a new estimate, a revised concept (perhaps), and new or revised missions for subordinate commanders. Sometimes, the feedback is the basis for a revised mission.
Correction is the process of issuing to subordinate commanders revised missions, new time schedules, and updated coordinating instructions, or other guidance to direct the vectors back again toward mission accomplishment. Correction is continuous.
Leadership is the most important vector of command. Leadership in general is the process of inducing individuals or members of a group to achieve the leader’s or group’s goals. Military leadership is the process of inducing members of military units and forces (including civilian employees and contractors) to contribute effectively to mission accomplishment. Military leadership often involves inducing people to undergo long hours and physical hardship and danger, and in combat to expose themselves to a lethal environment in which they can be killed or wounded and have to kill or wound others in order to accomplish a mission. Even though all of the other command vectors are carried out well, poor leadership usually leads to mission failure. Good leadership, however, does not necessarily lead to mission accomplishment. This aspect of leadership is discussed in detail in the final section on The Art of Command.
Leadership is not well understood, and there are many different explanations of what makes a good leader. Leadership is required at all levels in the hierarchy of military organizations. Almost everyone has to lead in one way or another and at some time or another, albeit in different ways and with different purposes. Most of the emphasis in leadership studies is on combat leadership, and properly so, but leadership is also important in campaigns and wars. Leadership is a people oriented vector, with five elements: purpose; morale; esprit de corps; cohesion; and will.
Purpose is a personal understanding of what is to be done, as opposed to the institutional understanding expressed in the mission. Good leaders align their own purposes with the mission and try to have their subordinates do the same. Unity of purpose is enhanced by a clear expression of what is to be done, termed the commander’s concept or intent. Purpose is always a basic component of leadership, for it animates and directs the energies of human beings. Purposefulness may or may not contribute to mission accomplishment. Mission is institutional and impersonal—something that is passed down from a higher commander and disseminated to lower commanders. Purpose is personal—an individual quality that applies to the commander’s own aspirations and goals. When mission and purpose are aligned, the commander seeks above all to accomplish the mission, but if the commander’s purpose is not aligned fully with the mission, there can be divergence. If the commander’s purpose is promotion, wealth, or good living, those goals may not contribute to doing the job well or at all. One of the duties of the commander at each echelon is to assure that the purposes of subordinate commanders are aligned with his or her own purposes—and the mission.
Morale is the well-being of the troops as they see it. Morale is linked to but does not depend on either comfort or safety. Troops will undergo hardship, deprivation, and danger with high morale if they perceive that the conditions are warranted and that all of the troops are treated equally. Troops with high morale are eager to fight or work and will apply themselves enthusiastically. Troops with low morale shirk and disassociate themselves from the organization. Morale is affected by the way in which the troops perceive that they are treated by the commanders and by performing useful work. Commanders who take care of their troops, treat them fairly, and use them wisely raise morale. However, Commanders should assure that taking care of the troops does not become coddling that works against mission accomplishment. Morale is dependent also on a sense of self-worth at being part of a useful, commendable enterprise and doing a good job at it, even though the job is difficult, dirty, and dangerous. Troops detect make-work and hypocrisy and respond accordingly. High morale will not by itself increase the effort dedicated to mission accomplishment, but low morale is likely to reduce that effort.
Esprit de corps is an expression of the enhanced value of a particular group or unit that promotes a collective urge to excel. Esprit is a collective belief that the military member and/or his or her unit or organization are superior and can exceed what is normally thought possible. Commanders try to promote esprit because it promotes doing dangerous and difficult deeds, but it has to be merited to be believed. The advantage of esprit to the commander is that it does in many cases allow ordinary units to perform in extraordinary ways. Esprit sometimes leads to failure when the truly impossible is tried.
Cohesion is an expression of teamwork and group solidarity. Cohesion may develop in a group as a result of good leadership, or it may develop in reaction to poor leadership, in which case it usually works against mission accomplishment. Group cohesion promotes teamwork and collective effort. It is expressed in terms of loyalty to the group and to the other members of the group. Unit cohesion may be promoted by close association and the compatibility that develops when the same people serve together for extended periods may promote unit cohesion. Cohesion may develop loyalties to a unit, to a larger organization, and also to a military service.
Will is mental determination to accomplish the mission. It is an essential characteristic of commanders. In combat, will is all-important. Even if all of the other vectors are overwhelmingly in favor of mission accomplishment, failure is likely to result if will to succeed is lacking. Conversely, will has led to victory in situations where the other vectors were not auspicious. Will is a human attribute. It is a set of cognitive elements that act on both cognitive and physical elements. Along with mission, will that brings otherwise inert elements into purposeful organization and action. Good commanders have will and instill will in their subordinate commanders. It is the duty of each commander to have and demonstrate the will to accomplish the mission. Even though a commander has doubts, these must be concealed from the troops (but made known to higher commanders). Will combined with skill can be substituted to an extent for combat potential.
Commanders are required to operate differently for different situations and for the various levels of command. To accommodate these differences in style and emphasis there are three general kinds of leadership skills—intellectual, managerial, and personal. Each of these kinds of leadership skills relates closely to the seven vectors of command.
