The articulation of a “philosophy” of air power is rendered difficult by several phenomena:
â While war on land and sea has been practiced for millennia, war in the air (as opposed to simple observation by balloons) is less than a century old.
â The “theoreticians” of air power have tended to be practitioners whose writings have addressed tactics, materiel, and operational doctrine more than addressing warfare in a different medium.
â In most countries with considerable air assets, a significant amount of intellectual and bureaucratic effort has been spent in justifying the existence of a separate air arm, or the division of assets among other services.
Carl Builder, in his controversial The Icarus Syndrome, attributes much of this comparative lack of air power theory to the unique circumstances of its birth. The early air warriors tended to be technically oriented young men whose quest was for “higher, faster, and farther” rather than reflection on war theory. Similarly in The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine, Barry Watts makes a case that the second generation of air power leaders viewed operational air warfare as an engineering exercise – amassing the correct amount of assets over a critical area in order to disrupt enemy military or economic activity.
Additionally, the utility, management and control of air power are in the eyes of those who contend for them. The head of U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, noted that every general and admiral told him what he should do with his airplanes, while he never told them what to do with their divisions and ships. Each country has approached air power with a unique mindset, which has been reflected in the organization of its air arm.
Nevertheless, certain enduring concepts have evolved over the brief period of our experience with war in the air. Those with particular relevance to the overarching philosophy of air power as war conducted through a different medium will be highlighted below. Perforce, the essay will emphasize historical experience from the perspective of powers with significant air arms.
Ii.
DEFINITIONS
In its broadest sense, Air Power includes anything that is guided through the air. Aside from the familiar heavier-than-air fixed-wing airplane, air vehicles must be inclusive of lighter-than-air, rotary-wing, unmanned, and missile assets. National air power consists of not only military and support aerial vehicles, but commercial aviation as well. Air power should not be mistakenly equated with “Air Force”.
The Airman’s Perspective is at the heart of the control of air power. Luftwaffe Chief of Staff General Karl Koller commented that most soldiers think only as far as the radius of action of their branch of service, and only as quickly as they are capable of moving with their own weapons. The airman, on the other hand, sees a less restricted scope of action. Air power is capable of affecting operations on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war simultaneously.
Centralized Control – Decentralized Execution is the concept of placing all air assets under the control of a single commander, preferably an airman, while allowing local air commanders the freedom to execute (e.g., “kill boxes”) in accordance with doctrine and commander’s intent (e.g., the Air Tasking Order). Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery articulated this idea very succinctly when he said, “Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset – its flexibility.”
Air Superiority is the ability to use airspace to carry out operations while denying the enemy the ability to do the same. It is the great enabling objective of air power, but is not an end in itself. Although other arms (air defense artillery, special operations forces, etc.) can contribute to air superiority, it is primarily an air power responsibility.
The application of air power against surface targets is its greatest contribution to national military power. Close Air Support involves the use of air assets to assist ground units in direct contact with the enemy and presupposes coordination between the two arms. Interdiction is the destruction or neutralization of enemy combat resources (units or sustainment) before they can affect or come into contact with friendly forces. Strategic Attack is not platform or range dependent, but is any attack which engages a “strategic” target, i.e., one with effects on a strategic center of gravity. In addition, air power can be used to strike maritime surface and subsurface targets.
Center of Gravity, in the context of air warfare, is a source of enemy strength or power, which may be engaged directly or through a Critical Vulnerability upon which it is dependent. Centers of gravity may exist at each of the levels of warfare (strategic, operational, tactical). In a similar manner, enemy “systems” may be disrupted by the engagement of Critical Nodes or the interruption of Links between critical nodes. (Critical nodes are physical, while links are simply relationships.)
The success of air power is measured not in terms of attrition, targets serviced, or ordnance delivered, but through Effects-Based Operations. That is to say that higher level commanders should articulate the effects they desire, and these will be addressed in the best way that air power can make a contribution.
A host of other functions can be performed by air power, most of which require no detailed definition. These include: intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance; troop and supply transport; parachute drop operations; special operations; search & rescue; weather monitoring; and aerial refueling. Rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles may perform many of the same operations.