Intellectual skills are particularly important for three vectors: mission; situation; and plan. Receiving, interpreting, and expanding a mission is an intellectual activity. Accepting and synthesizing information into a coherent view of the situation is an intellectual activity. Establishing alternative courses of action, deciding on a course of action, and preparing a plan with missions for subordinate units is an intellectual activity.
Managerial skills are particularly important for three vectors: resources; organization; and control. Inventorying and allocating resources to subordinate forces is a managerial activity. Task organizing sub-elements into effective forces is a managerial activity, particularly for support elements. Assuring that the subordinate elements are carrying out their assignments or are correctly reacting to events by changing their assignments is a managerial activity.
Personal skills are particularly important for leadership. Inducing personnel to join in the team effort, to exceed normal working hours, to withstand discomfort and pain, fire their weapons with deadly intent, and enter into a lethal environment in the name of mission accomplishment is a highly personal activity.
All of the vectors of command require the effective application of intellectual, managerial, and personal leadership skills, but there are differences in emphasis. Intellectual leadership consists of knowing what to do (in accordance with doctrine) and being able to use brainpower quickly to perform the prescribed activities. Managerial leadership consists of knowing what to do (in accordance with good management principles and doctrine) and being able to guide the resource allocation, organization, and control vectors smoothly without blunders. Personal leadership consists also of knowing what to do, doing it by setting an example, and persuading others to do it.
This distinction is useful because it points up the basic difference between military leadership and commercial or governmental leadership. In commerce or government, is it both necessary and sufficient for executives to be good at intellectual and managerial leadership. While personal leadership is needed in all human activities, only military activities (and paramilitary activities such as police and fire fighting) ask humans to perform the inherently irrational act of placing themselves in danger routinely and regularly. In the military services, it is important to have a sound grasp of the military profession by exhibiting intellectual leadership, it is important also to exhibit good managerial skills, and it is absolutely necessary to exhibit good personal leadership.
Leadership is the most complicated of the seven vectors of command and, unlike the other six vectors, is more of an art than a science. The complex nature of leadership is addressed in the final section of this paper, which deals with The Art of Command.
The vectors of command explain the nature of the command function, but they fail to animate the subject. Command is a very human function, and the responsibility for initiating, performing, and sustaining the command process rests ultimately with those few people who are the commanders. The commander alone is responsible for mission accomplishment at each level of command. What, exactly, do commanders do?
This section deals with the way that commanders exercise command. The discussion is organized into the command process, the commander’s staff, degrees of command authority, levels of command, and unity of command.
The elements involved in the command process are the commander; the staff; subordinate commanders, direct support; general support; and central support.
The commander is the focal point of the command process—the individual who initiates the process, drives it to its intermediate states, and is responsible for its operations and the outcomes.
The staff is a group of people who assist the commander in performing the command function.
Subordinate commanders are the customers who receive their missions, priorities, and resources from the command process.
Direct support elements provide some of the resources needed by a commander to accomplish the mission, and over which the commander has considerable influence but little or no authority, other than appeal to a common higher commander. For these elements, the personalities of the commander and the members of his staff are an important factor in how much and how well this support is provided.
General Support Elements provide some of the resources needed by a commander to accomplish the mission, but these are provided in wholesale terms and the commander has little influence over when and how they are provided. For these elements, the knowledge of the commander and staff of the availability and limitations of this general support is the important factor is obtaining it and using it well.
Central Support elements provide some of the resources needed by a commander in a manner that allows the commander almost no influence over how they are provided. If the system for central support is a good one, these resources will be made available almost automatically without effort on the part of the commander. If not, the commander has to learn to work around a lack of central support or work through the command hierarchy to obtain the support.
Except at the lowest level of command, each commander has help in performing the duties of the commander and going through the command process. Commanding officers usually have an enlisted leader to help and often an officer deputy as well. At the lower levels in the ground forces, the platoon leader has a platoon sergeant to assist him and the company commander has an executive officer and first sergeant to assist him. These assistants to the commanders are primarily useful in disseminating orders, providing feedback on what is going on in the unit, and taking care of routine administrative and resource tasks, leaving the commander better informed and able to focus on the planning process.
At the battalion, squadron, and ship level, and above, commanders are provided staffs to help them carry out the command process. Staffs consist of officers and enlisted leaders whose primary function is to help the commander do his or her job. Staffs are organized functionally into sections or departments to perform certain of the vectors of command. Staff organization varies among land, air, and sea services and among the armed forces of different nations. Modern military forces typically have separate staff officers for personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics, although there are many variations. A deputy commander, executive officer, or chief of staff coordinates the activities of the staff sections.
As an assistant to the commander, a staff officer has no separate authority (other than that inherent in his or her rank) and is supposed to issue orders only in the name of the commander. However, staff officers are often allowed to act for the commander in routine matters or standing policies. In some circumstances, staff officers have assumed the right or been granted the authority to act as quasi-commanders. And in some armed forces, staff officers are given de-facto status as deputies entitled to give orders on their own authority.
The authority of a commander differs according to tradition, circumstances, personalities, and deliberate limitations imposed by the command process.
Command authority varies according to national and service tradition. Naval forces traditionally have granted commanders of ships a greater degree of authority and autonomy than allowed to contemporary commanders in the ground forces. This tradition is based on the previous difficulties in communicating with ships and may be changing as it becomes more and more feasible to have real time communications among ships and headquarters. Soviet style command held authority at higher levels and preached conformity to rules, while Germany style command delegated authority at lower levels and welcomed initiative. In the United States, the authority of command is limited by traditional civil-military relations and a historical distrust of military officers.
The de facto authority of a commander varies according to circumstances that prevent or limit communication among the commanders of a force or organization. Command is weakened or may be impossible if a higher commander cannot communicate with a subordinate commander or if the higher commander cannot comprehend the local situation sufficiently to issue orders with the appearance at least of rationality. Command authority also varies greatly according to the personality and style of the personnel involved in the command process. Some commanders allow great latitude to subordinate commanders; others do not.
Command authority may be constrained deliberately as part of the command process to accommodate the predilections and differing views of subordinate organizations and units. This means that different degrees of influence are established in military doctrine by different command relationships. The terms and definitions listed below are based on United States Joint Doctrine, which is a contemporary approach that indicates some of the complexity that may arise.
Command. The commander is responsible for all aspects of organization to include operations and administration.
Administrative Command. The commander is responsible for administration of the organization but has no authority to direct its operations.
Operational Control. The designated commander is responsible for operations but not for the administration of the organization.
Tactical Control. The designated commander has authority to direct the operations of the organization in a limited way.
Direct Support. The supported commander has priority for obtaining goods and services from the direct support organization and may place requests for support directly to the supporting organization that are tantamount to orders unless the supporting organization’s commander disagrees.
General Support. The supported commander has entitlement to goods and services from the general support organization in accordance with the mission and priorities assigned the general support organization by its own commander.
Central Support. The supported commander has entitlement to a share of goods and services provided to the force as a whole in the manner indicated by the central support commander. Central support is usually allocated by doctrinal policies as amended by operational level commanders.
Commanders at all levels have to understand and comply with these degrees of command authority as they exist in a given situation. Failure to comprehend and react properly to tradition, personalities, and circumstances may cause severe problems in the command process.
The style and content of effective military command varies at different levels and in different domains.
Command in War demands a high level of skill in managerial leadership, for the essence of strategy is to allocate resources correctly to competing missions. The focus of command for war is creating combat potential of the right kind and amounts to serve the political entity. This kind of command requires a lot of personal leadership to persuade the people, the legislature, the armed forces, and other interest groups of the polity to provide the resources being marshaled and allocated for military purposes. President Roosevelt displayed a high degree of personal leadership in mobilizing the United States for war with Japan and Germany before the people and Congress were ready to do this.
Command in Campaigns demands a high level of skill in intellectual leadership, for the essence of operational art is to use military forces to achieve political ends. The focus of command in campaigns is to place enough combat potential in the hands of combat commanders to accomplish the purposes for which the campaign is being waged. Maximizing available combat potential requires managerial leadership, and personal leadership is required to weld the senior commanders of the major military elements into a cohesive group that works toward the same end. General Eisenhower displayed a great deal of personal leadership by avoiding major dysfunctions among the prickly personalities of the senior generals of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in World War II. He also exerted considerable intellectual and managerial leadership by overseeing the preparation of sound plans for Operation Overlord and marshalling sufficient resources to accomplish that operation.
Command in Combat demands the highest level of skill in personal leadership. It is in this domain that people are called upon to kill others and are most likely to be killed or wounded by enemy action. The focus of command in combat is the transformation of combat potential into combat power—something not done in war or campaigns. Not only must the combat commander be skilled in managerial leadership (to conserve combat potential) and intellectual leadership (to plan and control the battle), but also be skilled in personal leadership to persuade troops to subordinate their own comfort and safety to the goal of mission accomplishment. The troops of the 101st Airborne Division were scattered after their parachute assault into Normandy, and Major General Maxwell Taylor and other officers and non-commissioned officers of the division exhibited considerable personal leadership by taking charge of small elements and assembling them into larger forces then moving out to accomplish the mission.
One prevailing theme that appears in all lists of the Principles of War is unity of command. This is the idea that a unit, organization, force, or military service works best when there is only a single commander whose ideas, methods, and will alone invigorate and impel subordinate commanders to accomplish a mission.
The virtue of unity of command derives from the observation that subordinate commanders assigned several competing missions and given conflicting instructions become confused and ineffective. It is evidently better to receive a single set of instructions to unify the effort of a force. Unity of command assures that the intended alignment is the same for all of the vectors.
Unity of command is often paid lip service or is politically or practically hard to achieve. In many cases unity of command exists only as a theoretical goal. Unity of command appears to be very difficult to achieve when forces of different nations or different services in the same nation are in the same force. The various kinds of command authority listed above are required to accommodate the unwillingness of forces of one service or nation to be commanded by an officer of another service or nation. These complicated command authorities are needed to present the appearance of unity of command while enabling that unity to be effective.
Only a few commanders have achieved the ultimate authority of sole, unquestioned, and unhampered command. The major reason for this is that the military commander seldom has both political and military authority. Alexander and Napoleon were both national rulers and military commanders, but most military commanders are subservient to a state or some other form of political authority. This leads to divergences between political and military views that have to be resolved to bring full power to bear on a mission—or even to define the mission.