III. BACKGROUND
Although static balloons had been used for observation as early as the Napoleonic era, and the first use of an airplane for ground attack was in 1911, it was the First World War which brought air power to prominence. Beginning with a simple reconnaissance role, air arms grew in size and sophistication so that by 1918 most of the air power missions in use today were taking place, albeit at a crude level. Most technical and tactical developments during the war were reactive to the operational environment, but some notable organizational innovations were advanced. In September 1918, Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell was given control of 1,481 British, French and American aircraft to support the US First Army’s Saint-Mihiel offensive. This was the first demonstration of true concentration of air power, and the forerunner of the modern use of a Combined Force Air Component Commander. At a higher level, in answer to the need to efficiently defend British airspace from German bombers, the Royal Air Force was established in April of 1918, combining former navy and army air assets into a single independent service.
Tentative steps had been taken late in the First World War to establish an Inter-Allied Bombing Force to strike German industry, but actual strategic bombing theory was not put forward until the 1920s. Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell espoused markedly different ideas on the proper targets and organization of forces, but they shared a common thread in that they advocated the use of air power to bypass surface forces and strike directly at enemy strategic centers of gravity. This became the raison d’ętre of the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Force, while the German Luftwaffe and the Japanese army and naval air arms concentrated on tactical/operational support of surface forces, as did US Naval Aviation and US Marine Corps Aviation. Strategic bombing theory was made more attractive by technology – which tended to heavily influence thinking – as inter-war bombers generally outperformed fighters, and radar was an unknown entity.
World War II appeared to bear out General George Kenney’s assertion that, “Air power is like poker. A second-best hand is like none at all – it will cost you dough and win you nothing.” But the war experience was rough on the promises of the visionaries. The Luftwaffe contributed greatly to the German revolution in military affairs known as the Blitzkrieg, but it failed miserably in an air campaign for which it was not designed – The Battle of Britain. The German air arm was not versatile enough to conduct operations which were not tied to ground forces, and it suffered at the hands of radar and British centralized command innovations.
The Russians, faced with the Blitzkrieg, developed their own tactical air forces to the point that they were able to match and surpass the Germans. The Japanese, while flirting with terror bombing of Asian cities, maintained their tactical focus, and demonstrated the vulnerability of surface fleets to air power at Pearl Harbor in 1941. US Naval Aviation, eventually deployed in massive carrier task forces, dominated the Central Pacific. In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur’s was the first major campaign to feature the use of naval and ground forces in support of air forces – i.e., being primarily involved in seizing islands to advance the range of ground-based aviation.
In the west, US tactical air forces, penny-packeted out to ground units in North Africa, proved ineffective until reorganized under a central command structure which took advantage of flexibility. This was partly responsible for the July 1943 edition of FM 100-20, which stated that, “Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other.” Along these lines, the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive took the war to Axis heartland, prompting the remark by German Armaments Minister Albert Speer that the Western Allies had already opened a “second front” by 1943. This referred to the substantial diversion of German resources needed to deal with the strategic bombing campaign.
Nevertheless, serious US bomber losses (due to lack of escorts), the siphoning off of bombers to other missions, and the changing of target priorities, prevented the full effect of the bombing effort from being felt until late in the war. With the directive of the 8th Air Force commander, Lt. Gen. “Jimmy” Doolittle, to primarily use escort fighters to engage Luftwaffe fighters, the USAAF dominated the skies over Western Europe. This paved the way for the Normandy invasion and, when Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower landed, he pointedly observed that, “If I didn’t have air superiority I wouldn’t be here.” The war in Europe ended with the Allied and Soviet ground offensives of 1945 and the simultaneous collapse of the German war economy from heavy bombing.
In the Pacific Theater, US firebombing destroyed not only Japanese industry but a great amount of urban housing as well. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki highlighted the end of the war against Japan and, in the final analysis; Douhet was vindicated – in theory if not in the details. Nuclear deterrence dominated post-war great power thinking, leading to an initial lack of US conventional capability during the Cold War.