A lack of unity of command also occurs commonly within the military forces where, because of personalities and differing purposes, some senior commanders compete and deny full authority to subordinate commanders. This also occurs because staff officers acting on orders, or in accordance with doctrine, or because of personal hubris or ambition issue orders at variance with the intent of the commanders. Thus, commanders are often put into a position of responding to conflicting orders, ambiguous missions, and partially understood concepts. It is the duty of the commander at each level to separate the wheat from the chaff and stick to the intent of the higher commander to whom he or she reports.
The commander also has to be able to discern in many cases the actions that will accomplish the real mission instead of the one that was received through the control system. As the intent of the senior commander is processed, the clarity of the concept is fuzzed by the addition of different views and in response to different purposes. The commander has to sort through the chaff and get to the kernel of what will accomplish the mission, even if that means literal disobedience of orders. The commander pursuing this line of action is vulnerable to charges of disobeying orders in any case, but the severity of these charges nay be mitigated by success in combat. (Failure speaks for itself.) Commanders must be ready to take this risk in order to get the mission accomplished, and they must also be willing to recognize that subordinate commanders should at times deviate from strict adherence to their own orders in the name of accomplishing the mission.
Command is both an art and a science. It is a science because it works in a deliberate and rational way to achieve a given end—the mission. It is an art because it relies on persuading people to engage willingly in irrational behavior by putting themselves in harm’s way and by killing or trying to kill other people.
The science of command rests of a solid basis of good practice and rational rules for data compilation, transformation of data into information, analysis, decision-making, resource allocation, and communications to give more or less rationale direction to the enterprise. As science, command is merely the cold, deliberate, and objective movement through an intellectual process to achieve a given end—the mission. The science of command provides a solid basis for exercising command.
The art of command consists of motivating, persuading, cajoling, pressuring, or forcing human beings to act along vectors directed at a common or prescribed outcome. This is difficult even in non-military activities, for humans bring misunderstanding, jealousy, adoration, ambition, greed, and plain contrariness to even the most mundane pastimes. For military operations, all of these human traits apply plus the necessity to induce people to accomplish a mission by killing others at personal risk in a deadly environment. In combat, normal human feelings are augmented by fear—and by heroism. The commander operates at each level to bring life and purpose to the military forces as they engage in combat.
As an art, command is expressed primarily through its leadership vector. It is in leadership that command meets the ultimate test of inspiring people to perform their duties and contribute to mission accomplishment. Lacking leadership, all of the other vectors of command are impotent. This section covers five important facets of the art of command: trust, combat leadership, group cohesion, dying, and killing. Finally, the relationship of command and leadership is examined.
Effective command is built on trust, which is an essential element of the leadership vector. Troops will obey orders because of the authority of the commander, but they will do so willingly and even enthusiastically for commanders they trust. Trust is needed to exercise command in all of the military conflict domains, but it is particularly important for combat leadership. Trust works in all directions. Troops must trust their commanders. Commanders must trust their troops. Each military member has to be able to trust his or her comrades, and each commander has to be able to trust the commanders whose elements are on the flanks or in support. Trust is an essential condition for all of leadership and for all of command.
Throughout history, trust has been absent at least as often as it has been present in military conflict. Many successes can be attributed to mutual trust, and many failures can be attributed to treachery, lying, incompetence, and other breaches of trust. Great commanders of the past gained the trust of their troops, who responded by carrying them to victory or sustaining them in defeat.
This element of trust is one of the things that sets the military culture apart from the other aspects of society. For commerce or daily living, trust is convenient, but for military conflict trust is crucial. There is no certain formula for establishing trust or for becoming a great commander, but there are certain qualities that will, ceteris paribus, make it possible for a commander to gain the trust of the troops. These qualities are not essential in every instance and their application may vary according to the personal style of a commander, but they all contribute to establishing that bond of trust that is the basis for all of the other aspects of the art of command.
In order for troops to trust a commander, that commander must fulfill certain expectations as a leader. The following is a partial list of qualities of commanders that contribute to trust.
Professional competence. Troops cannot trust a commander who does not know his or her duties. No one wants to work for a fool or a pretender who lacks the knowledge to be a good commander. This quality is obvious, for it is impossible to fool the troops.
Integrity. No one trusts a liar. Commanders must tell the complete truth despite adverse consequences that might accrue from telling it the way it is. Absolute integrity is the basis for being able to accept at face value a commander’s statement that the unit is at a particular location, that the unit’s readiness is at a particular state, or that the unit needs support or supplies. Dishonesty is a major distraction and disadvantage in all human activities, but in military conflict, it can be lethal.
Fairness. Law, rules, regulations, and customs must be applied and enforced evenhandedly and without favoritism. The commander must be perceived by the troops to be fair. If everyone in a unit is treated equally in terms of rewards and punishment, the troops will be more willing to accept strict discipline and harsh conditions than if some are treated better or worse than others. This quality allows commanders to administer discipline firmly and ask the troops to place themselves in harms way with the expectation of being obeyed.
Courage. Troops admire physical and moral courage and are more likely to trust commanders who display these qualities.
Example. Trust can be developed and sustained by commanders who set the example in terms of appearance, conduct, and integrity. Commanders who share the common hardships of the troops set a good example for the troops and other leaders. On the other hand, troops expect their commanders to act as such and accept privileges accorded their positions.
Consideration. Troops like and will trust commanders who are considerate of them and their individual fears and wants. Commanders who are selfish and neglectful of those in their charge generate distrust. This quality is expressed in the adage: Take care of the troops and they will take care of you.
Consistency. The commander has to be consistent and avoid sudden swings in mood and attitude that confuse the troops and make them uneasy.
Equitable Distance. Trust is built best by commanders who maintain an equitable distance from the troops—friendly but not intimate, concerned but not necessarily involved uninvited in personal matters.
Commanders who gain the trust of the troops may; have a high degree of confidence that the troops can be trusted to contribute to mission accomplishment. This mutual trust is particularly important in combat.
Combat leadership is the most difficult kind of leadership and requires extraordinary qualities and methods. Only combat leaders are charged with transforming combat potential into combat power to achieve a desired outcome. Non-combat leadership is charged only with maintaining combat potential. Only combat leaders induce military personnel to operate in a lethal environment in which they may be wounded or killed. Non-combat leaders may inflict discomfort and danger but not deliberate exposure to deadly fire. (This distinction becomes less important as the number of personnel exposed to enemy fires increases.) Non-combat leaders order men into combat but normally do not have to inspire them to do that. Only combat leaders inspire military personnel to fire their weapons, loose their bombs, or launch their missiles with the intent to kill or wound enemy personnel (often civilians) and to destroy enemy communications centers, factories, infrastructure networks, and structures. Non-combat leaders are involved in this activity by planning the operations and selecting the targets but assume their orders will be carried out. For the purposes of this paper, combat leaders are in combat brigades or divisions, air wings, or naval task forces and smaller organizations.
Although combat leadership is essential, it remains mysterious. It is taught in schools. It is codified in manuals. It is discussed in learned treatises. It is modeled and explained. Yet, there appears to be little understanding of combat leadership. LTG (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., has said: "we have missed the mark in developing a useful model which translates differing situational variables into a reasonably reliable prescription for leader action." Dr. Jim Tritten, a Navy analyst, acknowledges a "lack [of] serious scholarly consideration of combat leadership." Tritten points out that existing material on leadership is largely anecdotal and that there is a lack of rigorous scientific analysis of leadership that is found in other disciplines.
Combat leadership occurs in an environment of absolute violence that demands constant attention. There are distinct differences in combat leadership in the three different kinds of military forces—ground, sea, and air.
Ground Force Combat is the most primitive, for in ground combat there is the greatest likelihood of facing the enemy directly. This used to be normal prior to the introduction of stand-off weapons. Before the introduction of standoff weapons and even during the 19th Century, combat leaders were in front of the troops. When coordination of supporting fires became important in the 20th Century, combat leaders had to be behind the lines to control the operation. In modern warfare, combat leaders are arrayed in depth on the battlefield from the front line to the rear boundary of the battle area. Near the front line, non-commissioned officers, and company grade officers face direct enemy action. Farther back, senior NCOs and field grade officers deal primarily with staffs and focus on controlling movement and fire support.
At the front, leadership is direct and personal. Communications is simple but hard to do because of excitement, noise, terrain, and vegetation. Orders are issued orally. Contact between the leader and the troops is intimate and direct. The atmosphere is stressful and the threat is immediate. Fear is pervasive. The orientation is on techniques and tactics in three dimensions. Strength, courage, and self-control are required. Contact is limited to a few individuals or teams. The emphasis is on basic tasks. Responses have to be instant and instinctive.
Further back to the rear, the style of ground force leadership changes. Communications are written and relatively quiet with multiple systems. Orders are issued orally using electronic means. Some written messages appear. Contact between leader and subordinates is mostly indirect, with some occasions for direct contact. The atmosphere is stressful, but not as fearful or lethal as at the front line. The orientation is on tactics and logistics. Stamina, vision, and control of systems are required. Contact is limited to staff officers and a few subordinate commanders. The emphasis is on advanced tasks, fire support, and complex activities.
Naval Combat involves the entire crews of combatant ships and other ships that may become targets of enemy fires. On a ship there is only one shooter—the captain. All of the members of the crew share the same dangers and risks. The fate of the ship is in many cases the fate of the crew. Combat leadership on ships emphasizes calm in the midst of fear and stress. Doing the right thing depends on avoiding panic or the appearance of panic—a condition that can spread quickly once it starts. Orders are given in an understated manner than belies the real danger facing the ship. Leadership means inducing others to do their duties quickly and correctly with no regard for the threat facing the ship. Naval actions begin and end quickly and there is no time for reflection or hesitation. Responses must be determined quickly and made almost automatically in order to protect the ship and accomplish the mission. This kind of leadership requires steel nerves, dignity, and will.
Aerial Combat involves directly the pilots and crews of combat aircraft. Only the pilots and aircrews are shooters, and only they are routinely exposed to danger. It is true that the support personnel may come under attack, but in that case they will be defending themselves rather than attacking the enemy directly. Leadership starts with the individual pilots, who must inspire their crew chiefs, mechanics, and support personnel with the desire to assure that the aircraft does not fail because of mechanical problems or bad information. For aircraft with crews, the pilot is responsible to assure that the crew performs its mission. Flight leaders and squadron leaders are responsible to assure that the pilots of the aircraft under their command perform appropriately and accomplish the mission. Real combat leadership occurs at the squadron or perhaps the group level where commanders interact directly with the pilots and inspire them to perform dangerous feats.