Soviet war theory featured strategic missile attack and the idea that a nuclear war could be winnable under favorable conditions. US missile, bomber (and later nuclear ballistic missile submarine) forces received the priority of military funding, which was quite proper. Aerial / missile weapons were the only possible deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack, and it was prudent to prepare for the most dangerous threat. In the event, the Cold War eventually ended with Soviet economic / political defeat but no nuclear exchange – a tribute to air power deterrence. Ironically though, the first Western “victory” of the Cold War had been the bloodless 1948 Berlin Airlift – demonstrating the power of air transport assets, which would become a feature of subsequent US humanitarian efforts and force deployments.
During the Korean and Southeast Asian wars, US “strategic” aviation was, for the most part, a non-player because of the nuclear mission, so “tactical” forces dominated air employment. “Limited war” restraints, largely self-imposed, led to a period of sub-optimal use of air power. In retrospect, there was no US air campaign in Vietnam, simply a political campaign with aircraft thrown in.
The Cold War era also saw the improvement of airborne anti-ship and anti-submarine aviation (which had been instrumental in winning the WWII Battle of the Atlantic against German U-boats), as well as the incorporation of rotary-wing aircraft in ground units for rapid troop and supply movement, and close attack of ground targets. The development of cruise missile technology, not necessarily welcomed by the pilot community, added another option for deep strike of well-defended targets.
The post-Vietnam explosion of technical improvements in military aviation led to a period where the claims of early air power theorists have nearly come to fruition. Air power has always been ruled by technology, and the present era has witnessed the ascendancy of the air arm as the weapon of choice for advanced nations in intervention scenarios. Current radar-evading stealth capabilities, combined with cheap precision-guided munitions, allow the use of parallel strategic attack to induce paralysis in the enemy military machine. Other innovations have included the centralization of most air power assets under a single theater commander to insure concentration, unity of effort and deconfliction.
Additionally, tactical air and attack helicopters have acquired a degree of lethality unparalleled on the battlefield. In the US these items were complementary under the doctrine of AirLand Battle, originally conceived to engage Soviet ground forces throughout the depth of the battle space.
During the Cold War, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had depended on support from tactical aircraft and helicopters. The Soviets had counted on air superiority against ill-armed guerrillas, but this was denied to them by the introduction of Stinger man-pack surface-to-air missiles from the United States. Thus, an enemy that has no “air force” of its own can thwart the use of air power.
The post-9/11 US campaign in Afghanistan has highlighted yet another military technological revolution – again not particularly welcomed among pilots. This was the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles in the combat role, when a Predator UAV successfully engaged an enemy target with a Hellfire missile. This may have been the most significant air combat innovation since Gen. Billy Mitchell’s bombers sank the former German battleship Ostfriesland in 1921. UAVs, at present, have mission times in excess of 20 hours, have low visibility, do not risk a man in the cockpit, and can be purchased in great numbers compared to the cost of conventional fighter aircraft. Not only does this bode well for the air power tenet of persistence, but also it is another step toward the recognition that air warfare is not about specific platforms, but about warfare in the medium of the air.
IV.
CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER
Air warfare continues to evolve with technological changes, even though many of its enduring features were articulated early in the 20th century. Section III could only scratch the surface of this complex topic in historical context. A distillation of the philosophical underpinnings of air power, as it is understood today, can be gleaned by reference to Phillip Meilinger’s “Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power” and the US Air Force’s “AFDD-1”, among other sources. The most important of these concepts are set out below:
â Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. –Meilinger This, of course, may also be stated in the reverse, i.e., without control of the air, control of the (ground or sea) surface becomes extremely difficult due to susceptibility to air operations.
â Concentration of purpose is the key to effective use of air power. –AFDD-1 That is to say, for example – when used in support of ground forces – given a choice, air power is less effective when employed in small amounts, and more effective when used in the role of a reserve brigade for decisive action.
â Precision air weapons have redefined the concept of mass. –Meilinger The original scope of “mass” presupposed the massing of combat forces to achieve effects. With precision weapons, air power can mass “combat power” at a critical point without the necessity of massing units.