Combat leadership is the basic expression of military leadership. Ironically, It is carried out by the youngest, least experienced leaders. Combat is a young person’s game, and requires physical strength and stamina beyond the capabilities of older people. Since it is not possible to provide young bodies to old minds, experienced combat leaders must, as commanders, staff officers, and instructors, teach their young leaders how to do it well. This is an essential aspect of the art of command.
One of the important tasks of a commander, in the role of leader, is to foster group cohesion. Cohesion cannot be demanded. It has to be developed.
Cohesion is a property of a group that is the resultant of the forces of social control that act on the members of the group to integrate it and hold the group together. These social forces include laws, regulations, rules, identities, socialization, norms, and habits. Cohesion is not the same as bonding, which is a property of a relationship at the individual level. Cohesion is an important element in hardening military personnel against stress and maintaining group discipline. There is evidence that cohesion is crucial to mission accomplishment, an important training enhancer, and a leading indicator of future group performance.
Group cohesion can be fostered in several different levels in the organizational hierarchy. Many experts stress the value of cohesion in small units—cohort, crew, platoon, or section. Intermediate size organizations, such as battalions, squadrons, and ships, may serve as a focal point for unit pride and cohesion. It is also common for large organizations to be the focus of the cohesive group. During the ascendancy of the Roman Empire, the legion was the focus of cohesion. During the great days of the British Empire, the regiment was the focus of cohesion in the British Army. During World War II, U.S. Army combat soldiers identified with their divisions to a great extent.
The development of group cohesion is inhibited by personnel turbulence, which prevents military personnel from investing in one another. Thus, long-term service together may lead to bonding that enhances group cohesion. On the other hand, it is possible also that serving together for a long period of time may foster the development of personal dislikes that disrupt the group and prevent it from becoming cohesive.
Leader turbulence is particularly damaging. New leaders generally change standing operating procedures and ways of doing things. When leaders change, the unit members are not certain of what to do until the new ways are learned. Usually, in this situation they simply do nothing until they are told what to do. This results in a loss of initiative and training momentum.
Good leadership promotes cohesion, and bad leadership precludes it. Leaders who micro-manage and find it difficult to delegate responsibility create subordinates who are unwilling to act on their own and simply wait for detailed instructions. Leaders who fail to keep the troops informed also limit the development of cohesion, for troops who lack knowledge of the situation and what is expected of them will turn into a passive herd.
Appearances are important for cohesion. Military personnel take pride in sharp appearance and unique badges and caps. However, over-emphasis on looking sharp may limit cohesion. The troops do not object to looking sharp or chanting slogans on runs, marches, or details, but they do not want to allow over emphasis on these things to detract from they perceive to the be the important parts of training and operations. On the other hand, sloppy dress and dirty or inoperative weapons, ammunition and equipment indicate a lack of unit pride and effectiveness.
In many cases, leaders assume their units are cohesive, often because they lack the tools to measure the state of cohesion. They are usually aware of detractors to cohesion but unaware of the true state of their organizations compared to the desired state. Quantitative measures of performance on training such events, such as rifle range scores, physical training test scores, and training exercise ratings, measure performance on these specific activities, but they do not necessarily measure cohesion.
Armed forces know about the virtues of cohesion and take steps to foster it. Military systems based on long-term enrollment are designed to enhance cohesion, although the benefits have sometimes been negated by harsh discipline. However, cohesion is expensive and is often disrupted by measures taken to enhance efficient administration. Sometimes this personnel turbulence is a by-product of what is thought to be fair personnel management, as is the case of the up-or-out policies used by many professional military organizations. Sometime personnel turbulence is induced deliberately to increase civilian control over the army, as was the case in Eighteenth Century Prussia.
When personnel turbulence is high, leaders have to take extraordinary measures to foster group cohesion. This was not done very well in the United States Army during World War II, when many individual replacements were sent to front-line combat units without proper preparation. They often were killed before they could be integrated into their squads and platoons. The United States Army faced the same situation in Vietnam from 1964-1973 and did a bit better in maintaining group cohesion by providing better training before deployment and taking measures to receive and indoctrinate new personnel before they were sent into combat. The North Vietnamese Army at the same time reaped benefits from small unit cohesion by eschewing career management in favor of keeping their solders together under tight discipline.
Commanders can create a climate for group cohesion to develop by stressing group history and traditions, by adopting unique uniforms and insignia, and by establishing social events, athletic events, and military ceremonies that enhance unit pride. Some of the methods that are effective for developing group cohesion are inefficient (and are obvious targets for cost-cutters), but they are important for increasing combat potential.
Military commanders routinely ask their subordinates to operate in a lethal environment in which there is a high risk of death or disability. Inducing people to participate—willingly or not—in this unnatural act is a major leadership challenge.