â The Versatility of air power allows it to be employed on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war effectively and simultaneously. –AFDD-1 Instead of the old paradigm of fighting tactical battles to obtain operational campaign victories which finally produce a strategic result, air power can affect the enemy at all three levels from the outset of hostilities.
â Air power is an inherently strategic force. –Meilinger The ability to strike globally and go right to the enemy’s vitals is a unique feature of air power and part of the airman’s perspective.
â Balance is crucial to the most effective use of air power. –AFDD-1 The correct balance between offensive and defensive roles, and employment on the various levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) must be maintained in order to achieve maximum contribution to the overall effort.
â Air power is primarily an offensive weapon. –Meilinger Although the overall situation may be defensive, air power takes the fight to the enemy and, indeed, may sometimes be the only force that can do so.
â Synergistic Effects stem from the precise, coordinated application of air, space and surface forces and bring disproportionate pressure to bear on the enemy. –AFDD-1
â Air power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension – time. –Meilinger The difference in speed and tempo between air and surface forces is great, allowing mass and surprise on an unparalleled scale.
â The Flexibility of air power allows it to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously to a greater extent than surface forces. –AFDD-1 Air power can rapidly and decisively shift from one theater objective to another.
â Freedom of Maneuver is inherent in warfare in the medium of the air. Surface obstacles and threats are largely capable of being outmaneuvered by air weapons.
â Air power’s unique characteristics necessitate that airmen centrally control it. –Meilinger In other words, centralized control & decentralized execution along with the airman’s perspective.
â The Range of air power is now virtually unlimited. Rapid global mobility by air assets in combat or support roles makes the threat from the air real anywhere on earth.
â Lethality from the air has always been great: in the days of large-scale raids; in the guise of nuclear weapons; and more recently in the form of precision munitions.
â Persistence represents the ability of air power to employ speed and range to revisit a wide range of targets nearly at will, without the necessity of occupying terrain. –AFDD-1
â Prioritization of use is necessary in the employment of air power as, most often, there will be a higher demand than assets can support. –AFDD-1 Priorities must be established at the highest levels in a theater.
The list above is not all-inclusive, nor, it can be argued, are all of its items exclusively the province of air power. Nevertheless, most practitioners and “theorists” of air warfare would subscribe to them as the philosophical bedrock of air power thought. Naturally not all nations possessing air power possess the full range of air power capabilities and, indeed, many of the capabilities of air power which were theorized early in the 20th century have only been realized over the past two decades.
V.
CONCLUSION
Produced at the end of World War II, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey commented that at the end of the First World War air power had been in its infancy, and by the end of the Second it had “reached a stage of full adolescence”. We have not yet seen the maturity of air power.
Although many of the concepts of air power which were put forth by the early visionaries have now attained concrete form, responsible advocates of the air arm continue to acknowledge that only in the context of an overall war effort can air power achieve its full potential. Air power has become an indispensable complement to ground and naval forces. Air superiority is very nearly a prerequisite for successful surface operations, and the ability to move men and materiel by air is a necessity for timely global intervention.
In addition, the unique attributes of air power have, over the last century, allowed warfare to finally “slip the surly bonds of earth” and project military might at speeds and distances that could not have been dreamed of through the length of recorded history. Barriers of terrain, weather, and supply are no longer insurmountable.
Even though the capabilities of air power can contribute to a military decision when properly employed, these same capabilities appear less than convincing to adversaries if misused. The very same qualities of speed, range, and lethality - which allow intervention without the deployment of large surface forces - can tempt statesmen to use them in lieu of rational policy. The use of air power to “send signals” – increasingly popular in the last half century – is easily interpreted as unwillingness to risk the commitment of national resources in a contest of wills.
Air power has always been wedded to technological advancements. Even though this will remain a basic truth, the conduct of war in the medium of the air continues to be subject to the principles of war and its own tenets of air power. The future development of air power depends on the ability of aviation leaders to synthesize technology and war theory, as seen through the unique perspective of the airman.
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Charles Tustin Kamps