A unique feature of military organizations is that they ask their members to risk their lives by entering into a lethal environment in which they may be killed, wounded, or injured as a by-product of doing their jobs. No other profession asks their members to go into harms way in this manner. Para-military organizations, such as police and fire departments, also ask their members to operate in dangerous environments where there is often a threat of violence, but for these civil organizations, the violence is an occasional thing. For military personnel, violence is the norm.
Leadership involves getting people to do things they otherwise would not do of their own volition. It is easy to persuade people to enter into pleasant activities, but getting them to enter into unpleasant activities is hard. Persuading them to enter into dangerous activities is very difficult.
Not all military personnel are equally at risk during war. Many in the rear areas are relatively safe from enemy fires and, while they may work in difficult surroundings and have to give up some comforts, they are not usually in danger. While the advent of long-range weapons allows military forces to attack larger areas than before, there are still relatively safe areas that can be found for the bulk of the fighting forces.
The people who have to put themselves at risk to do their jobs are relatively few. For ground troops these are the infantry, tankers, and combat support soldiers and Marines. For aviation units they are the pilots and aircrews in combat aircraft and helicopters. For the Navy, they are the crews of the combatant ships and submarines. These are the military personnel whose lives are on the line in combat.
However, risk is also borne by military personnel and civilians who are in the combat area and may be the targets of terrorism, guerrilla actions, standoff attacks, bombing and staffing, or ground assaults. They may be "collateral damage"—the incidental victims of attacks aimed at other targets. The challenge for commanders is to induce essential personnel to do their duty despite the risk.
Authority alone will not suffice to send men and women to possible death. Except for a few that seek death actively, it is an unnatural act to place one’s self into harms way. A fundamental question of military conflict is why people do that. There are many schools of thought. Some people, it is said, expose themselves to death or injury for the good of a cause—survival, national pride, religious fervor, or an ideology. Some may do so because they fear or hate the opponent. Others may enter combat because they do not want to let their comrades down.
In all armed forces in all times, the task of inducing men (and women) to face possible death has been a major concern of military policy. In some instances, such as the long-service British Army of the Napoleonic Era, officers led the formations in battle while the non-commissioned officers were behind the formations keeping the privates from fleeing. In the Greek phalanx, the troops were caught up in a massed formation from which it was difficult to escape. In World War II, soldiers of all sides were inspired to place themselves at risk for the benefit of patriotism, hatred of the foe (often induced by high level commanders), and some sense of the adverse consequences of defeat. In some modern forces, soldiers are taught that it is glorious to die for the cause. In other modern forces, emphasis is placed on not letting one’s comrades down.
This is a very important aspect of the art of command, and one for which there have been a variety of solutions through the ages. Whatever the method, persuading others to put themselves in harms way; is a major leadership challenge, but it is not the most difficult challenge. To paraphrase General George S. Patton:
The object is not to die for your country,
but to get the other fellow to die for his.
Another duty of commanders, as leaders, is to get their people to do bad things to other people. Fundamentally, military combat requires some of the participants to kill, wound, maim, or injure other people intentionally. This is the ultimate challenge of military leaders.
The purpose of military combat is to dominate by killing or threatening to kill enemy troops. However, it is not easy to persuade military members to kill their fellow humans. Most men and women are reluctant to do so, but with proper conditioning and leadership, this innate resistance can be overcome, and most military personnel can and will kill. Military leaders must make their military personnel good at the techniques of killing, overcome their reluctance to kill, and deal with the psychological consequences of the killing.
The propensity of a military person to kill depends on three factors: the demands of authority, diffusion of responsibility, and distance from the victim. It is the commander’s responsibility to compel and facilitate the killing process. The commander has the further responsibility for the rationalization and acceptance process that occurs after the killing is over.
Killing is done is response to an order that directs and authorizes the act. There are four factors that constitute authority: proximity, respect, demand, and legitimacy.
Group Absolution is also important. One of the primary factors that motivate military personnel to enter combat to die or kill is a powerful sense of accountability to his or her comrades in the primary group. It is group bonding that replaces the instinct for self-preservation on the battlefield, and it is group absolution that allows people to kill without guilt. The influence that the primary group has on killing occurs through an interaction of accountability and anonymity. Accountability to the members of one’s group diffuses responsibility among the group and increases the anonymity of the individual. In effect, killing becomes a group act. It is the commander’s responsibility to generate, or permit the development of, bonding and its absolution effect. There are five factors that constitute group absolution: identification, proximity, intensity, number, and legitimacy of the group.
Distance from the Victim is a powerful influence on propensity to kill. The general rule is that the greater the distance, the easier it is to kill. There are three kinds of distance: physical, emotional, and mechanical.
After the killing, the commander has the further responsibility to facilitate the acceptance and rationalization process. There are five factors that can help killer soldiers to rationalize their killing and accept it. These factors are as follows: victory, mature comrades, codes of conduct, safe areas, and recognition.
Killing is unpleasant, but it is the essence of military combat. It is better, as strategists have advised repeatedly, to win wars without fighting battles. But when battles have been fought, the goal is to destroy the enemy forces by killing them or capturing them. There has been from time to time and is now considerable sentiment to win wars with few casualties and limited killing. But the way of war has seldom allowed this to be done. War has been a bloody affair and is likely to continue to be a bloody affair. When military conflict is stripped down to its elemental nature, it comes down to dying and killing. In many respects it is easier to induce military personnel to die than to kill. The ultimate expression of the art of command is to induce military personnel to kill to accomplish the mission.
The relationship between command and leadership and command has been a subject of some considerable discussion and even controversy. This paper maintains that leadership is one of the seven vectors of the command function. Some authorities assert that leadership is the primary function, of which command is a subordinate, included activity. Others say that leadership and command are twins—independent but equally important functions operating simultaneously and doing many of the same things.
Assuming that command and leadership and command are independent functions, it is possible to examine the historical record for evidence to support or negate that assumption. The first step is to describe good and bad cases for each of the two functions. These are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Descriptions of Good and Bad Command and Leadership
|
Command |
Leadership |
|
|
Good |
Mission is feasible, situation is known, resources are adequate, the correct course of action is adopted, plans are good, and the execution is also good. |
Troops understand the purpose of the exercise, have high morale and good esprit, are formed into cohesive groups, and are highly motivated to accomplish the mission. |
|
Bad |
Mission is impossible, situation is not understood, resources are inadequate and are allocated improperly, the plan is defective, and sub-elements are out of control. |
Troops do not understand the purpose of the operation and are poorly informed as to what is going on, morale is low, they have no unit esprit or cohesion, and they do not want to fight. |
There are four possible combinations of these conditions as follows: good command and good leadership; good command and bad leadership; bad command and bad leadership, and bad command and good leadership. Examination of the correlations between commanders and leaders for these four combinations may provide some insights on the validity of the hypothesis that the two are independent.
Good command and good leadership occur when a good plan is well executed. There are numerous examples in military history in which good commanders were also good leaders.
The fact that good command and good leadership both occur often in the same force and in the same combat operation suggests that they are not independent.
Good command and bad leadership occur when a bad plan is well executed. It is not clear that this combination is possible. An extensive review of military history does not reveal an example of a battle, campaign, or war in which this combination occurred. If this combination does not exist, the assumption that command and leadership are independent is wrong.
Bad command and bad leadership occur when a bad plan is poorly executed. This unfortunate combination of bad command and bad leadership occurs often in military history. Many commanders have not only failed to inspire the troops but failed to give them a chance to win.
The prevalence of bad command combined with bad leadership suggests that the two activities are not independent.
Bad command and good leadership occur when a bad plan is well executed. The issue is whether good leadership can overcome a difficult mission, an erroneous estimate of the situation, inadequate resources, inferior organization, a poor plan, ineffective control, or all of the above.
"Among the groups of scared, tired riflemen huddled along the beach were a few intrepid leaders—officers, noncoms, and privates on whose individual backs the big responsibility at the moment lay. They began by example and exhortation to prod the men to get up, leave such poor shelters that they had found, and walk or crawl across the beach flat and up the hills where the enemy was dug in with rifles, mortars, and machine guns."
Because of the exemplary leadership of these soldiers, the troops moved ahead under heavy fire and succeeded in establishing a beachhead and accomplishing their mission.
In the D-Day example, small unit leaders knew what had to be done to accomplish the mission, and they inspired others to follow them. In the Gettysburg example, good leadership appears to have exacerbated an already bad situation. It is possible that, in some cases at least, the combination of good leadership with bad command is a prescription for disaster.
These examples in which good leadership overcomes poor performance in the other vectors of command can be interpreted to mean either that the two are independent, or that leadership is properly a part of the overall command function.
The evidence considered thus far indicates that the assumption that command and leadership are independent is wrong. More than that, the evidence suggests strongly that good command requires good leadership while bad leadership goes hand in hand with bad command. It is unlikely that good commanders will be poor leaders. The evidence is that good commanders tend also to be good leaders. It is possible sometimes for good leadership to overcome bad command in order to salvage victory from the jaws of defeat, but in these cases, one can argue that good leadership is part of good command and indeed has the duty to help overcome shortcomings in the other vectors of command. It is tempting to conclude that leadership and command are so inextricably entwined that the quality of one is bound to be the quality of the other.
If command and leadership are dependent, as this brief analysis suggests, which is the superior process? Is leadership to be part of command, as this paper asserts, or is command to be part of leadership, as some others claim?
The Overview of Military Conflict and A Concise Theory of Military Combat suggest that command is the superior function and that the approach taken in this paper serves best to increase understanding of command as a military conflict function.
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Command is perhaps the paramount function of military conflict. It is required for each of the other six functions and is essential for the conduct of wars, campaigns, and combat. More importantly for the study of military conflict and war, command is unique to military conflict. The civil counterpart of command is management and, although management is important and difficult, it lacks two essential features of command—dying and killing. The difference is immense.
As this description of the command function indicates, command is a complicated matter but can be systematized and explained in an orderly manner. Although there have been variations in style, the command function has been exercised similarly since war began. Greek leaders in the Peloponnesian War, Roman Generals in Gaul, medieval kings, Chinese emperors, renaissance dukes, and modern military and naval commanders have used the same basic vectors and elements of command described herein. The pace has quickened, but the processes remain the same. That should not be surprising, for despite the introduction over the centuries of new kinds of machines and devices, military conflict—war, campaigns, and combat—remains a most human affair.